BTI Institute
Borders • Trade • Immigration
A Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence

COMMUNITY ACTION PLAN
Unified Regional Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

As of October 1, 2018

The Borders, Trade, and Immigration Institute
A Department Of Homeland Security Center Of Excellence

www.uh.edu/bti

Please provide comments and recommended changes to:

Kevin M. Clement
Executive Director, Strategic Partnerships
College of Technology
University of Houston
713.743.1676
KClement@uh.edu

We acknowledge the research and contributions of the following individuals:

Cadet William Boardman, U.S. Coast Guard Academy
Cadet Emiliano Gonzalez, U.S. Military Academy
Cadet Kyla Hughley, U.S. Coast Guard Academy
Cadet Matthew Nagle, U.S. Coast Guard Academy

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

Executive Summary

The Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack is an amalgam of doctrinal tenets and recommended actions taken from Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice resources, applicable FEMA courses, and publications and teachings of professional organizations of first responders (law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services, and communications).

The Action Plan also incorporates After Action Review recommendations, "lessons learned," and acknowledged best practices taken from After Action Reviews of prior Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks, terrorist attacks, and Active Shooter Incidents. It addresses suggested terrorist tactics found in extremist literature and online publications.

The result is a listing of recommended tasks or considerations for communities throughout the United States to increase the preparedness of communities to respond to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack.

Community leaders are encouraged to jointly review the recommendations and to determine applicability to their jurisdictions. It is intended that elected officials, county sheriffs, police chiefs, fire chiefs, public works directors, communications directors and emergency medical service chiefs and leaders from hospitals, medical facilities, and local representatives from Volunteer Organizations Active in our Nation's Defense (VOADs), meet and work together with State and Federal agency representatives to conduct a critical assessment of the applicability of these recommended actions to their current preparedness.

Through this review/discussion, these community leaders can eliminate those actions that have already been accomplished or that do not apply to their jurisdiction. They may amend recommendations to more appropriately serve their region. The resulting document should be a Community Action Plan, tailored to their jurisdiction, based on comprehensive research of doctrinal tenets, threat tactics, after action review recommendations, and acknowledged best practices.

Readers will note that assignment of responsibilities, target date for completion and status for each task are left to the communities to assign, based on their jurisdiction's priorities and financial wherewithal.

The section on Training identifies Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and other professional courses that can further assist communities in preparing for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack.

As threat strategies and tactics will undoubtedly evolve over time, an "*As of*" date is printed on the coversheet of this document, to allow for further addition or amendment of recommendations and best practices.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

Table of Contents

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

I. POLICY

Task 1.1. **Establish an All-Hazards Standing Committee for the Region**.
Discussion. Focus this All-Hazards Standing Committee on integration of responder assets, organizations and disciplines to include Active Shooter/Hostile Events. Such a committee should include representation from local, state, and federal law enforcement; jurisdictional and county EMS; local fire and rescue; local and state emergency management; local public works; and local 911, public safety answering point (PSAP), dispatch, and communication.
References.
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS,   The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 9, para 4)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 1.2. Create Opportunities for Joint Policy and Planning
Discussion. Pursue opportunities for integrated policy discussions and joint planning among stakeholders, which will lead to accepted regional and jurisdictional policies, plans and procedures among law enforcement/fire/EMS/dispatch/public works.
References.
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement, Fire and EMS*, The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 9, para 1)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 1.3. Enact and Enforce Regional and Agency-Specific Policies to Prohibit Self-Dispatch of Assets
Discussion. Self-dispatch (over convergence) remains a significant issue affecting scene control, stabilization, security, and logistics. Self-dispatch violates the tenets of the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System. It increases the threat of "blue on blue" engagements. Responder agencies in law enforcement, fire services, EMS and public works should enact and enforce policies to prohibit self-dispatch.
References.
- *Boston Marathon AAR,* p. 118
- *Broome County, NY Shooting AAR,* Area 2

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 1.4. **Enact a Statute to Limit Liability for Citizens Submitting Suspicious Activity Reports.**

Discussion. Draft and enact a statute that limits the liability for citizens who report indicators of potentially violent behavior.

References.

- *Community-Based Approaches to Prevention: A report on the 2014 National Summit on Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence,* U.S. Department of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Services, ISBN: 978-1-932582-97-0, (2015), (page 21, Recommendation 8)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 1.5. **Enact a Statute for Pertinent Professions to Report Indicators of Potentially Violent Behavior.**

Discussion. Enact a statute establishing affirmative requirements for pertinent professions to report bona fide indicators of potentially violent behavior.

References.

- *Community-Based Approaches to Prevention: A report on the 2014 National Summit on Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence,* U.S. Department of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Services, ISBN: 978-1-932582-97-0, (2015), (page 21, Recommendation 5)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 1.6. **Authorize Dispatchers to Proactively Assist Incident Commanders in Response Actions.**

Discussion. Dispatchers are a valuable resource to responding agencies. They are ideally positioned to collect and disseminate key information, enhance situational awareness and establish a common operating picture. Dispatchers should be authorized to proactively assist Incident Commanders in response actions and be provided written parameters to:

1. Prompt Incident Commanders for key actions
2. Alert and notify agencies and key personnel of incidents
3. Call in off-duty personnel
4. Notify hospitals
5. Call wreckers in rotation to clear routes of access and egress

References.

- Presentation: "*Active Attack Training for Dispatchers and Keeping the Lost Alive.*" Wayne Freeman, South Carolina Law Enforcement, 2018 ALERRT Conference.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 1.7. Integrate Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) Between Response Agencies
Discussion. Establish unified Standard Operating Guidance/Procedures for public safety response to high threat incidents including active shooter, fire as a weapon, and IED/explosives. SOPs should be coordinated with other responding services to ensure that there are no conflicts and that there is a clear understanding of how each service will respond. Avoid "stove piping" of information.
References.
* FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions*, (Slide: Benchmarks – High Threat, bullets 1 and 2)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 1.8. Policy – Sharing Information Under HIPAA
Discussion. Establish and disseminate a policy on information sharing to inform health care practitioners, hospitals, and other medical facilities to alleviate perceived barriers to sharing information under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Privacy Act.
Reference.
* *Strategic Approaches to Information Sharing*, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, (2013) (page 13, Recommendation 4)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 1.9. Create a Mental Health Support Policy for Responders.
Discussion. Create an agency-supported Mental Health Support Policy that addresses a structural support framework established prior to incidents; recommended actions that may be taken during the incident to mitigate the psychological impact on responders; actions immediately following the emergency; and long-term support for both responder and family. Identify resources available to the responder both in community and through professional organizations.
References.
* DHS *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks* Washington D.C., July 2018*,* (page 16, Preparedness, Mitigation and Recovery, bullet 4)
* *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 118)
* *Orlando AAR*, (page 28)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 1.10: Policy - Common Keys for Police Cruisers
Discussion. Establish procedure s for leaving keys in vehicles or having master keys to move vehicles after initial response. A common problem is responding patrol cars parked on avenues for access and egress. Patrol cars are left blocking roadways and preventing access by ambulances and other resources. To address this, police departments/sheriff's offices should consider using a common car key for police units to enable other officers to move vehicles as required.
References.
*   *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement, Fire and EMS*, The InterAgency Board, September 2015. (page 14, para 32, 3rd bullet)
Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 1.11. Revise the Job Descriptions of Fire and EMS personnel
Discussion. Job descriptions of all Fire and EMS personnel should include requirements that all personnel be able to integrate and operate safely and effectively with other responding disciplines and agencies when responding to any incident, including acts of violence.
References.
*   *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement, Fire and EMS*, The InterAgency Board, September 2015. (page 9, para 3)
Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 1.12. Determine Minimum Safety Standards for Rescue Task Force.
Discussion. Determine optimal team sizes and ratio of law enforcement to fire/EMS personnel with minimum safety standards for team composition. The size and exact composition of the RTF should remain the discretion of the Incident Commander.
References.
*   *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement, Fire and EMS*, The InterAgency Board, September 2015. (page 16, 5)
Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

II. PLANNING

Task 2.1. Review the Jurisdiction's Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) and any Existing Supporting Plans.
Discussion. A jurisdiction's base EOP or supporting plans will address many of the responsibilities and actions taken during a CCTA, as they are required regardless of the specific threat (CCTA) or hazard.
References.
- DHS *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks* Washington D.C., July 2018*,* (page 12, Goal 4)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.2. Identify Potential Consequences and Impacts of a CCTA on the Community/Region
Discussion. Conduct a Risk Assessment of a CCTA using existing Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) analysis. Review/use capability assessments and after action reviews to inform/assist planning efforts.
References.
- Federal Emergency Management Agency, *CPG 201: Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment Guide, Third Edition* (Washington, DC),
- DHS *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks* Washington D.C., July 2018*,* (page 11)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.3. Conduct a Joint CBRNE Threat Assessment
Discussion: The purpose of the joint threat assessment is to determine the likelihood of an intentional incident and identify response actions that should be performed by law enforcement and public health. It is recommended that the joint threat assessment be conducted by a conference call and, at a minimum, include the following representatives: Law enforcement (trained in WMD response), Public health (epidemiologist, clinician, laboratorian), Communications (law enforcement and public health). The agenda of the conference call may include: incident briefing by public health, explanation of concern by public health, update on confirmed or suspected cases, demographic information: gender, age, race, ethnicity, occupation, religious affiliation, membership in any groups or associations, description of where patient lives (e.g., urban, rural), patient's recent travel history (e.g., domestic or international), recent activities that may be related to exposure and illness, current laboratory test results, hypotheses regarding source of exposure, syndromic surveillance: any unusual patterns of disease presentation or geographical clustering of disease. Law enforcement information / intelligence: information on existing threats in the jurisdiction (WMD or otherwise), WMD intelligence that may be

5

connected to patient's exposure (e.g., religious affiliation, group, association), intelligence regarding acquisition or intended use of any biological threat agent, which may be related to the patient's symptoms.
References:

- *Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook, FBI/CDC,* (page 54)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: Task 2.4. Identify Goals and Objectives of a CCTA Response Plan
Discussion. Determine goals and objectives of CCTA response. These goals and objectives will contribute to the development of potential courses of action in plan development.
References.

- DHS *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks* Washington D.C., July 2018*,* (page 11)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.5. Identify Operational Priorities in Response to a CCTA
Discussion. Develop and reach agreement on operational priorities during response to a CCTA.
References.

- DHS *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks* Washington D.C., July 2018*,* (page 11)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.6. Pre-Identify and Map Regional Staging Areas and Rally Points.
Discussion. In coordination with region's law enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public works agencies, designate and label staging areas and rally points throughout the region. Provide this information to Dispatch. This allows Dispatch to easily activate during incidents and help limit negative aspects of self-dispatch/over-convergence and direct responding resources/assets from outside the region to suitable staging areas.
References.

- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS,   The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 13, para 1, bullet 10 and page 14, para 2, bullet 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.7. Conduct Agency Inventories of Assets by Resource Type.
Discussion. Establishing an interoperable resource inventory and maintaining the currency and accuracy of resource information is key in effective resource management. First Responder agencies in the region should conduct an inventory of assets by resource type and enter it into IRIS for ready reference in the event of an Active Shooter or Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack. Update this information as changes are made. Conduct an annual review to ensure accuracy of the information provided in the Incident Resource Inventory System (IRIS).

IRIS is a distributed software tool, provided at no-cost by FEMA. It is standards-based and allows for the seamless exchange of information with other instances of IRIS and with other standards-based resource inventory and resource management systems. IRIS allows users to identify & inventory their resources, consistently with National Incident Management System (NIMS) resource typing definitions, for mutual aid operations based on mission needs and each resource's capabilities, availability, and response time. IRIS automatically uses the national NIMS resource typing definitions cataloged in the Resource Typing Library Tool (RTLT). IRIS stores data locally on the user's computer or on the user's network if configured during installation.
References.
* https://preptoolkit.fema.gov/web/nims-tools/home

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.8. Develop/Update List of High Priority Targets in the Jurisdiction.
Discussion. In accordance with the jurisdiction's Threat and Hazard Identification Threat Assessment (THIRA), identify high priority, at-risk targets. Establish plans and assign responsibilities to provide security in heightened threat environment.
References.
* DHS *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks* Washington D.C., July 2018*, (page 12, Goal 4)
* *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Workbook*, (page 2-34)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.9. Develop/Update List of Soft Targets in the Jurisdiction.
Discussion. In accordance with the jurisdiction's THIRA, identify those soft targets in the jurisdiction at which there would be a high concentration of people with little to no security forces present (e.g., malls, churches, schools, sports venues, theaters, etc.)

7

References.
- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Workbook*, (page 2-10)
- DHS *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks* Washington D.C., July 2018*, (page 12, Goal 4, Objective 4.1 and 4.2)
Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.10. **List Names/Contact Information of Key Community Leaders.**
Discussion. During an incident, senior staff, local, state and Federal elected officials should be quickly notified. This can be done by Incident Command, Dispatch or the JIC and should be noted in the response plans. Community leaders and elected officials may be targeted in incidents of terrorist attacks. Should credible threat information be received, the jurisdiction should maintain a contact list to inform/advise community leaders both to assist in response should the need arise and to increase their security awareness.
References.
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions*, (Slide: Plans, bullet 3, "Unified Command Structure)
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions*, (Slide Benchmarks – Public Info, bullet 3)
- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Workbook*, (page 2-20)
Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.11. **Determine Special Operations/Tactical Teams Response Times.**
Discussion. The timeliness of the tactical response and the type and number of teams called in to support incident response is a critical aspect of planned response.
References.
- *Unified Regional Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack*, [Pre-Decisional Draft] (pages 8-13)
Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.12. **Identify Infrastructure Critical to the Jurisdiction.**
Discussion. Identify the critical infrastructure in the region that impacts the jurisdiction. This is not simply the Federally-mandated Tier I and Tier II critical infrastructure, rather a listing of those local assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital [to the region/jurisdiction] that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economy, public health or safety. Consider as well that infrastructure located outside of the jurisdiction the loss of which may result in cascading effects impacting the local community.

References.
- DHS *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks* Washington D.C., July 2018*,* (page 12, Goal 4, Objective 4.1 and 4.2)
- *Texas Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency Plan*, Texas Department of Public Safety, 2014, (pages 59-63 and Annex C)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.13. Develop a Regional Contact List/Data Base of Critical Infrastructure Stakeholders.
Discussion. Identify those personnel with purview over the operation and security of critical infrastructure impacting the jurisdiction. The Regional CIKR list should include more than Tier I and Tier II critical infrastructure, addressing that critical infrastructure significant to the region and local communities. Recommend this list be provided to local law enforcement agencies, regional fusion centers, and DHS Protective Security Advisors in addition to inclusion in the Texas Infrastructure Protection (TX-IP) Community of Interest.
References.
- *Texas Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Plan*, Texas Department of Public Safety, 2014. (page 80)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.14. Identify Trigger(s) to Activate the Area Command in the Event of a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack.
Discussion. The jurisdiction's CCA Response Plan should specify what conditions merit activation of the Area Command and who will make that decision.
References.
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions*, (Slide: Benchmarks – Command, bullet 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.15. Identify the Trigger to Activate the Emergency Operations Center in the Event of a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack.
Discussion. The jurisdiction's CCA Response Plan should specify what conditions merit activation of the Area Command and who will make that decision
References.
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions*, (Slide: Questions to Consider, bullet 2)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

9

Task 2.16. Public Health Officials Should Have Immediate Triggers For Information Exchange With LE Officials.

Discussion: Public health and law enforcement are encouraged to notify and involve each other early in a potential investigation of a biological threat, even if it turns out to be a non-criminal event. During a biological threat, certain information or a specific event should trigger the exchange of information between law enforcement and public health. These include: any specimens or samples submitted to public health for analysis that test positive for a potential biological threat-related agent, large numbers of patients with similar symptoms or disease, large numbers of unexplained symptoms, diseases, or deaths, disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution (e.g., tularemia in a non-endemic area), unusual disease presentation (e.g., inhalational vs. cutaneous anthrax), endemic disease with unexplained increase in incidence (e.g., tularemia, plague), death or illness in humans preceded or accompanied by death or illness in animals that is unexplained or attributed to a zoonotic biological agent, unusual "typical patient" distribution (i.e., several adults with an unexplained rash).

References:

- *Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook, FBI/CDC, p. 48.*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.17. LE Officials Should Have Immediate Triggers For Information Exchange With Public Health Officials.

Discussion: The following law enforcement observations should result in the automatic notification of public health officials: any intelligence or indication that any individual or group is unlawfully in possession of any biological agent, seizure of bio-processing equipment from any individual, group, or organization, seizure of potential dissemination devices from any individual, group, or organization, identification or seizure of literature pertaining to the development or dissemination of biological agents, any assessments that indicate a credible biological threat exists in an area, a HAZMAT response that involves the presence of biological agents.

References:

- *Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook, FBI/CDC,* (page 52)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.18. **Identify Private Sector Services, Personnel and Resources.**

Discussion. The jurisdiction/region's response plans identify services, personnel and resources available from the private sector, community, and non-profit organizations with 24 hour contact information. This information is made available to both Dispatch and Emergency Operations Centers**.**

References.
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions*, (Slide Benchmarks – Resources, bullets 3 and 4)
- *Unified Regional Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack*, (page E-2, bullet 5)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.19. Identify the Threshold to Transition to Recovery Operations. Attack.
Discussion. The plan outlines how command is demobilized and its functions transitioned to recovery and investigation.
References.
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions*, (Slide: Questions to Consider, bullet 6)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.20. Create Response Packages for Pre-Defined Incident Types.
Discussion. Determine suitable response packages for incidents
References.
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS, The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 13, para 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.21. Develop and Exercise Continuity of Operations Plans.
Discussion. Develop a Continuity of Operations Plan for each agency in the event any section or department, including its leadership, becomes disabled, to ensure a continuity of essential functions.
References.
- International Fire Chiefs Association. *TERRORISM RESPONSE: A Checklist and Guide for Fire Chiefs and Community Preparedness Leaders*, 4th Edition (page 23)
- https://www.iafc.org/docs/default-source/lg-scale-response/terrorismchecklist_4thedition.pdf?sfvrsn=498ca70d_0

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 2.22. **Incorporate NFPA 3000 (PS)**
Discussion. Incorporate NFPA 3000 (PS): The New National Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response Program in plans, procedures, and training.

11

References.
- NFPA 3000 (PS): The National Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response Program

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 1.23. **Security Clearances.**

Discussion. Increase the number of law enforcement officers, special agents and intelligence analysts with security clearances. Determine a standard for clearances for officers in all first responder agencies. Clearances are needed for members that meet the FBI/DHS guidelines. Maintain a list of members who have clearances and the issuing agency.

References.
- *Orlando AAR*, (page 27)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status**

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

III. INCIDENT COMMAND

Task 3.1. Establish Unified Command.
Discussion. Establish Incident Command as soon as the initial fires responder arrives on scene. Focus on providing a coordinated response that ensures law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services and public works operate together. Stage co-responding agency representatives within arms' reach to facilitate communications and clear direction.
References.

- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS, The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 13, bullets 1 and 2)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 3.2. Develop and Implement ASHE-Specific Unified Incident Command Boards.
Discussion. Incident command boards are a portable incident scene management tool to help incident commanders organize and manage information and resources to support decision making.
References.

- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS, The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 15, para 6)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 3.3. Train Law Enforcement Officers in Incident Command System
Discussion. An observable trend among Law Enforcement agencies is the lack of trained senior leaders in the Incident Command System – specifically a lack of training in ICS 300 and ICS 400. Recommend that this training be included as a prerequisite for promotion to lieutenant (ICS 300) and captain (ICS 400).
References.

- *National Incident Management System* (NIMS)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 3.4. Train Law Enforcement Officers in ICS Position-Specific courses.
Discussion. Train senior Law Enforcement officers to assume position-specific positions as Incident Commander, Operations Section Chief, and Intelligence Section Chief. Afford additional personnel position-specific training for Staging Manager and Tactical Group Supervisor, Perimeter Group Leader, et al. Ensure that this information is known to Dispatch.

References.
- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Guide,* Version 1.1 revision 2 (Pages 2-15).
- SETRPC CCTA Tactical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (May 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 3.5. Develop Capacity to Establish an Agency-Internal Law Enforcement-Dominant Incident Command Structure.

Discussion. Local agencies cannot depend solely upon Regional Incident Management Teams to assume ICS responsibilities for all significant terrorist incidents. Law enforcement agencies will be called upon to fill key positions in Incident Command structure during terrorist attacks.

References.
- SETRPC CCTA Tactical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (May 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 3.6. Train First Responders to Serve in the ICS Intelligence Section.

Discussion. Recruit law enforcement investigators, fire marshals, intelligence analysts, and other selected officials to receive position-specific training to fill key positions in the Incident Command's Intelligence Section during a terrorist attack. Detectives and investigators should be well-versed in ICS, especially their position-specific IMT roles. Ensure that these individuals are provided with a Secret-level security clearance

References.
- *Orlando AAR,* (page 27)
- *Washington Navy Yard,* (page 79)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.26. Establish a Law Enforcement Medical Coordinator (LEMC) within the Incident Command Structure.

Note: This recommendation is restated in the Medical Response Section.

Discussion. Establish a Law Enforcement Medical Coordinator (LEMC) within the Incident Command structure to coordinate and de-conflict EMS resources with law enforcement response to a large incident(s). Creating an LEMC position ensures proper allocation of both human and medical assets. The LEMC would oversee resource need and distribution among operational teams. The LEMC ensures proper allotment of resources regardless of the duration of operations. The use of the LEMC allows the SWAT medic to focus solely on providing emergency aid within the hot zone, knowing that the coordination is being managed by a professional who understands the scene, its evolution, and their needs. Ideally this position would be filled by an active or former tactical medical provider – preferably a physician with knowledge of both the tactical and EMS

14

functions. The LEMC provides the commander with critical information that may be overlooked by the traditional medical branch of the ICS. The LEMC will possess the ability to conduct an in-depth medical threat assessment using operational data gathered by law enforcement**.** The LEMC provides a conduit to both EMS and fire assets as well as providing operational input to the incident commander.

References.

- Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, D., Patterson, S., Baldridge, T., Eby, M., Lichtman, O. (2018). *A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident.* Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 19(2), 290. doi:10.5811/westjem.2017.10.31374

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

IV. PUBLIC INFORMATION

Planning

Task 4.1. Establish a Media Strategy for Active Shooter/Terrorist Attacks
Discussion. Incident Commanders and PIOs should plan for a media strategy focused on the following three objectives:
1. Ensure Public Safety
2. Generate leads to identification/location of the attackers
3. Establish Unified Messaging – a unified Public Information Team

References.
- SA Michelle Lee, FBI Presentation on Austin, Texas Bombings, 2018 ALERRT Conference, Grapevine, Texas (November 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.2. Establish a Media Relations Plan
Discussion: In advance of any incident, consider how best to control media access to and distance from the event, crime scene, first responders and other public safety personnel, victims, and family members. Direct the press to a designated area, a significant distance away from the event that does not interfere with first-responder or incident command operations. A Press Information Officer (PIO) should be assigned to establish contact with the media and provide timely information as appropriate, at a distance from the event or operations. Provide the media with the communications platforms (toll free numbers, incident website, and/or social media) used to deliver public updates (incidents status, road closures) for the public to report suspicious activity or event related or other relevant information.

References:
- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center
- SETRPC CCTA Public Information Officers Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (March 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.3. Create a Regional Listing of Public Information Officers
Discussion. Create a regional listing of public (federal, state, tribal, territorial and local) and private agency PIOs that may be called upon to assist during major incidents. Information may include name, agency, jurisdiction, email, telephone numbers, work and home addresses, and level of training.

References.
- SETRPC CCTA Public Information Officers Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, March 27-28, 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.4. Provide Ready Access to Foreign Language Translators.
Discussion. Establish on-call access to foreign language translators to assist Public Information Officers and law enforcement investigators in the event of an emergency**.**
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Public Information Officers Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, March 27-28, 2018.
- *Orlando AAR*, (page 26)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.5. List Serves for Community Leaders.
Discussion. Develop a series of contact lists/list serves for elected officials, community leaders, and state officials to facilitate information sharing during and in an incident's aftermath.
References.
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions,* (slide 24)
- SETRPC CCTA Public Information Officers Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, March 27-28, 2018

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.6. List Serve for Local Media Representatives.
Discussion. Develop a contact list/list serve for regional media representatives for radio and television to facilitate information sharing during and in an incident's aftermath.
References.
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions,* (slide 24)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.7. Establish "Go Kits" for Public Information Officers
Discussion. In addition to the typical contents recommended at www.ready.gov, the following are recommended contents for a Public Information Officer "Go Bag":
- Smart Phone with charger
  - Includes Contact Information for PIOs in region
- Laptop Computer with charging apparatus
- Digital Camera
- Wi-Fi Hotspot
- Thumb Drive(s)
- Combination printer/scanner/facsimile (fax)

- ▪ Pencils/Pens/Markers
- ▪ Paper

References:
- • SETRPC CCTA Public Information Officers Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, (March 27-28, 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.8. Plan/Equip to Establish a Public Information Command Post
Discussion. Plan to establish a Public Information Command Post remote from the crime scene in a major incident. Reporters want access to a "talking head" and the ability to video something for the electronic media. Establishing a press command post that provides regular briefings and the ability to photograph police activities from a distance usually satisfies that need. PIOs should not set up within the incident command post as this may interfere with command and control operations.
References.
- • *Aurora AAR,* (page 98)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.9. Construct Synchronization Matrix for Public Information Officers.
Discussion. Provide PIOs with a synchronization matrix listing key tasks in accordance with their Incident Command responsibilities to be accomplished aligned with phases of response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack. This matrix is graphic representation of planned actions aligned to time and/or events. It facilitates the integration of planning and resources and manages the alignment of available capabilities to each task. The synchronization matrix: provides a quick aid to decision making; shortens reaction times; acts as a blueprint for response to a variety of contingencies; provides continuity to staff and decision makers in the absence of key personnel; and lessens the impact of stress and sleep deprivation by providing a previously determined series of actions.
References.
- • *SETRPC Public Information Officers Workshop*, Beaumont, Texas, March 27-28, 2018.

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Media Relations

Task 4.10. Advance Collaboration with Local Media Representatives.
Discussion. During the planning process, meet with local media representatives to discuss the challenges of providing information during a CCTA, discuss

19

lessons learned, and solicit their input to planning, procedures/protocols to be used in such incidents and their aftermath.

References.
- SETRPC Public Information Officers Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, (March 27-28, 2018)
- *Aurora AAR, (*page 99)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.11. Operational Security – Media Broadcasts.
Discussion. Prevent media access/broadcasts of response actions and tactics. There have been instances in the past where terrorists, monitoring television broadcasts, have used that information to their advantage, resulting in the loss of lives of both civilians and responders.

References.
- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Guide,* Version 1.1 revision 2 (Pages 2-15).
- *Video on Mumbai Attacks, PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks Course.*

Responsibility: **Assisted by**:
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.12 Priority **to Local Media.**
Discussion. Local media should be allowed to do interviews first, before the national media is accommodated. The information is more important to get out locally, and the local media has more of a vested interest – thus, they will be covering the story for a long time after the national media representatives leave.

References.
- *Aurora AAR, (*page 99)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.13. PIOs and Agencies Incorporate "Don't Name Them."
Discussion. Don't make murderers famous. As a tenet of public communications, avoid the use of the terrorist/criminal's name(s) and background in public announcements and presentations. Focus instead on providing information on the survivors and victims and heroes involved.

References.
- www.DontNameThem.org

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Messaging

Task 4.14. Provide Public Messaging for the Whole Community.
Discussion. Plan and train to ensure timely and accurate public messages are provided to the whole community including those with accessibility needs (i.e., deaf/hard of hearing, blind/low vision, English as a second language, etc.).
References.
- *FEMA, Planning for a CCA: Guide to Local Jurisdictions,*(page 25)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.15. Citywide Traffic Updates.
Discussion. PIOs should remain mindful of the impact the incident may have on citywide traffic. Street and road closures are inevitable; however ensure an individual is tasked with monitoring citywide traffic and providing the public and media with regular updates as to the street and road closures resulting from the emergency response.
References.
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR,* (page 77)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.16. Create "Fill in the Blank" Emergency Message Templates.
Discussion.   Frame emergency messages likely to be used in incidents with "fill in the blanks" for situational details. Do so for use in media releases, social media platforms (Twitter, Facebook, NextDoor, and others). Translate these messages into common languages used in that region. PIOs would already have these templates available. They would assist in focusing PIOs on what information was key to its content. This can be a plus in times where PIOs are in situations of extreme stress and/or sleep deprivation. Such emergency messages should include:
- Evacuation Instructions
- Shelter-In-Place Instructions
- Avoid these areas
- Instructions to Responding Units
- Call for Blood Donations
- Information on Donations
- Guidance for Volunteers
- Missing Persons Hotline
- Family Assistance Center
- Transition of Family Assistance Center to Long Term Care

Template messages may be kept on a thumb drive or in paper copy in a PIO's notebook or may be kept on the jurisdiction's web site in a "blind" segment (example: beaumonttexas.gov/PIO/) known only to the PIO.

References:
- *SETRPC CCTA Public Information Officers Workshop,* Beaumont, Texas (March 27-28, 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.17. Establish an Incident Web Page for use during incidents.

Discussion. This web page would be set up in advance to allow ready activation during incidents.

- Construct the web page so that it may be used by persons with sensory disabilities
- Activation of the Incident Web Page would also cause the creation of an associated banner across the jurisdiction's home web page. This banner would be color coded: Yellow – Advisory; Red – Warning and provide a direct link to the Incident Web Page
- The Incident Web Page would be linked to other jurisdictions as needed to facilitate a "single message" approach to official information regarding the incident
- Consider including the following on the Incident Web Page:
  - Provide factual synopsis/updates of the incident with information approved by the Incident Command
  - Provide "call in" telephone number for the public allowing them provide information/intelligence to the Incident Command
  - Post Emergency Messages with date/time groups
  - Embed the jurisdiction's official Twitter enabling readers to see past and current Tweets
  - Post the time, date, and location for the next Press Conference
  - Provide information on parameters/rules to attendance at Press Conference (i.e., maximum of two credentialed media representatives (reporter and cameraman) per network with priority given to local media stations)
  - Post the questions and answers being posed by media for easy, ready reference
  - Provide a telephone number or email address to accept media questions
  - Post photos of the incident taken by jurisdiction's photographers/PIOs for media use

References.
- SETRPC CCTA Public Information Officers Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (March 27-28, 2018)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.18. Ensure that all CBRNE Information and Monitoring Results Information are Widely Communicated to the Public.
Discussion. During and in the aftermath of a Mass Casualty Incident, ensure that all CBRNE monitoring results – both negative and positive, are rapidly reported to all public safety, public health, and healthcare partners as soon as possible.
References.

- *Boston Marathon AAR*, (page 98)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.19. Public Messages to Request Only Financial Donations.
Discussion. Jurisdictions should consider releasing public messages following a disaster stating that only financial donations will be accepted for disaster relief efforts. This can help response officials avoid the difficulties of managing and distributing unsolicited goods and services donated by the public as all too often these officials are beset with logistical problems associated with managing spontaneously arriving unsolicited goods and services.
References.

- Lesson Learned. *Donations Management: Employing Public Messages to Request Only Financial Donations After a Disaster*, www.LLIS.gov
- Department of Homeland Security, FEMA Region I/II. *Region I/II Hurricane Preparedness After-Action Report*. 21 Jun 2006 (page 38) https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=20727

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.20. Coordinate use of Department of Transportation Digital Signs.
Discussion. Coordinate and incorporate the use of electronic signs through the state Department of Transportation and local Departments of Public Works to help divert and re-route traffic around the incident scene and to assist in emergency messaging in crisis situations. Coordination should be made in advance to outline the procedures necessary to ensure a rapid response from Department of Transportation assets. This coordination may also involve the creation of short template messages that will work within the limited space provided on portable, stationary message signs.
References.

- SETRPC CCTA Operational Communications Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (September 12-13, 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.21. Public Sector Electronic Signs to Aid in Emergency Messaging.
Discussion. Through coordination with local businesses and the Chamber of Commerce, Emergency Managers can solicit the use of public and private sector

23

electronic signs to provide public notice of key information. Emergency Managers, through interaction with business owners and Non-Governmental Organizations in the area, can construct a list serve to send out messages which private sector can then post to their advertising signs for an agreed upon period of time.

References.

- *Department of Public Works Emergency Communications Procedures*, City of Hayden, Idaho, 2017-2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Use of Social Media

Task 4.22. Plan for use of Social Media to Pass Information to the Public.
Discussion. The following are recommendations for use of social media platforms made by Public Information Officers at the:

- Establish use of social media before any incident. Use in day-to-day operations to get the word out.
- Ensure accuracy of messages
- If multiple agency involvement, decide if a joint account is needed for Facebook, Twitter, etc.
- Determine release authority and approval process
- Obtain pre-delegated release authority
- Establish texting group ("Group Me") to provide information and stay in contact with area PIOs
- Identify back up plans for social media release should power go out or communications go down
- Identify partners for streamlined release workarounds
- "Know your audience" to identify best social media platforms to use
- Balance transparency with the need to know
- Avoid publishing operational tactics – focus on what the public needs to know (safety focus)
- Use Facebook and respond to all posts: designate someone to monitor inappropriate comments
- Use social media to distribute media advisory information for press conferences and avoid overflow of phone calls
- Use social media to get out information on road closures and restrictions
- If victims of incidents reply on social media, pass their location(s) and information to the appropriate ICS operations element

References:

- *SETRPC CCTA Public Information Officers Workshop,* Beaumont, Texas (March 27-28, 2018)

Responsibility:　　　　　　　　**Assisted by:**
Target Date:　　　　　　　　　**Status:**

Task 4.23. Social Media Monitoring.
Discussion. Assign/Establish agency/position responsibilities to monitor media and social media outlets in order to quickly correct mistaken or inaccurate information. There may also be investigative benefits, such as identifying potential witnesses (Navy Yard workers were posting information on their Twitter accounts.) Use of social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Periscope, Flickr, and NextDorr.com, and others has become critical for releasing timely and accurate information both to the public and to the traditional media. By being active on social media leading up to critical incidents, law enforcement agencies can better inform the public.
References.
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR,* (page 81)
- *San Bernardino AAR,* (page 117)

Responsibility:　　　　　　　　**Assisted by:**
Target Date:　　　　　　　　　**Status:**

Joint Information System/Joint Information Center

Task 4.24. Plan for Joint Information Center (JIC) to Ensure Coordinated Public Messaging.
Discussion. Plan and practice establishment of a Joint Information Center to manage large incidents to ensure that all public messages, including those distributed through social media are coordinated and validated. Identify what position is tasked with leading the JIC and what agencies contribute to its staffing. A JIC would have primary responsibilities of coordinating messages across and between agencies and jurisdictions – for both traditional media and social media platforms. The JIC would also serve to provide periodic briefings between press conferences to satisfy the media's needs for most updated information.
References.
- *Boston Marathon AAR*, (page 107 and 121)
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 99)
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 117)
- *Orlando AAR*, (page 25)

Responsibility.　　　　　　　　**Assisted by:**
Target Date:　　　　　　　　　**Status:**

Task 4.25. Hospital/JIC Integration.
Discussion. Establish formal protocols for ensuring the appropriate representatives from the area hospitals are integrated into the JIC.

25

References.
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR*, p. 81

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.26. Create a Texting Group for Regional Public Information Officers.
Discussion. In order to immediately establish communications and coordination among the area's Public Information Officers, and use it in day-to-day operations – don't wait until a major incident occurs. Use the Texting Group to stay on track, maintain awareness, and establish unified message. During an incident, the PIO Texting Group allows communication with one another at various incident sites, media staging areas, Joint Information Center, and other locations. Restrict this to PIOs and do not allow access by media.

References.
- *SETRPC CCTA Public Information Officers Workshop*, Beaumont, Texas (March 27-28, 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Training and Exercises

Task 4.27. Train Public Information Officers – Both Primary and Alternate.
Discussion. FEMA provides free training for Public Information Officers. Agencies cannot always be sure that their assigned PIO will be present, on-scene for a no-notice incident. Agencies are advised to build depth in their organization by training alternate PIOs to fill in or assist in the event of an emergency/disaster. Current FEMA courses include:

- **G290 – Basic Public Information Officer.** This two-day course will consider the value of communication before, during and after an incident. It will help PIOs identify critical audiences, both internal and external. This course covers basic skills and techniques for use during small, localized, single-agency responses; preparedness campaigns; and escalating localized responses.

- **G291/E-L0387 – Joint Information System/Joint Information Center Planning for Tribal, State and Local PIOs. T**his one-day course will outline the communications needed for different incidents and define the roles of the PIO within ICS. The E/L 0387 is the course version we often offer on-campus just prior to the 0388 course for students who don't have access to the training in their states.

- **E/L0388 Advanced Public Information Officer.** The advanced level course teaches participants additional skills for use during escalating incidents, including strategic communications and incident action planning as it relates to Joint Information Center (JIC) operations.

26

References.
- SETRPC CCTA Public Information Officers Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, (March 27-28, 2018)
- https://training.fema.gov/programs/pio/index.aspx

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status**

Task 4.28. IMT Training for Region's Public Information Officers.
Discussion. Ensure that the appropriate public information officers and public affairs personnel receive position-specific Incident Management Team training. The lead of the JIC should be identified early on during establishment of the JIC. It is prudent that this individual should possess ICS/IMT training in order to ensure that all JIC responsibilities are properly managed.
References.
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR,* (page 80)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.29. Offer Public Information Officer Training to Public Officials.
Discussion. Agency and community leaders should be encouraged to take FEMA Public Information Officer training. Many times agency chiefs or a designated elected official will be asked to serve as the spokesperson or the "face" of incident response. The primary audience for this training is individuals who have public information responsibilities as their main job or as an auxiliary function at the federal, state, local, tribal or territorial level of government, and in the private and nongovernmental sectors. Training is free and applications may be submitted through the local Office of Emergency Management.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Public Information Officers Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, (March 27-28, 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status**

Task 4.30. Training and Exercises.
Discussion. Whenever conducting training and exercises for Public Information and Affairs personnel from all relevant agencies to ensure that they are aware of the roles, responsibilities, and operations of the JIC. Public Affairs units should be included in the training, whether conducted as a tabletop or a live exercise.
References.
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR*, (page 80)
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 117)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

Elected Officials and Community Leaders

Task 4.31. Provide PIO Liaison to Public Officials.
Discussion. When possible, identify a PIO-trained liaison to work with and coordinate the involvement of elected officials. Liaisons should be at the scene, not in the office, as this is where many politicians will likely be located. The liaison can help officials stay focused on predesignated duties and responsibilities rather than being involved in scene or on camera when such involvement is outside the scope of the official's jurisdictions or duties. The liaison can help steer officials away from comments that might inadvertently affect ongoing investigations.
References.
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 117)
- *SETRPC Public Information Officers Workshop*, Beaumont, Texas   (March 27-28, 2018)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.32. Liaison with Impacted Community Leaders to Explain Media Strategies.
Discussion. PIOs should be meet with leaders of those communities impacted by attacks to explain media strategies in relation to ongoing investigations.
References.
- 2018 Austin Bombings, ALERRT Conference, Dallas, Texas

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.33. Public Recognition.
Discussion. Take every opportunity to recognize the collaboration and support of community partners and leaders in emergency response efforts.
References.
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 113)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 4.34. Messaging During Recovery.
Discussion. Take every opportunity to recognize the collaboration and support of community partners and leaders in emergency response efforts.
References.
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 113)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

V. TACTICAL RESPONSE

Policies and Protocols

Task 5.1. Deployment Authority in Mutual Aid Agreement.
Discussion. Deployment authority for law enforcement tactical assets in response to a CCTA should be pre-approved by each agency's leadership and clearly addressed in the applicable Mutual Aid Agreement.
References:
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack, [Pre-Decisional Draft],* (page 10)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.2.   Establish a Tactical Reserve.
Discussion. In order to guard against acts of deception, diversions, false reports and subsequent over commitment of assets, Dispatch and law enforcement agencies should establish policies to hold resources in reserve (tiered response) at the outset of response efforts. Unassigned officers and resources may be sent to a rally point or staging area to establish a tactical reserve.
References:
- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *CounterTerrorism Guide for Public Safety Personnel*. National CounterTerrorism Center, (page 18)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.3. Protocol for Emergency Vehicle Parking.
Discussion. Establish guidelines on access, parking, and staging vehicles to facilitate the transit of vehicles to the scene, especially large fire trucks. Create a protocol on parking emergency vehicles when responding to a major incident so as not to block access by ambulances and other responders. In this protocol, incorporate procedures to establish a travel lane(s) for ambulances.
References:
- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Workbook*, (page 20)
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS,   The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 14, para 2, bullet 3)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

29

Task 5.4. Plan for Evacuation and Management of Large Groups
Discussion. Develop a protocol or plan for evacuation and control of large groups. Managing large groups is a matter of strategic funneling. Allowing them to move to a controlled, protective area is vital and needs to happen with a minimum number of non-responding officers.
References:
* *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Workbook*, (page 2-35)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.5.   Identify Critical Personnel Exemptions to Travel Restrictions.
Discussion: Area hospitals should work with law enforcement to better define critical sectors, personnel (doctors, nurses and other specialties) and outline exemptions from orders or requests that impose travel restrictions (shelter-in-place, etc.). Hospitals/law enforcement may establish recognized credentials to allow law enforcement personnel to readily identify and facilitate the passage of such key personnel.
References:
* *Boston Marathon AAR,* (page 122)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.6.   Utilize Heavy Fire Vehicles as Cover from Active Shooters.
Discussion: Response protocols should include positioning heavy fire response vehicles as shields from secondary devices and active shooters.
References:
* *San Bernardino AAR,* (page 117)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.7.   Use of Force Investigations
Discussion: Officials must track and debrief officers and inspect weapons prior to the officer departing the scene to determine which officers have used force or deadly force.
References:
* *Washington Navy Yard AAR,* (page 77)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.8.   Develop and Enact Debriefing and Demobilization Procedures.
Discussion: All law enforcement and emergency response agencies should have clear policies and training that directs responding personnel to follow the appropriate demobilization procedures prior to departing the incident location. Debriefing of personnel, especially those who were in the "hot zone," is a vital

30

aspect of demobilization as it allows officers to get critical witness information, assess the well-being of officers, and offer Employ Assistance Program support services once the crisis is over.

References:

- *Washington Navy Yard AAR,* (pages 81-82)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.9.   Defer Report Writing.
Discussion: Defer report writing until officers have had time to recover. Many officers advised that although exhausted (and in some cases traumatized), they followed normal procedures requiring submission of written reports before going off duty. Fatigue can impair report quality.

References:

- *Aurora AAR,* (page 33)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Planning

Task 5.10.   Establish Hierarchy for Command and Control.
Discussion. Establish a clear hierarchy of coordination and command that is understood among multi-agency partners. Understand the authorities, mission, roles, and responsibilities of responding partners. Develop this prior to a major incident or terrorist attack.

References:

- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack,* [Pre-Decisional Draft], (page 13)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.11.   Identify "Triggers" for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack.
Discussion. A key step during response to a CCTA is for first responders to recognize that the incident is or could be a CCTA. Identify triggers for the jurisdiction to assist in this assessment.

References:

- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Workbook,* (page 2-17)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.12.   Identify possible targets.
Discussion. Identify as possible targets those locations within the jurisdiction that typically are:

- ▪ Public spaces
- ▪ Places where there is a large number of people coming and going
- ▪ Places with limited ingress and egress points
- ▪ Places with high density crowds

References:

- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Workbook*, (page 2-10)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.13. Enhanced Security Operations.
Discussion. Address how to prioritize and enact enhanced security operations at potential high-risk attack sites based on the assessment of an initial attack profile. The most frequent gap in plans is in the detailing of actions to increase critical facility security posture during a threat.

References:

- DHS *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks* Washington D.C., July 2018*, (page 14)
- DHS *Multi-Jurisdictional Improvised Explosive Device Security Planning Workshops Capability Gap Analysis*, Washington D.C., (page 5)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.14. Identify/Assign a Senior Tactical Advisor.
Discussion. Whenever possible, a senior tactical advisor should be designated and assigned to the primary operations center (this may initially be Dispatch) to advise decision makers of the needs and allocation of tactical resources to incident sites. Dispatch must maintain current contact numbers and should be clear on that advisor's role in activating tactical Mutual Aid Agreements.

References:

- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack*, [Pre-Decisional Draft], (page 9)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.15. Plan for Responder Rest and Recovery.
Discussion. Incorporate protocols in plans to ensure responders receive appropriate rest and mental health support. When possible, officers exposed to high levels of trauma should be relieved by officers who were off-duty when the incident occurred.

References:

- *Aurora AAR,* (page 33)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.16.   Critical Incident Counseling and Mental Health Support
Discussion: Ensure that the agency has a policy regarding mental health support after critical incidents and clearly communicate it to the entire department. Assign a mental health or officer wellness officer to oversee officer mental health and coordinate services among participating agencies. Compel participation in critical incident debriefings for both victims, civilians, and commissioned staff. Consider follow-up counseling as it is not unusual for post-traumatic stress to manifest itself several weeks or months after an event. Have supervisors monitor and check-in with members to determine if they have a need for mental health provider services. Ensure all responders are aware and encouraged to use the services as needed. Require all responding members to attend a stress management session debriefing following a traumatic incident. In addition to mental health assistance, consider unit, team, or department-level briefings to bring closure to the incident.
References:
- *San Bernardino AAR,* (page 118)
- *Orlando AAR,* (page 28)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.17.   **Information on Law Enforcement Tactical Response Assets**.
Discussion. Compile information on available local, regional, state and federal tactical response assets (Agency, response time, personnel, armored vehicle, TEMS training, CBRNE level, explosive breaching capability, contact information). Organize in separate matrices by response time (i.e., 1 hour, 2 hours, more)
References.
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack,* [Pre-Decisional Draft], (page 10)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.18.   Provide Security to Area Hospitals.
Discussion. In Active Shooter or Complex Terrorist Attacks, send law enforcement officers to hospitals to assist in establishing order, providing security and helping with ambulance traffic.
References.
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement, Fire and EMS,* The InterAgency Board, September 2015. (page 14, para 2, bullet 5)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.19. **Provide Information Displays to Incident Commanders**
Discussion. Provide cogent information displays to Incident Commanders, staffs, and Dispatch to assist in establishing incident and domain awareness and tracking of resources. Develop and implement ASHE-specific unified incident command boards. Incident command boards are a portable incident scene management tool to help incident commanders organize and manage information and resources to support decision making. Information addressed should include, type and location of attack, number and types of casualties, resources assigned, staging area location, etc.
References.
- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Workbook*, (pages 11-13)
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS,   The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 15, para 6)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.20. Develop a Protocol/Plan for Mass Witness Management.
Discussion: Develop the capability to quickly evacuate, triage, and interview all potential witnesses. Formalize this as a protocol or plan. Ensure that the protocol is agreed upon and shared between law enforcement, fire, EMS, and any other first responders. Train officers to implement the plan.
Reference:
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR*, (page 80)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.21.   Identify Locations for Key Operational Sites.
Discussion: Identify locations within the jurisdiction where existing man-made or natural barriers provide security, and may therefore be suitable for such key operational sites as command posts or staging areas.
References:
- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Workbook*, (page 20)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.22.   Pre-Designate Staging Areas.
Discussion: Identify staging areas on the outer edge of the jurisdiction(s) for inbound tactical teams and resources without a mission or that are not assigned to a specific crisis site. These staging areas can also be used to divert self-dispatched assets to avoid over-convergence at the incident site. Incorporate this information in plans; communicate this information among agencies in the

jurisdiction; and provide Dispatch with locations and designations of staging areas for ready reference and use during crises.

References.

- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack,* [Pre-Decisional Draft] (page 9)
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions*, (Slide Benchmarks – Command, bullet 5)
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS, The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 14, para 2, bullet 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.23.   Designate Rally Points

Discussion. To avoid over-convergence but to allow for the collection and organization of responders close to the incident site, plan pre-designated rally points. Include these in written plans and provide locations and designating numbers (RP1, RP2, etc.) to Dispatch.

References.

- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS, The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 14, para 2, bullet 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.24.   Plan to Address Possible Diversionary Tactics

Discussion: Attackers and associates may use diversionary tactics (i.e., hoax calls, swatting) to draw responders away from the intended primary target(s) of an attack. These tactics may be used as part of a complex or multipronged attack. Agencies should:

- Establish dispatch policies designed to hold resources in reserve (tiered responses);
- Provide situational updates to first responders to enhance safety; and
- Provide regular notifications to interagency partners and neighboring jurisdictions to provide a shared operational picture of possible diversionary acts.

References:

- *Counter Terrorism Guide for Public Safety Personnel,* Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, (page 18-19)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.25. Plan to address Traffic Management During the Crisis.
Discussion: A typical plans gap is the failure to address…traffic management. This should include pedestrian traffic, taxi/Uber, mass transit ad system off-load, parking/parking structure security and access control, maintenance and rapid establishment of response corridors.
References:
- DHS *Multi-Jurisdictional Improvised Explosive Device Security Planning Workshops Capability Gap Analysis*. Washington, D.C. (page 5)
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions*, (Slide Benchmarks – Plans, bullet 1)
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack,* [Pre-Decisional Draft], (page 9)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.26. Plan for Language Interpretation Capability.
Discussion: Plan for interpretation services in real time. There are now apps for smart phones and iPads as well as telephone interpretation services to identify and translate in a wide variety of foreign languages. Emergency responders should know how to access these services to facilitate evacuation and give instructions to non-English speakers. One can speak in English and get voice out in another language (and vice versa) with a smart phone.
References:
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 41)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.27. Protocol for Building Site Nomenclature
Discussion: Harmonize designations for building sides so that all responding agencies (local and state law enforcement, fire services, search and rescue, etc.) in the region adopt a standardized marking system, (International Search and Rescue Advisory Group marking system), for easy identification of areas searched, cleared, and secured by law enforcement personnel.
References:
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 33)
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 116)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.28. Identify Bomb Squad Resources.
Discussion. Know the available bomb disposal resources. Every law enforcement agency need to know who to call for bomb technician and render-safe assistance should they encounter hazardous incendiary materials,

36

explosives, or explosive devices beyond their in-house capability, or for second opinions and back-up. For complex situations, FBI and ATF are excellence resources
References:
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 33)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.29. Be Prepared to Set Up Decontamination and Hydration Stations.
Discussion. Plans should include assigned responsibilities to set up decontaminations and hydration stations for first responders. Consider procurement of suitable "clean up/hydration" station for use at major fires and police emergencies if not available from fire rehab vehicles.
References:
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 33)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status**

Equipment

Task 5.30. **Establish a Regional Credentialing System.**
Discussion. Provide appropriate credentials to agency representatives in the region to ensure security at incident scene(s), staging areas, and operations centers.
References:
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack,* [Pre-Decisional Draft], (page 14)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.31. Maintain an Adequate Supply of Radio/Cell Phone Chargers/Batteries.
Discussion. Due to the possible long duration of an incident, response partners may work long hours and use their communications equipment far more than anticipated. The ability to obtain fresh radio batteries and charge radio and cell phone batteries can become a critical need. In anticipation of this possibility, agencies should maintain an adequate supply or develop a streamlined process to obtaining radio and cell phone chargers and batteries.
References:
- *Boston Marathon AAR,* (page 97)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.32. Provide Law Enforcement Officers Access to Long Guns.
Discussion. Law Enforcement officers should have ready access to rifles so that they have the greater stopping power higher magazine capacity, and the capability to fire accurately from a distance. Departments with patrol rifles and ruggedized optics with or without magnification would provide responding officers the means to match or overwhelm attackers with precision-aimed firepower.
References.

- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Guide, Version 1.1*, revision 2, (page 2-27)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.33. Ensure Availability of Ammunition to Law Enforcement Officers.
Discussion. Police departments should consider having easily accessible extra magazines pre-loaded with ammunition (patrol rifle, shotgun, and pistol) ready for deployment on short notice for police officers engaged in an extended gun battle with attackers.
References.

- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack,* [Pre-Decisional Draft], (page 5)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.34. Provide Body Armor to Responders.
Discussion. The Department of Justice requires patrol use of protective vests if DOJ subsidized their purchase, but there is not requirement for additional ballistics protection. A policy of rapidly confronting the shooter increases the need for protective equipment. In addition to wearing protective vests, uniformed officers should carry active shooter armor kits. Responders should carry Level III or Level IV body armor for protection against high-powered, high velocity weapons.
References.

- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Guide, Version 1.1*, revision 2 (Pages 2-27)
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack*, [Pre-Decisional Draft], (page 5)
- *Aurora AAR,* (page 30)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.35. Explore the Procurement/Deployment of an Equipment Truck.
Discussion. Some patrol officers may patrol on foot, bikes, and/or motorcycle or other mode that does not allow for carrying large pieces or amounts of such equipment. Consider providing an equipment truck that is manned and ready for rapid deployment to any location in the jurisdiction during an incident. While

many police departments have long had the equipment issued to various officers throughout the department, the deployment of an equipment truck, standing by 24/7, is a practical approach that allows equipment to be ready, secured, and available to responding officers. This truck would hold various tools and equipment – such as breeching equipment, rifles, shotguns, Level III vests and helmets, compact shields, lights, batteries, etc. Also included would be active shooter armor kits (ballistic helmets and ballistic vests with ceramic plates) that afford greater protection from high-powered, semi- and fully automatic weapons and ammunition.

References:
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR,* (page 35)
- *San Bernardino AAR,* (page 116)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.36. Provide Earpieces to First Responders.
Discussion. Responders should be issued ear pieces to radio equipment to provide higher levels of audio during response operations. Use of earpieces also helps prevent attackers from discerning first responder locations from the sound of radio transmissions.

References.
- SETRPC Tactical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (June 2018).

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.37. Provide Sleeve Identification.
Discussion. To help avoid blue on blue casualties, law enforcement officers responding to an incident should be issued and wear Velcro sleeves that identify the wearer as "Police". This is especially useful for responding law enforcement officers that are not wearing a police or deputy sheriff's uniform on-scene.

References.
- SETRPC CCTA Tactical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (June 2018)
- Armed-ID.com
- DSMsafety.com

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.38. Issue DHS/FBI Bomb Threat Stand-Off Card to Responders
Discussion. Provide agency personnel with a copy of the DHS/FBI Bomb Threat Stand-Off Card providing descriptions of type Threat, Explosives Capacity, Mandatory Evacuation Distance, Shelter-In-Place Zone and Preferred Evacuation Distance.

References:
- https://tripwire.dhs.gov/IED/resources/docs/DHS-DOJ%20Bomb%20Threat%20Stand-off%20Card.pdf

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Resources

Task 5.39. Develop Best Practices for Use of K9 Resources In Response.
Discussion. Include the use of K9 resources at the staging and command areas, in sanitation/secondary clearing phase with the evacuation/clearing team, and witness searching at the collection point.

References.
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement, Fire and EMS*, The InterAgency Board, September 2015. (page 14, para 2, bullet 11).

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.40. Incorporate Public Works Personnel as First Responders.
Discussion. Often overlooked, public works personnel are designated as first responders by Presidential Homeland Security Directive 8, which states:

The term "first responder" refers to those individuals who in the early stages of an incident are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency response providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide immediate support services during prevention, response, and recovery operations.

Public Works responders serve as a force multiplier. Leaders should be required to participate in planning, training, exercises, and response operations on a regular basis.

References:
- *Presidential Homeland Security Directive 8, National Preparedness,* https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html
- *Guidance Position Statement: Public Works Professionals as Emergency Responders*, American Public Works Association, Washington, D.C., March 4, 2010. http://www2.apwa.net/documents/Advocacy/_EM_%20PW%20Prof%20as%20Emergency%20Responders-Guidance.pdf

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.41. Identify High-Occupancy Vehicles Available in the Region.
Discussion. Identify resources in the area that have high-occupancy vehicles, (i.e., buses, trucks, vans, etc.) that can be used to transport large numbers of victims or casualties. Develop agreements for their use in times of an emergency.
References:
- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Guide, Version 1.1*, revision 2 (page 20)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.42. Plan Access to Additional Equipment, Weapons and Ammunition.
Discussion. Identify local resources from which your agency can obtain protective equipment or additional weapons or ammunition should they be needed. Obtain 24/7 contact information to owners/managers of these resources.
References:
- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Guide, Version 1.1*, revision 2 (page 19)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.43. Identify Local Caches of Equipment and Supplies.
Discussion. Identify local businesses and warehouses that stock and can provide equipment or supplies (plywood, bottled water, first aid supplies) during a CCA
References:
- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Guide, Version 1.1*, revision 2 (pages 21)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.44. Provide Air Support for Critical Incidents.
Discussion. Studies have shown that airborne monitoring can increase the safety of pursuits, help set up perimeters to contain suspects, respond quickly to criminal activity, and assist in other activities and efforts. Agreements should be established with government entities that have air surveillance and support capabilities to provide air support for terrorist attacks and other critical incidents.
References.
- *Aurora AAR* (page 31)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.45. Establish an Unmanned Aerial System Capability.
Discussion. Operating rotary or fixed wing aircraft for surveillance is expensive. A relatively cost-effective alternative is to use a small helicopter unmanned aerial system (UAS or drone) that provides aerial imaging of the incident. Some cost less than $5,000 and can be operated with minimal training.
UAS or drones can also be used within buildings to locate and gather intelligence on terrorist suspects without exposing responders to weapons fire.
References.
- *Aurora AAR* (page 31)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.46. Deployment of Heavy Equipment by Public Works
Discussion. Plan for the use of heavy equipment by the Department of Public Works to close routes of ingress/egress to attackers and to provide cover and assist in security at command posts, casualty collection points, staging areas, and other emergency command and control nodes.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Tactical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, (May 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Training

Task 5.47. ALERRT Active Shooter Incident Management Checklist.
Discussion. Train law enforcement officers at incident sites to work in accordance with the Active Shooter Incident Management Checklist, Rev. 2.0.
References:
- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks, Participant Guide, Version 1.1*, revision 2 (page 2-27)
- Bill Godfrey, *"ASIM – Tactical, Triage and Transport,"* 2018 ALERRT Conference, Grapevine, Texas (November 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.48. Train Law Enforcement Officers as Operations Section Chiefs.
Discussion: During an Active Shooter or CCTA incident, assignment of an Operations Section Chief is critical. The Operations Section Chief is typically a lieutenant or above from that agency having the highest priority for achieving the UCP incident action plan objectives. For Active Shooter Incidents and Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks, it is recommended that the Operations Section Chief be a trained/qualified law enforcement officer.

Reference:
- *Fire, Emergency Medical Services Department Operations Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents*, (page 8)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.49. Training in Emergency Casualty Care.
Discussion. Conduct cross-training of law enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public works responders in emergency casualty care and evacuation of wounded survivors.
References:
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack,* [Pre-Decisional Draft], (Page 4)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.50. Tactical Emergency Medical Services (TEMS) Training
Discussion. Tactical teams require medically trained personnel attached to their team because medical support cannot be assured during a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack. Law Enforcement agencies should train their own personnel in TEMS with the capability to provide immediate care to injured team members and wounded victims while the crisis is ongoing.
References:
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack,* [Pre-Decisional Draft], (Page 10)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.51. Adopt the Rescue Task Force Concept
Discussion. Train law enforcement, fire services personnel and EMS in Rescue Task Force protocols so as to rapidly organize and move to bring medical support into "warm zones" of the incident scene.
References.
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement, Fire and EMS*, The InterAgency Board, September 2015. (page 5, para 5)
- DHS *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks* Washington D.C., July 2018, (page 14)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 5.52. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures – Fire as a Weapon
Discussion. Conduct integrated training between law enforcement, fire and rescue departments to develop techniques and practices to better prepare responders when fires are used as an offensive weapon by terrorists.

43

References.
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack,* [Pre-Decisional Draft], (page 10)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

VI. MEDICAL RESPONSE

Policy and Protocols

Task 6.1   National Incident Management System (NIMS)
Discussion. Local and state law enforcement and emergency services should institutionalize the National Incident Management System (NIMS)-based command and control language through plans and exercises and during ongoing education and training.
References.
- *First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents.* Department of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs, June 2015, (page 6, "Response and Incident Management," 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.2. Adhere to the Tenets of the Hartford Consensus.
Discussion: Each medical institution must follow the Hartford Consensus protocol and adhere to the national policy to enhance survivability from active shooter and intentional mass casualty events.
Reference:
- *Hartford Consensus, (*page 8*)*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.3. Interoperable Radio and Communications Equipment
Discussion. Local and state emergency management, EMS, fire, public works, and law enforcement personnel and receiving medical facilities should have interoperable radio and communications equipment.
References.
- *First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents.* Department of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs, June 2015, (page 6, "Response and Incident Management," 2).

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.4. Communications Liaison with Air Evacuation Helos
Discussion. Air Evacuation helicopters from a variety of organizations may be used to transport casualties to area hospitals for treatment. These may include helicopters from responding Federal law enforcement agencies, US Coast

45

Guard, and Department of Defense. In those cases that radio communications with hospitals is not interoperable with these aircraft, request a liaison with radio communications co-locate with the Law Enforcement Medical Coordinator/Officer or at the servicing hospital to effect communications and eliminate lags in response and treatment times.

References.

- CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, June 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.5. Integrate Law Enforcement to Enhance Hospital Security.
Discussion: Hospitals and law enforcement should meet to discuss the circumstances under which law enforcement may be assigned to enhance hospital security and establish protocols to integrating local law enforcement into their security plans. Hospitals should consider options for contracting additional security personnel when needed. .

Reference:

- *Boston Marathon AAR*, (page 90-91)
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR*, (page 77)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.6. Protocol for First Responders Under Fire
Discussion: Develop protocols for all first responder groups (Law enforcement, Fire, EMS, etc.) and train them on immediate actions/response to weapons fire and bombing attacks.

Reference:

- Dr. Michael Foreman, CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, 26 June 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.7. Provide for Ambulance Access
Discussion: Develop protocols to ensure paths remain open for ambulances. Discuss access issues with EMS/Fire Services as they occur. Ambulance access should be a high priority task of police and incident command, but may get overlooked. Factors to consider for facilitating access include:

- Initial parking of police vehicles
- Repositioning of police vehicles, which would be easier if the department uses universal car keys. Universal car keys have their pros and cons, but many department use them. Further research is needed on how to handle this with "chip" controlled vehicles
- Towing or pushing civilian vehicles out of the way

- Determining in pre-plans and purchase decisions whether ambulances and fire service vehicles can be driven over curbs. Educate fire and ambulance drivers as to what heights of curbs and off-road terrain are likely to be traversable
- Familiarization of police, fire and ambulance crews with street and parking lot geography
- Having a police vehicle lead ambulances up to triage areas
- Sending pictures or maps of the parking lots or street configuration in real time, using photos from helicopters, remotely piloted vehicles, or fixed wing aircraft
- Using pathfinder vehicles to show the path through congestions. Once one vehicle figures out how to get through the maze, the path can then be sent to other ambulances or vehicles using apps n smart phones or possibly via an email from the pathfinder to communications center for relaying to others

Reference:
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 29-30)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.8. Develop a Standard Protocol in the Region For Patient Tracking.
Discussion. Patient tracking is difficult in Mass Casualty Incidents. Incident Command's Transportation Group, EMS, hospitals, clinics and other medical facilities must work together to identify, assign, and track names, locations and status of casualties. Consider the use of electronic devices and apps to assist.
References.
- Dr. Michael Foreman, CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, 26 June 2018
- *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks*, (page 15)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.9. Exceptions for Medical Personnel to Travel Restrictions
Discussion: Area hospitals should work with law enforcement and emergency management to better define critical sectors, critical personnel and outline possible exemptions from orders or requests that impose travel restrictions. A protocol should be established to allow key medical personnel, who were recalled to provide emergency medical assistance, access to those hospitals and medical facilities.
Reference:
- *Boston Marathon AAR*, (page 122)
- Dr. Michael Foreman, CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, 26 June 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.10. Address Post-Traumatic Stress for Rescuers, First Responders, Survivors and Witnesses
Discussion. Post-Traumatic Stress (PTS) is a likely outcome to mass casualty incidents. Recognize the need for providing critical incident stress counseling. Team medics at the first opportunity should interact with team members to informally evaluate for signs of post-traumatic stress. Provide formal and informal grief counseling post incident. Formal gatherings of team members and peer groups should be initiated very early to begin discussions. Allow for small-group and peer discussions in the aftermath.
References.
- Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, D., Patterson, S., Baldridge, T., Eby, M. Lichtman, O. (2018). *A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident*. Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 19(2), 291. doi:10.5811/westjem.2017.10.31374
Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.11. Protocol for Cleaning EMS Vehicles: Investigations
Discussion: All medical personnel must be trained on the proper process of cleaning EMS vehicles to avoid cross contamination while keeping into consideration that the vehicle may also be an object involved in the crime scene.
Reference:
- Assistant Fire Chief Larry Haydu, SETRPC CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (June 26, 2018)
Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.12. Active Shooter/Mass Casualty Incident (AS/MCI) Check List
Discussion: All medical personnel and other responsible parties must follow the AS/MCI checklist.
Reference:
- *Fire, Emergency Medical Services Department Operations Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents,* (page 5)
Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

Plans

Task 6.13. Alert/Notification System for Medical Personnel
Discussion: Every hospital and EMS facility must have an alert/re-call system to its medical personnel to inform them of emergency Mass Casualties Incidents and speed the process of personnel coming to assist.
Reference:
- Dr. Michael Foreman, CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, 26 June 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.14. Develop an Active Shooter/Mass Casualty Plan for the Community.
Discussion. Develop and update the medical community's mass casualty plan that delineates all the region's medical resources and provides a recall system that directs personnel to the appropriate facility. Plans should identify secondary trauma facilities, including temporary mobile treatment centers. This plan should be developed in coordination with leaders of local and state response agencies in the community.
References.
- *Fire, Emergency Medical Services Department Operations Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents,* (page 10)
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.15. Mass Casualty Incident Plan for Each Medical Facility
Discussion: Every medical facility must coordinate a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) plan developed in collaboration with first responders in the community it serves, that takes in consideration lessons learned from previous mass casualty incidents and provides information and training on what to do during similar instances.
Reference:
- Dr. Michael Foreman, CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, 26 June 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.16. Plan for Walk-In Patients.
Discussion. Experience from previous Active Shooter/Mass Casualty Incidents has shown that many of the wounded will not wait for ambulances but, with the assistance of family or friends, will drive to the nearest hospital for treatment.

49

This can exacerbate patient tracking and allocation of casualties based on planned capacities as "walk-ins" are not tracked by EMS. Hospitals must anticipate the influx of walk-ins, address security considerations, and the coordination needed to defer incoming patients to other medical facilities.
References.
- Dr. Kevin Menes, CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, 26 June 2018
- *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks*, (page 15)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.17. Address Pre-Hospital Care and Triage.
Discussion. Plans should address pre-hospital care and triage,
References.
- *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks*, (page 15)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.18. Hospitals Have to Effective Security Plans.
Discussion: Individual hospitals have security plans to lock down without support from law enforcement.
Reference:
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions* (Slide: Questions to Consider – bullet 7)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.19. Address Medical Care En Route
Discussion: It is important to emphasize that emergency medical care activities should not stop as a casualty is evacuated. The military's experience demonstrates that continuation or escalation of these measures is critical in reducing mortality during prehospital care. While there is a need to understand how these military experiences in prehospital patient care can be leveraged to decrease morbidity (illness or injury) and mortality (death) in the civilian setting, the ability to translate the military's findings related to on-site and en route care to the civilian setting has not been fully demonstrated.
Reference:
- *The First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents,* (page 12)
- Dr. James Geracci, CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (June 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.20. Medical Response Sites in Incident Response
Discussion: Medical personnel from all units must plan to quickly identify locations to establish casualty collection points, a medical assembly area, triage area, ambulance traffic routes, land zone for life flight, aid station locations, hazard specific information (HAZMAT treatment, etc.), closest hospitals, and consider separate treatment areas for responders and victims, as well as sending all responders to a single hospital.
References.
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS, The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 5, para 6)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.21. **Determine standard "tallies" by hospital of patient capacities.**
Discussion. First responders should work with hospitals to determine typical planning numbers by category of wounded (red, yellow, green) that each hospital can service. These "tallies" can then be used during times of degraded communications to effectively assign wounded to hospitals for medical care,
References.
- Dr. Kevin Menes, CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, 26 June 2018
- *PER 335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.22. **Determine the Decontamination Capabilities/Capacities for Numbers of Patients by Hospital.**
Discussion. In those instances when radiological substances or chemical and biological agents are used, first responders and Dispatch should know the decontamination capabilities and capacities of hospitals in the region to effectively assign/transport casualties. Disseminate this information to Dispatch and first responders.
References:
- *PER 335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks.*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.23. Preplan and Coordinate with Medical Facilities for TECC.
Discussion: There must be preplanning discussions with medical directors, medical control and with the primary receiving medical centers regarding the principles of TECC.

Reference:
- *Fire, Emergency Medical Services Department Operations Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents*, (page 8)
- *After Action Review, Boston Marathon,* (page 62)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.24. Engage Private Partners to Expand Medical Capabilities and Capacities.
Discussion. Healthcare systems will be presented with unique clinical care challenges and will be stressed to their capacities. Consider developing public-private partnerships that provide assistance to overwhelmed medical facilities during times of crisis.
References.
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.25. Plan for Extended Duration of Operations
Discussion. Begin planning early in the incident response to enact personnel rotation and substitution, and for providing basic necessities such as food and water to sustain a high operational temp and sustainment during a prolonged event.
References.
- Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, D., Patterson, S., Baldridge, T., Eby, M., Lichtman, O. (2018*). A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident*. Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 19(2), 291. doi:10.5811/westjem.2017.10.31374

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.26. Address Mental Health Assistance and Support.
Discussion. Plans should address how to provide mental health assistance and support in recovery support efforts.
References.
- *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks*, (page 16)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Organization

Task 6.27. Establish a Law Enforcement Medical Coordinator (LEMC) within the Incident Command Structure.

Discussion. Establish a Law Enforcement Medical Coordinator (LEMC) within the Incident Command structure to coordinate and de-conflict EMS resources with law enforcement response to a large incident(s). Creating an LEMC position ensures proper allocation of both human and medical assets. The LEMC would oversee resource need and distribution among operational teams. The LEMC ensures proper allotment of resources regardless of the duration of operations. The use of the LEMC allows the SWAT medic to focus solely on providing emergency aid within the hot zone, knowing that the coordination is being managed by a professional who understands the scene, its evolution, and their needs. Ideally this position would be filled by an active or former tactical medical provider – preferably a physician with knowledge of both the tactical and EMS functions. The LEMC provides the commander with critical information that may be overlooked by the traditional medical branch of the ICS. The LEMC will possess the ability to conduct an in-depth medical threat assessment using operational data gathered by law enforcement**.** The LEMC provides a conduit to both EMS and fire assets as well as providing operational input to the incident commander.

References.

- Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, D., Patterson, S., Baldridge, T., Eby, M., Lichtman, O. (2018). *A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident.* Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 19(2), 290. doi:10.5811/westjem.2017.10.31374

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.28. Medical Command Structure

Discussion: The command structure of the hospital's immediate medical team involved in a Mass Casualty Incident must be clear. The team leader must wear something noticeable that identities him/her as the individual in charge such a red head-cover.

Reference:

- Dr. Michael Foreman, CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, June 26, 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Task 6.29. Develop Inter-Domain Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Discussion. First responders should develop inter-domain (EMS, fire, and law enforcement) Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) – including use of ballistic vests, better situational awareness, and application of concealment and cover concepts – and train first responders on them.
References.

- *First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents.* Department of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs, June 2015, (page 6, "Protective Equipment", 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.30. Adopt the Rescue Task Force (RTF) Concept
Discussion: To provide immediate triage and evacuation, first responders must wear ballistic protection equipment and be under the protection of LE officers. This will allow them to treat, stabilize, and remove the injured rapidly. Also, the team will include at least one advanced life support (ALS) provider.
Reference:

- *Fire, Emergency Medical Services Department Operations Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents, (*page 9)
- *After Action Review, Washington Navy Yard,* (page 51)
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement, Fire and EMS,* The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 5, para 5)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.31. Employ Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC)
Discussion. Have medics and personnel, who might be in situations requiring indirect threat area operations for point-of-wounding care, train to the tenets of TECC for guidance on prioritization and familiarization with the management of ballistic and explosive wounds.
References.

- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS, The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 5, para 6)
- Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, D., Patterson, S., Baldridge, T., Eby, M. Lichtman, O. (2018). *A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident.* Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 19(2), 292. doi:10.5811/westjem.2017.10.31374

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.32. Coordinated/Integrated Planning and Response
Discussion: The Hartford Consensus recommends that an integrated active shooter response should include the critical actions contained in the acronym THREAT:

- Threat suppression
- Hemorrhage control
- Rapid Extrication to safety
- Assessment by medical providers
- Transport to definitive care.

To increase survivability of victims, fire and EMS agencies must incorporate THREAT principles as Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Reference:

- *Fire, Emergency Medical Services Department Operations Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents,* (page 4)
- *Hartford Consensus,* (page 26)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.33. **Implement MARCHE for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care.**
Discussion. Major Care Interventions in order consist of:

- **M** - Major Bleeding
- **A** - Airway:
- **R** - Respiration: Chest Seals, needle decompression
- **C** - Circulation: Fluid resuscitation? Shock
- **H** - Head/Hypothermia: Mental status, TBI, C-spine
- **E** - Everything Else: Full evaluation "Head to toe, treat as you go."

References.

- Smith, E. & Shapiro G (2012), Changing the Paradigm, Tactical Emergency Casualty care Guidelines for High Risk Scenarios. Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care, (page 23)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Training and Exercises

Task 6.34: Train Medical Personnel in Incident Command System
Discussion: Medical personnel must be trained on the Incident Command System to ensure effective integration of medical response efforts and assets. Senior medical responders should be prepared to assume ICS positions, roles

and responsibilities associated with medical response. It is recommended that progressive training in ICS (ICS-100 through 400 and additional position-specific ICS training) be made mandatory for medical responders and also for medical facility staff.

References.
- Assistant Fire Chief Larry Haydu, CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (June 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.35. Train First Responders in Tactical Emergency Casualty Care
Discussion. Provide all first responders (i.e., law enforcement, fire, EMS and Public Works personnel) training in Tactical Emergency Casualty Care Course. First responders should develop and adopt evidence-based standardized training that addresses the basic, civilianized tenets of Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC). Training should be conducted in conjunction with fire, emergency medical services, (EMS) and medical community personnel to improve interoperability during IED, active shooter incidents and CCTA .Recommend that law enforcement officers complete the Tactical Emergency Casualty Care Course.

References.
- Smith, E. & Shapiro G (2012), Changing the Paradigm, Tactical Emergency Casualty Care Guidelines for High Risk Scenarios. Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care, (page 23-23)
- *First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents.* Department of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs, June 2015. (page 6, 2)
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.36.   Train Medical Personnel on Damage Control Resuscitation.
Discussion: All medical personnel must be trained on the damage control resuscitation (DCR) strategy. Research shows it has demonstrated decreased mortality associated with the use of a blood component-based volume replacement compared to the use of crystalloid fluids for patients in shock. DCR also includes avoidance of hypothermia and pursuit of other measures to maximize oxygenation and reduce injurious factors in the blast-injured patient.

Reference:
- *The First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents,* (page 12)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

Task 6.37. Training to Control Hemorrhage/Bleeding
Discussion: All medical personnel must be trained on the common challenges of fatal bleeding. By teaching everyone the challenges of uncontrollable hemorrhage and the basic principles of stopping bleeding, lives will be saved.
Reference:

- *Hartford Consensus,* (page 8)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.38. Provide Integrated Scenario-Based Training for Responders.
Discussion. Engage law enforcement and EMS in integrated, scenario-based training to ensure they recognize the increasing IED threat and are prepared and equipped to treat multiple patients with blast injuries and multiple amputations. The actual procedures for IED, complicated, active shooter incidents (ASI) should be a standard, practiced scenario.
References.

- Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, D., Patterson, S., Baldridge, T., Eby, M., Lichtman, O. (2018). *A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident.* Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 19(2), 291. doi:10.5811/westjem.2017.10.31374

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.39. Provide Training in Triage for First Responders
Discussion. Training to improve first responder triaging precision is essential for dealing with IED and/or active shooter incidents.
References.

- *First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents.* Department of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs, June 2015, (page 6, "Response and Incident Management," 4)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.40. Train Medical Personnel on Allowances Granted to Law Enforcement Investigators under FERPA/HIPAA.
Discussion: Train hospital and medical facility personnel regarding privacy matters associated with such regulations as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Campus officials need to be clear on the allowances and limits of federal and state regulations and be prepared to assist and provide information to law enforcement and homeland security investigators in emergency situations.

Reference:
- *Mass Murder goes to College: An Examination of Changes on College Campuses Following Virginia Tech*, (page 1462)
- *After Action Review, Washington Navy Yard*, (page 51)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.41. Re-emphasize Treatment of Blast Injuries in Medical Training.
Discussion. Medical directors and medical assets should update their educational / professional development programs to re-emphasize treatment of blast versus ballistic injury.
References.
- Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, D., Patterson, S., Baldridge, T., Eby, M., Lichtman, O. (2018). *A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident.* Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 19(2), 292. doi:10.5811/westjem.2017.10.31374

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.42. Provide Training to Clinical Care Providers on the Recognition and Management of Blast Injuries.
Discussion. Hospital and clinic staffs can provide law enforcement and intelligence entities with critical information by recognizing and reporting blast injuries. In the absence of military grade explosives and dynamite, some terrorists will seek to manufacture and test explosives before their use on intended targets. Injuries sustained from blasts may lead investigators to discern terrorist threats and prevent future attacks.
References.
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.43. Train Hospital Staffs on Unique Aspects of Bombing Victims.
Discussion. Leverage military and international experience with blast injuries to save lives. Many physicians and hospital personnel who have served in war zones over the last two decades have been exposed to bombing victims and effective techniques to ensure the survival of casualties in their care.
References.
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.44. Provide Medical Facility Staff Training in IED Awareness.
Discussion. Medical facility personnel must be trained on how to scan for IED's and VBIEDs when entering a mass casualty incident in order to prevent further harm/deaths. This training should also increase the awareness of medical facility staff to IEDs and VBIEDs that might be placed at or in proximity to a hospital or medical facility. Hospitals should ensure that all staff members understand their hospitals protocols and procedures, as well as their individual roles and responsibilities during a bomb threat or discovery of a suspicious package. Hospitals should regularly exercise these procedures with local police and fire departments.
References.
- *Boston Marathon AAR*, (page 43)
- Assistant Fire Chief Larry Haydu, CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, (June 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.45. Provide First-Aid Training to Community Members Through the Education System and Faith-Based Organizations.
Discussion. Increase the capabilities and capacities of medical response by training community members in first aid. Request the assistance of the local school and college education system, Scouts, and faith-based organizations in the conduct of training so as to gain a critical minimum number of trainees.
References.
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*
- Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, D., Patterson, S., Baldridge, T., Eby, M., Lichtman, O. (2018). *A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident.* Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 19(2), 291. doi:10.5811/westjem.2017.10.31374

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.46. Engage Responder Agencies in Rescue Task Force Training.
Discussion. Provide regular Rescue Task Force (RTF) training that is cohesive and coherent across agencies. This will provide law enforcement an understanding of medical priorities and familiarize EMS with the tactical priorities of law enforcement partners. All medical personnel must receive and complete Rescue Task Force Training (RTF) and continuing education on RTF in order to properly prepare for a response to a mass casualty incident.
References.
- Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, D., Patterson, S., Baldridge, T., Eby, M., Lichtman, O. (2018). *A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San*

Bernardino Terrorist Incident. Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 19(2), 291. doi:10.5811/westjem.2017.10.31374

- *State Board of Emergency Medical, Fire, and Transportation Services*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.47. Train Community Members to Initiate Bystander Care.
Discussion. Provide training to community members to initiate bystander care in alignment with Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) First Care Provider guidelines prior to the arrival of EMS. The complex and critical nature of injuries seen in active shooter and bombing incidents and the challenge of accessing patients wounded by explosions demonstrate the necessity for bystander care at the scene of the incident. Municipal and county agencies should consider training communities in TECC First Care Provider guidelines.
References.

- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*
- Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, D., Patterson, S., Baldridge, T., Eby, M., Lichtman, O. (2018). *A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident.* Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 19(2), 291-292. doi:10.5811/westjem.2017.10.31374

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Equipment

Task 6.48. Use Tourniquets and Hemostatic Agents for Severe Bleeding
Discussion. First responders should be issued and trained in the use of tourniquets and hemostatic agents as part of treatment for severe bleeding (if allowed by protocol). Tourniquets and hemostatic agents have demonstrated to be quick and effective methods for preventing exsanguination from extremity wounds (tourniquets) and other severe external bleeding (hemostatic agents).
References.

- *First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents.* Department of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs, June 2015, (page 6, 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

60

Task 6.49. Equip First Responders with Proven Protective Measures
Discussion. As technology improves, first responders should adopt proven protective measures (e.g., body armor) that have been demonstrated to reliably shield personnel from IED fragments and shock waves.
References.

- *First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents.* Department of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs, June 2015, (page 6, "Protective Equipment", 2)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.50. Provide Individual IFAK for Law Enforcement.
Discussion. Recommend that following completion of the Tactical Emergency Casualty Care Course, law enforcement officers be issued IFAK to include:

(2) Tourniquets
(2) Olaes Dressing (for wound packing)
(2) Chest Seals (Occlusive Dressings)
(1) Hook Knife
(1) Emergency Blanket

References:

- Chief of Police Travis Walker, CCTA Tactical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (May 2018)
- *Aurora AAR,* (page 30)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status**

Task 6.51. Establish Mass Casualty Incident Kits for Fire Services.
Discussion. In advance of Mass Casualty Incidents, Fire Services will create Mass Casualty Incident Kids that include the following items:

Triage
- Triage Tag
- FIRESCOPE Med Com/GAC Worksheet
- Marker/Pens

Treatment
- Space Blanket
- Gloves (2 pair)
- Vionex (4 packets)
- Bandaids (10 each)
- Trauma Shears (1 each)
- 4x4 pads

Airway
- Nasopharyngeal Airways (NPAs)

- Oropharyngeal Airways (OPAs)

Breathing

- ARS (Air Release System)
   Needle for chest decompression
- HyFin Chest Seal

Circulation

- QuickClot Combat Gauze
- Z-fold hemostatic dressing
- Israeli Pressure Dressing (2)
- Tourniquets (2)

References. MCI Kit Contents for Orange County Fire Authority
Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.52. Plan to Prevent Depletion of Medical Supplies.
Discussion: After Action Reports cite depletion of medical supplies in Mass Casualty Incidents. Assemble and make available "4th man" bags stocked with tourniquets, chest seals, dressings, triage cards/tape in significant quantities. Operators and law enforcement should carry multiple tourniquets in addition to their IFAKs.
Reference:

- Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, D., Patterson, S., Baldridge, T., Eby, M., Lichtman, O. (2018). *A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident*. Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 19(2), 291. doi:10.5811/westjem.2017.10.31374

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.53. Identifying Apparel for Medical Personnel at Incident Site.
Discussion: EMS personnel must wear identifying vests, neon sleeves, and/or sashes to identify themselves when entering warm zones so that each responding group (law enforcement, fire, medical, etc.) will know who is assisting, thus decreasing the risk of additional casualties. EMS ICS position vests should be used to identify those placed in key ICS positions. During Mass Casualty Incidents, there are mutual aid responders who may be unfamiliar with leaders on site. ICS vests help providers identify key leaders and better understand the EMS command functions.
Reference:

- *Aurora AAR,* (page 78)
- Assistant Fire Chief Larry Haydu, SETRPC CCTA Medical Response Workshop, (June 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status**

Task 6.54. Utilize Protective Equipment and Body Armor
Discussion: Medical directors must outfit their teams in relation to the perceived threat, with PPE and medical equipment designed to protect from handguns and treat the "preventable causes of death." As technology improves, first responders should adopt proven protective measures (e.g., body armor) demonstrated to shield personnel from IED fragments and shock waves.
Reference:

- *The First Responder guide for Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents,* (page 6)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.55. Evaluate Inventory for Response to Mass Casualty Incidents.
Discussion: Hospitals and EMS agencies should evaluate options and contingencies for obtaining additional supplies and equipment in a Mass Casualty Incident. In addition, each region should work to develop a listing of regional resources that can be accessed during emergencies, and detail steps on how to obtain such resources. Ensure a regional stockpile of surgical supplies are ready for rapid access.
Reference:

- *Boston Marathon AAR*, (pages 94 and 116)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.56. Access Non-Traditional Emergency Transport Assets.
Discussion: Locate and identify buses, vans, available armored vehicles and other non-traditional emergency transport vehicles to evacuate and/or transport casualties from the incident site when ambulance assets are committed.
Reference:

- *PER-335: Critical Decision Making for Complex Attacks.*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.57. Place Trauma/Mass Casualty Incident Stations in Public Spaces.
Discussion: Co-locate trauma/MCI equipment stations with AEDs in public spaces (malls, stadiums, office buildings) to provide access to medical supplies in emergency situations and facilitate bystander care prior to the arrival of EMS.
Reference:

- Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, D., Patterson, S., Baldridge, T., Eby, M., Lichtman, O. (2018). *A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident*. Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 19(2), 291. doi:10.5811/westjem.2017.10.31374

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

Schools

Task 6.58. Adopt an Emergency Mass Notification and Communications System on College Campuses

Discussion: Nearly all of the reports reviewed prescribed that every campus should have an emergency communications alerting system to provide information on the nature of an emergency and action to be taken. This messaging should also be sent to local medical facilities and law enforcement.

Reference:

- *Mass Murder goes to College: An Examination of Changes on College Campuses Following Virginia Tech,* (page 1460)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.59. Establish a Multidisciplinary Team to Respond to Threats and Other Dangerous Behaviors

Discussion: Many of the reports recommended that schools establish a multidisciplinary team, most commonly referred to as the Threat Assessment Team (TAT). This is a standing group whose purpose is to receive and assess all reports of threats and other alarming behaviors by any student or employee of the college or university. If it determines that a threat to self or others exists, the TAT plans a course of action for managing the case and continues to implement this plan over time until it is determined that the threat no longer exists. The TAT should consist of representatives from the administration, law enforcement, medical department, mental health, faculty, student services, legal counsel, and human resources functions.

Reference:

- *Mass Murder goes to College: An Examination of Changes on College Campuses Following Virginia Tech*, (page 1462)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status**

Task 6.60.   Required Medical Response Presence at Events

Discussion: Communities should establish a minimum number for expected attendance at local events that require Fire Department and EMS support. . Fire department and EMS must staff all local events that consists of over a certain amount of people in attendance in order to be more prepared if there is to be a mass casualty incident.

Reference:

- Assistant Fire Chief Larry Haydu, CCTA Medical Response Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (June 26, 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

64

Task 6.61. Mental Health Services on Campuses
Discussion: Schools should offer specialized mental health services, not just generalized services. Writing, drawings, and other forms of individual expression reflecting violent fantasy and causing a faculty member to be fearful or concerned about safety, should be evaluated contextually for any potential threat.
Reference:

* *Campus Violence Prevention and Response: Best Practices for Massachusetts Higher Education,* June 2008

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.62. Establish Trauma Response Team on Campus
Discussion: Each school should have a trained behavioral health Trauma Response Team (TRT), either on campus or through a contract or formal agreement.
Reference:

* *Campus Violence Prevention and Response: Best Practices for Massachusetts Higher Education,* June 2008

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 6.63. Conduct Drills and Exercises
Discussion: In addition to LE and EMS, participating entities in local drills should include schools, hospitals, businesses, and other community stakeholders at every opportunity.
Reference:

* *State Board of Emergency Medical, Fire, and Transportation Services*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

65

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

VII. INTELLIGENCE

Risk Analysis - Target Identification

Task 7.1. **Create a List of Possible Iconic Targets in the Jurisdiction**
Discussion. Assemble/maintain a list of possible high profile, "soft targets" in the jurisdiction. Past history has shown the determination of terrorists to seek high body counts, go after iconic targets, and cause economic damage. Since attacks against soft targets are relatively easy and cheap to mount, such institutions will remain targets of future attacks. Typical targeted locations were:
- Public spaces
- Placed where many people were coming or going
- Places with limited ingress and egress points
- Places with high-density crowds

References.
- *Mumbai AAR*, (page 21)
- NCBRT*, Participant Guide: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated, Attacks, Version 1.1 rev2, Part 2-20. (Baton Rouge, LA, 2016)*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.2. **Maintain a Prioritized List of Critical Infrastructure in the Region**
Discussion. Identify critical infrastructure that may be targeted in a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack. Consider the estimated impacts and possible cascading effects that damage to or loss of such critical infrastructure would have on the surrounding community and region.

References.
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, July 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.3. **Maintain a Contact List for Community Leaders in the Region**
Discussion. In the event that attackers seek to disrupt government by targeting public officials, a contact list of community leaders that include both their home and work addresses can help provide timely warnings and greatly reduce response times. In past instances of Complex Coordinated Terrorists Attacks, attackers have targeted specific individuals or groups of individuals. Specific targeting of an individual may not be particularly telling, but it normally indicates a high degree of planning by attackers.

References.
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, July 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

67

Task 7.4. **Conduct "Walk Throughs" of Key Facilities by First Responders**
Discussion. Periodically conduct "walk throughs" of key facilities to include malls, schools, churches, and sports venues, to thoroughly familiarize first responders with each facility's entry and access points, floor plan, passageways, location of power sources, control centers, internal communications and CCTC coverage.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Tactical Response Workshop, June 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Community Outreach

Task 7.5. **Educate the Public to Recognize and Report Terrorist Activity**
Discussion. Develop outreach materials to educate the public on recognizing and reporting behaviors and incidents that point toward terrorism or other criminal activity. Existing SAR awareness training programs, such as NSI's Hometown Security Partners training programs available at http://nsi.ncirc.gov/training_online.aspx can be used to educate those partner with missions similar to law enforcement.
References.
- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* https://hsin.dhs.gov, (page 15)
- http://nsi.ncirc.gov/training_online.aspx

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.6. **Promote the "See Something, Say Something®" Campaign**
Discussion. Conduct a Public Awareness Campaign about detecting and appropriately addressing indicators of potential multiple casualty violence focused on
- Increase trust between law enforcement and the general public
- Reduce individual's reluctance to come forward
- Dismiss the notion that "minding one's own business is acceptable and instill a sense of moral obligation to protect fellow community members
- Direct people to available resources – who to contact, how to contact (advertise the DHS tip line and other various modalities such as telephone, Internet, telephone and texting).
References.
- *Strategic Approaches to Information Sharing*, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2013. (page 13, rec. 3)
- https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.7. Recruit Community Partners to the "See Something, Say Something®" Campaign

Discussion. The "If You See Something, Say Something®" campaign forms partnerships to help reach the public across the nation. Our partners increase awareness by displaying the campaign's messages and distributing outreach materials, including Public Service Announcements (PSAs).

Partners include, but are not limited to:

- States, cities, and counties
- Airports and mass transit entities
- Sports leagues and teams
- Major sports events and entertainment venues
- Colleges and universities
- Fairs and festivals
- Private sector businesses
- Media outlets

References.

- https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something/become-partner

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.8. Create Statute to Limit Liability for Citizens Reporting Indicators of Potentially Violent Behavior

Discussion. Draft a model statute providing limited liability for citizens who report indicators of potentially violent behavior.

Reference.

- *Strategic Approaches to Information Sharing,* U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, (2013) (page 13, Recommendation 8)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.9. Promote Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS) Program

Discussion. In order to increase the outreach of intelligence and law enforcement capacity during times of emergencies, jurisdictions should promote the VIPS Program in their communities. Volunteers in Police Service is a locally-driven Citizen Corps program that allows community members to offer their time and talents to their local law enforcement agency. The Volunteers in Police encourages individuals to provide support local police departments and sheriff's offices. Volunteers in Police Service serves both a volunteer's desire to serve as well as a law enforcement agency's need for support.

References.

- http://nnw.org/volunteers-police-service-vips

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.10. **Expand Upon the Local Neighborhood Watch Program.**
Discussion. The Neighborhood Watch Program is an element of the Citizens' Corps that focuses on crime prevention in the community. The National Neighborhood Watch Program unites law enforcement agencies, private organizations, and individual citizens in a nation-wide effort to reduce crime and improve local communities. The Neighborhood Watch program empowers citizens to become active in community efforts through participation in Neighborhood Watch groups. This existing program can be expanded upon to increase awareness of terrorism and terrorist activities –and also address helping those disabled or in need of assistance in the aftermath of a tragedy/disaster.
References.

- http://www.nnw.org/

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.11. **Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) Program**
Discussion. Consider instituting a Building Communities of Trust Program to engage community leaders in SAR efforts. Guidance on how to establish a BCOT program is available at http://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/BCOT_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
References.

- http://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/BCOT_Fact_Sheet.pdf
- http://nsi.ncirc.gov/training_online.aspx

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.12. **Promote InfraGard Among Businesses in the Jurisdiction.**
Discussion. InfraGard is a non-profit organization serving as a public-private partnership between U.S. businesses and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The organization is an information sharing and analysis effort serving the interests, and combining the knowledge base of, a wide range of private sector and government members. InfraGard is an association of individuals that facilitates information sharing and intelligence between businesses, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to prevent hostile acts against the United States. InfraGard's mutual nondisclosure agreements among its members and the FBI promotes trusted discussions of vulnerabilities and solutions that companies and individuals may be hesitant to place in the public domain and provide access to additional threat information from the FBI.
References.

- www.infragard.org

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.13. Promote the Bomb Making Materials Awareness Program

Discussion. The Bomb-Making Materials Awareness Program (BMAP) is a national outreach program, sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, designed to increase public and private sector awareness of the use of homemade explosive (HME) precursor chemicals, explosive powders, and improvised explosive device (IED) components. Through increased awareness, BMAP builds a network of vigilant and informed private sector partners who serve as the Nation's counter-IED "eyes-and-ears" as the first line of defense in providing early detection of the sale of HME precursor chemicals to suspect individuals. Program Description BMAP provides the training, tools, and resources that help local first responders and other community outreach officers engage a wide range of private sector establishments within their jurisdictions that manufacture, distribute, or sell products that contain HME precursor chemicals or explosive powders. Participants who attend the BMAP training become BMAP Outreach Officers who reach out to local businesses in their jurisdictions to help employees identify relevant HME precursor chemicals, explosive powders, potential critical IED components, suspicious purchasing behavior, and proper reporting procedures. The program simultaneously encourages stronger relationships between businesses and local law enforcement, and reinforces the foundation of effective community safety and security. This program serves to:

- Enhance public/private partnerships
- Increase private sector point-of-sale awareness
- Increase identification of suspicious purchasing behavior and reporting
- Promote community-based policing
- Provide free, secure access to training and awareness materials
- Provide reporting mechanisms to track and measure success
- Strengthens prevention opportunities

References.

- The Bomb-Making Materials Awareness Program at http://www.dhs.gov/bomb-making-materials-awarenessprogram.
- DHS Office for Bombing Prevention, http://www.dhs.gov/obp
- https://learn.nctsn.org/enrol/index.php?id=38

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.14. Train Terrorism (Threat) Liaison Officers

Discussion. Consider instituting a Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program, whereby TLOs are trained to be their agency's representative at the fusion center and can relay terrorism threat information to public safety officials.

References.

- National Counterterrorism Center, *JCTAWS Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack*, (page 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.15. **Train Select Volunteers as Infrastructure Liaison Officers.**
Discussion. Texas seeks to build a robust statewide network of public and private sector volunteers helping Texas law enforcement reduce vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure. The Texas Joint Crime Information Center's Infrastructure Liaison Officer (ILO) program is a network of trusted citizen volunteers or law enforcement officers recruited and trained to help Texas protect its infrastructure from crime, sabotage, and terrorism. ILOs are partners of the state's primary fusion center, the JCIC, which house a diversity of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies working together under one roof. ILOs are trained to see and report suspicious activities. In turn, the JCIC can use the reporting to create investigative leads and awareness to guard against threats.
References.
- http://www.dps.texas.gov/IntelligenceCounterTerrorism/ictILOBrochure.pdf
- tip@dps.texas.gov

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.16. **Adopt the Las Vegas Pathfinder Program for Hotels and Schools**
Discussion. As used in Las Vegas casinos, coordinate with each jurisdiction's hotels, malls, major sports venues, schools, hospitals and churches to designate one or more employees of that facility/organization tasked during an incident to move to a specified location equipped with master keys, maps, and mobile communications to meet and respond to facility-specific questions of arriving responders. If CCTV cameras exist, this individual should also be able to provide camera access.
References.
- M. Sanderson, 2018 ALERRT Conference, Grapevine, Texas

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.17. **Enact Counter Violent Extremism Training Programs.**
Discussion. Adopt and/or create training programs to counter violent extremism. Develop training programs and/or protocols to neutralize the radicalization of people within the community and to open lines of communications to report radicalized persons preparing to commit violent acts.
References.
- *Paris AAR*, (page 21)
- START Countering Violent Terrorism Training Course, 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

72

Situational Awareness

Task 7.18. Construct Synchronization Matrix for Intelligence Response
Discussion. Provide detectives, investigators, and intelligence analysts with a synchronization matrix listing key tasks to be accomplished aligned with phases of response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack. This matrix is graphic representation of planned actions aligned to time and/or events. It facilitates the integration of planning and resources and manages the alignment of available capabilities to each task. The synchronization matrix: provides a quick aid to decision making; shortens reaction times; acts as a blueprint for response to a variety of contingencies; provides continuity to staff and decision makers in the absence of key personnel; and lessens the impact of stress and sleep deprivation by providing a previously determined series of actions.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, July 2018.

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.19. Develop a Data Collection Process for Suspicious Activity.
Discussion. Develop a data collection process and a secure standardized reporting format for sharing suspicious activity. Review other agencies' SAR process missions/standard operating procedures to better understand the process and identify promising practices. Define and communicate trends in terrorism-related activity, geographically specific threat reporting, dangers to critical infrastructure, and general situational awareness.
References.
- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* https://hsin.dhs.gov, (page 15)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.20. Use National Standards to Analyze SAR Data
Discussion. Adopt common national standards to enhance your capability to quickly and accurately analyze suspicious activity data, such as the ISE-SAR Functional Standard, the National Information Exchange Model, and the records management system and computer-aided dispatch (CAD) functional standards.
References.
- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* https://hsin.dhs.gov, (page 15)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.21. Incorporate Guidelines to Establish the SAR Process
Discussion. Incorporate appropriate guidelines and concepts into agency operations, such as the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the Fusion Center Guidelines, the Findings and Recommendations of the SAR support and Implementation Project., and privacy and civil liberties templates. Use these guidelines to establish and integrate the SAR process.
References.

- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* https://hsin.dhs.gov, (page 15)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.22.   Roster of Intelligence Analysts
Discussion. Maintain a consolidated, cross-jurisdictional list of intelligence analysts with their level of security clearances and data bases accesses at the regional level.
References.

- *Washington Navy Yard AAR,* (page 79)
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, July 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.23.   Access Intelligence Analysts' Databases
Discussion. Develop and maintain a list of all databases to which intelligence analysts are allowed access. Require intelligence analysts to demonstrate timely access and familiarity in their use during semi-annual line inspections. Maintain a consolidated list of intelligence analysts with their level of security clearances and data bases accesses at the regional level.
References.

- *Washington Navy Yard AAR,* (page 79)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.24. Train All Agency Personnel on the SAR Process
Discussion. Institutionalize the SAR process with in your agency, ensuring that all agency personnel are trained in the process. Ensure that law enforcement and public safety personnel understand the SAR process and what internal policies or protocols exist to share appropriate information. Familiarize employees through available training classes to enhance capabilities such as the NSI training programs available at http://nsi.ncirc.gov or the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) program available at www.SLATT.org
References.

- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* https://hsin.dhs.gov, (page 15)
- http://nsi.ncirc.gov

- www.SLATT.org

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.25. **Connect to Major Information Sharing Networks**
Discussion. Take advantage of proven and trusted technology to share information, communicate and gain access to additional resources, such as RISSNet or LEO.
References.
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guidance for Local Jurisdictions*, (Slide - Questions to Consider, bullet 7)
- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* https://hsin.dhs.gov, (page 15)
- http://nsi.ncric.gov

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.26. **Access/Use the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)**
Discussion. Gain access and familiarity to the Homeland Security Information Network – a national, secure, and trusted web-based portal for information sharing and collaboration among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private-sector partners engaged in the Homeland Security mission. HSIN provides secure, real-time collaboration tools, including virtual meeting space, instant messaging and document sharing. Users can securely share within their communities or reach out to other communities as needed.
References.
- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* https://hsin.dhs.gov, (page 8)
- https://www.cjis.gov
- http://www.nctc.gov

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.27. **Establish an HSIN Community of Interest**
Discussion. Establish a regional Community of Interest on HSIN among law enforcement agencies that facilitates information sharing during an incident. Include local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.
References.
- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* https://hsin.dhs.gov, (page 15)
- http://nsi.ncric.gov

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

75

Task 7.28. OpenSource.gov
Discussion. The Open Source Center and its partners provide timely and tailored translations, reporting and analysis on foreign policy and national security issues. The website features reports and translations from thousands of publications, television, and radio stations, and Internet sources from around the world. The site also features a video archive and fee-based commercial data bases for which OSC has negotiated licenses. OSC's reach extends from hard-to-find publications and vide to reports from some of the most renowned thinkers on national security issues inside and outside the U.S. Government. Federal, state, and local government employees can apply for an account at http://opensource.gov.
References.
- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* https://hsin.dhs.gov, (page 8)
- http://opensource.gov

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.29. Law Enforcement Exercise Portal (LEEP)
Discussion. LEEP is an official government information-sharing and electronic-communications portal currently provides SSO access to LEO, RISSNet, the Joint Automated Booking System (JABS), the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), eGuardian, the Internet Crime Complaint Center, the National Data Exchange (N-DEx), Intelink, and the Department of Justice myFX.
References.
- https://www.cjis.gov
- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* (page 8)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.30. Law Enforcement Online (LEO)
Discussion. Law Enforcement Online is a secure, Internet-based information sharing system for agencies around the world involved in law enforcement, first response, criminal justice, counterterrorism, and intelligence. Through LEO, members can access or share Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information anytime and anywhere, from any computer system with an Internet connection. This official government information-sharing and electronic communications platform provides FBI, joint FBI and DHS, NCTC, and non-federally produced intelligence products at the LES/FOUO level.

LEO also provides members access to tactical tools, such as the Virtual Command Center, ORION, Trax, and the National Alert System. Federal state, local, tribal, and territorial personnel performing homeland security or law

76

enforcement duties and foreign law enforcement personnel can request accounts.

References.

- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* (page 8)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.31. Virtual Command Center (VCC)

Discussion. Virtual Command Center is a real-time situational awareness tool that can help law enforcement and other authorities during many situations such as special events, warrant sweeps, investigations, and natural disasters. Virtual Command Center is accessed through the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) information-sharing system.

References.

- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* (page 8)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.32. FBI Active Shooter Initiative

Discussion. The FBI Active Shooter Resources page provides a clearinghouse for materials available to law enforcement agencies and other first responders around the country to ensure preparedness for Active Shooter cases and Mass Casualty Incidents. FBI Active Shooter Resources page is available through the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) information-sharing system.

References.

- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* (page 8)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.33. Regional Information Sharing Systems Network (RISSNET).

Discussion. RISSNet facilitates information sharing within the law enforcement community to combat criminal activities and conspiracies that take place in several jurisdictions. It contains six multistate intelligence centers (RISS Intelligence Centers) and members include federal, state, local, tribal and territorial law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement agencies may request access through the regional RISS Intelligence Centers or apply online.

References.

- http://riss.net
- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* (page 8)
- www.nctc.gov/jcat/html

77

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.34. Technical Resources for Incident Prevention (TRIPwire).
Discussion. Use TRIPwire for access to DHS's 24/7 online, secure, collaborative information-sharing network for bomb squad, law enforcement, and other emergency services personnel to learn about current terrorist improvised explosive device (IED) tactics, techniques, and procedures, including design and emplacement considerations. TRIPwire combines expert analyses and reports with relevant documents, images, and videos gathered directly from terrorist sources to help law enforcement officials anticipate, identify, and prevent IED incidents.
References.
- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* (page 9)
- www.tripwire.dhs.gov
- Office for Bombing Prevention at OBP@dhs.gov
- TRIPwire Help Desk at help@tripwire-dhs.gov

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Investigations

Task 7.35. Provide Dedicated Investigative Radio Channel
Discussion. A dedicated encrypted radio channel should be established, known, and available to all investigative personnel to coordinate and communicate actions.
References.
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR*, (page 79)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.36. Establish Tactical Exploitation Team(s)
Discussion. Develop law enforcement agencies' capability to quickly insert a Tactical Exploitation Team into incident sites once secured to quickly gather cell phones, tablets, laptops/computers, pocket trash, and documents for analysis. Also provide the capability of lifting latent prints and fingerprints of disabled attackers.
References:
- M. Sanderson, 2018 ALERRT Conference, Grapevine, Texas

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

78

Task 7.37. Tactical Site Exploitation
Discussion. Train law enforcement investigative team(s) to rapidly assign and push teams into the incident site, identified residences, automobiles, and residences, storage units of attackers and associates in order to gather information to prevent further attacks. This may include obtaining cell phones, laptops, pocket trash, and use of devices to digitally scan prints.
References:
- M. Sanderson, 2018 ALERRT Conference, Grapevine, Texas

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.38. Provide Training to Responders in Evidence Exploitation
Discussion. Provide first responders training on real-time intelligence gathering and exploitation. Provide awareness training to prepare Fire Service, EMS, and Public Works personnel, to be alert for preservation, collection and exploiting of evidence during an emergency event.
References:
- National Counterterrorism Center, *JCTAWS Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack*, (page 4)
- M. Sanderson, 2018 ALERRT Conference, Grapevine, Texas

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.39. Develop a Mass Witness Management Plan
Discussion. Develop a mass witness management plan or protocol that outlies the process by which many witnesses can be quickly and effectively evacuat4d, triaged, and interviewed. The plan should also include an appropriate checklist that can be used by detectives to quickly process large numbers of potential witnesses.
References.
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR*, (page 77)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status**

Task 7.40. Use a Common Witness Interview Form
Discussion. There will be a number of agencies responding that typically use different interview forms. Reach agreement on a regional Mass Violence Interview Form to be used by all investigative agencies. Provide ample copies for investigators from all agencies to use.
References.
- 2018 ALERRT Conference, Gaylord, Texas

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status**

Task 7.41.   Dispatch/911 Training – Intelligence Gathering

Discussion. Ensure that Dispatch and 911 personnel are trained and provided reference checklists to assist in ASI and intelligence gathering. Ensure that they are trained to be able to provide and explain recommended actions for evacuation, shelter in place, etc.

Reference.

- "*Active Attack Training for Dispatchers and Keeping the Lost Alive.*" Wayne Freeman, South Carolina Law Enforcement at the 2018 ALERRT Symposium, Grapevine, Texas, November 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status**

Task 7.42.   Dispatch/911 Training - **Fire Arms Recognition**

Discussion. Allow Dispatchers to listen to the sounds of firearms training conducted by law enforcement agencies in their region so as to better recognize the sounds of gunfire, types of weapons being used that may be heard over the telephone in 9-1-1 emergency calls.

References.

- "*Active Attack Training for Dispatchers and Keeping the Lost Alive.*" Wayne Freeman, South Carolina Law Enforcement at the 2018 ALERRT Symposium, Grapevine, Texas, November 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date:

SAR/Intelligence/Tips Hotline

Task 7.43.   Create Mechanisms to Report Indicators of Potentially Violent Behavior

Discussion. Use technology to create mechanisms that allow individuals to anonymously report indicators of potentially violent behavior. This might be a standard Intelligence and Tips Hotline or an online platform for submission of Suspicious Activity Reports. Forward this information to the Houston Regional Intelligence Services Center for analysis and possible action.

References.

- *Strategic Approaches to Information Sharing,* U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2013. (Page 13, Recommendation 6)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.44. Create Intelligence/Tips Hotline
Discussion. Contract, lease, or obtain access to a toll-free number to be able to immediately establish an Intelligence/Tips Hotline for Suspicious Activity Reporting specific to an incident. It may be possible to coordinate this hotline with the Fusion Center servicing that region. Assign a law enforcement detective to this hotline to answer questions from call takers and to review information received for timely action.
References.
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions* (Slide: Benchmarks – Comms, bullet 4*)*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.45. Create Protocol for Intelligence/Tips Hotline
Discussion. If called upon to establish an Intelligence/Tips Hotline, establish a protocol for dispatchers/call takers that organizes the information received and provides them a series of questions to solicit information that might otherwise be overlooked. Provide a call intake form or electronic procedure to record call information and transmit same to a detective on station, the servicing Fusion Center, and to elements in the field.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, (August 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.46. 1-800-Call FBI
Discussion. In the absence of a toll-free number or a SAR/Tips Hotline, the Intelligence Section should consider requesting use of the FBI's 1-800-Call FBI number to solicit information and tips from the public.
References.
- SA Michelle Lee, "*Resilience, Recovery and the Media*," presentation, 2018 ALERRT Conference, Grapevine, Texas (November 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.47. Develop Protocol for Intelligence/Tips Hotline
Discussion. Create procedures, script, and questions and Call Sheet by which call takers can cogently capture key information provided by callers to the Intelligence/Tips Hotline. Develop techniques for call takers to solicit information from the public to help identify, locate attackers/criminals. Develop a drill for the assigned section/agency tasked with activating and staffing the Intelligence/Tips Hotline.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, July 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.48. Request Medical Facilities Report Suspicious Injuries
Discussion. Work with hospitals and medical facilities to develop protocol to report suspicious injuries to law enforcement that may point to the illegal or unsafe use of explosives, chemical, biological and radioactive materials.
References.
- National Counterterrorism Center, *JCTAWS Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack*, (page 4)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.49. Public Works Officials Map Subterranean Passageways/Sewers/ Waterways with Intersections, Access and Entry Points.
Discussion: In the effort to identify, isolate and contain suspected terrorists, Incident Commanders and Intelligence assets must be able to identify, monitor, and close off possible avenues of access/escape offered by subterranean passageways. The jurisdiction, working in concert with private sector entities, should assemble a concise mapping of subterranean tunnels, waterways, sewers, and utility passages, with possible entry and access points. This information should be made readily available to the Incident Commander and ICS General Staff (Intelligence and Operations) during an emergency situations.
Reference:
- Kevin Clement, SETRPC Tactical Response Workshop, June 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Technology and Equipment

Task 7.50. Access to Private Facilities CCTV Cameras/Footage
Discussion: Coordinate with business leaders and facility owners to provide local law enforcement agencies access to private facilities security cameras/footage Intelligence and information sharing typically continue to be a problem among public and private sector entities within a metropolitan area. Arrangements should be made to provide law enforcement access to private facilities security cameras/footage during a crisis. Ideally, continuous access by law enforcement officers to real-time camera footage will significantly assist law enforcement response to a terrorist threat and criminal activities.
Reference:
- *Aurora AAR,* (page)
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, July 2018

Responsibility: Local Businesses   **Assisted by:** Chamber of Commerce
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.51.   Access Highway Cameras
Discussion. Coordinate with and refine procedures to access Interstate and state highway cameras for intelligence purposes during a Terrorist Attack.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, July 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.52.   Train to Facilitate CCTV Camera Operator Integration
Discussion. The various units or entities responsible for CCTV cameras and security personnel at given locations (military installations, government facilities, transportation hubs, etc.) should regularly coordinate and train with one another to ensure all personnel are aware of camera locations, access protocols, and information sharing procedures in the event of an incident. This is especially important for locations that may have multiple or different units responsible for various portions or sections of a large facility or installation.
References.
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR,* (page 79)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.53.   Listing of CCTV Camera Coverage and Contacts
Discussion. Develop a list of facilities and areas covered by CCTV cameras and in the case of private facilities, obtain the 24-hour contact information of owners and operators to gain access to surveillance footage.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (July 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.54.   Memorandum of Agreement – Access to CCTV Camera Footage
Discussion. Obtain a memorandum of agreement with private sector stakeholders to gain access to CCTV camera surveillance footage.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (July 2018)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.55.   Computer Aided Dispatch Updates to Street Names
Discussion. Ensure all street names and addresses of internal or gated complexes are included in the jurisdiction's Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. Ensure that this includes street names and addresses for military or naval installations within or adjacent to the jurisdiction. Review and update on a regularly scheduled basis.

References.
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR,* (page 70)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.56.   **Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems**
Discussion. Consider use of small drones by Special Operations and Tactics Teams to safely reconnoiter areas and inside buildings to locate, identify, and gather further intelligence on attackers without exposure of first responders. This capability is now relatively inexpensive as small Commercial Off-the-Shelf drones can routinely provide necessary visual and camera capabilities.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, July 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.57. **Report Illegal or Unauthorized Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems**
Discussion. Develop a formalized approach to monitoring, reporting, and responding to drone activity in conjunction with the servicing Fusion Center.
References:
- National Counterterrorism Center, *JCTAWS Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack*, (page 4)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.58.   **Use of Robotics in Reconnaissance**
Discussion. Consider the use of robots for reconnaissance to determine the location of attackers without exposing law enforcement officers and responders.
References:
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, July 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Fusion Center

Task 7.59. Partner with Fusion Centers and Public Safety Agencies
Discussion. Foster interagency collaboration to maximize resources and create an effective and efficient information-sharing environment. Partner with other law enforcement, public safety, private-sector, and state or major urban area fusion centers
References.
- Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, *Intelligence Guide for First Responders,* https://hsin.dhs.gov, (page 15)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.60. **Leverage Fusion Centers to Enhance Intelligence Outreach**
Discussion. Leverage fusion centers to develop or enhance outreach opportunities to private sector officials and community volunteer organizations (e.g., Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative).
References.

- National Counterterrorism Center, *JCTAWS Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack*, (page 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.61. **Conduct Ongoing Coordination with Fusion Center(s)**
Discussion. Conduct periodic meetings between law enforcement and fire marshals and officials/analysts from the servicing Fusion Center to discuss information requirements and promote the accessibility of threat-related products. Discussion should seek to address any challenges to information sharing between local and state agencies, the Fusion Center, and non-government entities.
References.

- National Counterterrorism Center, *JCTAWS Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack*, (page 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.62. **Develop Formal Procedures to Share Threat Information Between the Fusion Center and Public Safety Organizations.**
Discussion. Determine and test best communication methods. Consider use of such existing systems as:

- Homeland Security Information Network
- FBI's Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP)
- Regional Intelligence Sharing Systems (RISS)
- Law Enforcement Online (LEO)
- eGuardian
- Virtual Command Center (VCC)

Provide a direct line from Incident Command (Area Command) to the Fusion Center. Consider deployment of an Intelligence Strike Team/Task Force with internal communications capabilities.
References.

- National Counterterrorism Center, *JCTAWS Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack*, (page 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.63. Create Critical Information Requirements for Terrorist Attacks
Discussion. In coordination with law enforcement and fire investigators and servicing fusion center(s), develop a set of questions to focus responders' attention and subsequent reports so as to help garner key information early in the attack. This typically includes detailed queries as to:
- Number of attackers
- Attire
- Body Armor
- Weapons
- Behavior/Aggressiveness
- Declarative Statements
- Remote Command and Control

References.
- NCBRT*, Participant Guide: Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated, Attacks, Version 1.1rev2,* Part 2-24. *(Baton Rouge, LA, 2016)*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.64.   Deployment of an Intelligence Strike Team
Discussion. It is recommended that the regional leaders coordinate in advance with their supporting Fusion Center to request deployment of an Intelligence Strike Team with organic communications capabilities to assist the Area Command in the event of an Active Shooter or terrorist attack. This Intelligence Strike Team would greatly assist in intelligence gathering and analysis and ensure close communications with the Fusion Center.

References.
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, TX, July 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.65. Monitor Social Media for Intelligence
Discussion. Establish a trained section at the Fusion Center level to monitor social media for information from the terrorists and their organization regarding the attack. This information, such as declarative statements may provide insight to the mindset of the attackers, and may assist Incident Commanders in their decision-making process.

References.
- National Counterterrorism Center, *JCTAWS Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack*, (page 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.66.   Provide a Forum for First Responders and Private Sector
Discussion. Provide a forum for first responders and private sector to identify processes for receiving information that will help with preparedness.
References.
- National Counterterrorism Center, *JCTAWS Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack*, (page 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.67. **SAR Training for All First Responders**
Discussion. Ensure Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) training is provided to all Fire, Law Enforcement, EMS, and Public Works personnel on a periodic, recurring basis.
References.
- National Counterterrorism Center, *JCTAWS Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack*, (page 1)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Explosives

Task 7.68. **Provide Radiation Isotope Identification Devices (RIIDs) to Law Enforcement Officers.**
Discussion. Issue RIIDS to law enforcement officers on patrol to help identify the presence and/or illegal use of radiological materials in the community.
References.

-

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.69. **Install Radiation Isotope Identification Devices (RIIDs) on Publicly-Owned Garbage Trucks.**
Discussion. Install RIIDS on community trash trucks to help identify the presence and/or illegal use of radiological materials in the community.
References:

-

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Critical Infrastructure

Task 7.70. **Database for Critical Infrastructure Stakeholders.**
Discussion. Create a data base of critical infrastructure stakeholders and the sectors, subsectors and facilities for which they have purview in both the public and private sector. Ensure that this data is readily accessible by Fusion Center analysts and DHS Protective Security Advisors in order to notify and advise business owners and facility managers of possible threats.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, July 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 7.71. **Protocols to Warn/Update Critical Infrastructure Stakeholders.**
Discussion. In collaboration with DHS Protective Security Advisors cybersecurity Advisors and Critical Infrastructure Stakeholders, establish protocols to provide warnings and intelligence updates to pending or possible threats. Test these protocols to ensure their effectiveness.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Intelligence Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, July 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

VIII. OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

Plans, Policy, and Procedures

Task 8.1. Goal for Operational Communications.
Discussion: Have a clear idea of an effective communications system. Ensure the capacity to communicate with both the emergency response community and the affected populations and establish interoperable voice and data communications between local, state, tribal, territorial, and Federal first responders. Re-establish sufficient communications infrastructure within the affected areas to support ongoing life-sustaining activities, provide basic human needs, and transition to recovery.
References:
- *National Response Framework,* (page 23)

Responsibility:　　　　　　　　　　**Assisted by:**
Target Date:　　　　　　　　　　　　**Status:**

Task 8.2. Ensure Familiarity with the National Communications System.
Discussion: The DHS/National Communications system coordinates the reestablishment of the critical communications infrastructure, facilitates the stabilization of systems and applications from cyber-attacks, and coordinates communications support to response efforts. Functions include but are not limited to: coordination with telecommunications and information technology industries, reestablishment and repair of telecommunications infrastructure, protection, reestablishment, and sustainment of national cyber and information technology resources, oversight of communications within the Federal response structures.
References:
- *National Response Framework,* (page 32)

Responsibility:　　　　　　　　　　**Assisted by:**
Target Date:　　　　　　　　　　　　**Status:**

Task 8.3. Establish Plans For A Joint Threat Assessment.
Discussion: The purpose of the joint threat assessment is to determine the likelihood of an intentional incident and identify response actions that should be performed by law enforcement and public health. It is recommended that the joint threat assessment be conducted by a conference call and, at a minimum, include the following representatives: Law enforcement (trained in WMD response), Public health (epidemiologist, clinician, laboratorian), Communications (law enforcement and public health). The agenda of the conference call may include: incident briefing by public health, explanation of concern by public health, update on confirmed or suspected cases, demographic information: gender, age, race, ethnicity, occupation, religious affiliation, membership in any groups or associations, description of where patient lives

89

(e.g., urban, rural), patient's recent travel history (e.g., domestic or international), recent activities that may be related to exposure and illness, current laboratory test results, hypotheses regarding source of exposure, syndromic surveillance: any unusual patterns of disease presentation or geographical clustering of disease. Law enforcement information / intelligence: information on existing threats in the jurisdiction (WMD or otherwise), WMD intelligence that may be connected to patient's exposure (e.g., religious affiliation, group, association), intelligence regarding acquisition or intended use of any biological threat agent, which may be related to the patient's symptoms.

References:

- *Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook*, FBI/CDC, (page 54)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.4. Develop A Multi-Agency Communications Plan

Discussion: Develop a multi-agency communication plan that can be implemented on short notice, including schools and business. The communication plan should include contingency plans in the event networks are inaccessible. The plan should establish a common language upon prior to an event among responding agencies. All information released to the public about an event must be consistent across agencies and comes from a designated Public Information Officer, as specified in the plan. A survey of radio equipment and encryption type for each department and discipline should be conducted while completing the plan. All information should be set forth in a crisis manual which is used both in rehearsals and in actual events. A manual with a modular structure, such as a loose-leaf binder, can easily be updated and permits information to be tailored according to need. The manual should be available both as hard copy and electronically.

References:

- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response,* (page 11)
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response,* (page 23).
- *A Critical Incident Review of the Kalamazoo, Michigan, Public Safety Response to the February 20, 2016, Mass Shooting Incident,* (page 37)
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response,* (page 9)
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page A-2)
- *SAFE-COMMS Terrorism Crisis Communication Manual for Public Authorities,* (page 44)
- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.5. Establish a Two-Level Communications Plan

Discussion: The plan should be able to be activated on short notice and should rapidly facilitate communications on two levels, the Incident Coordination Channel, and an On-scene Command Channel. The Incident Coordination Channel should be between the initial senior officer on-scene and the city/county dispatch center or appropriate entity coordinating the operational response. A dedicated incident coordination channel with dispatch is needed to ensure a single dispatcher is not overwhelmed and to ensure the on-scene commander has direct and uninterrupted communications with the dispatch to facilitate information follow and the requests for resources.

References:

- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page A-1)
- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.6. Develop Continuity Plans To Mitigate Cellular Degradation.

Discussion: Cellular systems typically become severely overwhelmed during the incident, severely impacting communications and response. The region/jurisdiction should develop communications continuity plans using a diverse set of tools, systems, and applications to mitigate cellular degradation. Include GETS, WPS, Satellite telephones, and non-traditional communications methods.

References:

- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page A-2)
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* p. (page F-2)
- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.7. Incorporate Non-Traditional/Basic Communication Methods.

Discussion: First responders should be prepared for the possibility of having to relay information through non-traditional modes of communication, such as utilizing runners or hand signals.

Reference:

- *Washington Navy Yard AAR,* (page 78)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.8. Establish Procedures for Rapid Recall of Personnel
Discussion: Develop and exercise a series of complex attack response plans that address the quick recall of personnel and the use of communications tools that enable the dispatch center to track and communicate needs to EOCs. Be prepared to obtain all necessary authorizations required to initiate the recall of local and regional tactical teams, who may have a 1-2 hour response time.
References:
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (pages 8, 9)
- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center.
Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.9. Point of Contact for Wireless Priority Services (WPS)
Discussion. Include WPS servicing Point of Contact in agency emergency plans.
References.
- *Pre-decisional Draft, Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page F-3)
Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.10. Establish Pre-Existing Relationships with Regional Facilities.
Discussion: A written memorandum of agreement should be maintained between facilities and agencies who may respond to a CCTA regarding access to CCTV Cameras, public announcement systems, two-way communication systems and alarm controls. A representative with knowledge of the incident location including buildings, security measures, primary and secondary lines of communication, and protocols must be able to provide background information on facilities in an area of operation. Ensure that video feeds are viewable from a central command station.
Reference:
- *Washington Navy Yard*, (page 79)
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response*, (page 14)
- *Active Shooter Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, NYPD*, (page 2)
- *First Responder's Toolbox*, National Counter Terrorism Center.
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 117)
- Active Shooter Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, NYPD, (page 2)

- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.11. Coordinate Procedures for Response to Military Installations

Discussion: Importance of communication, standardization, and integration of communications and protocols, including radio interoperability, between DoD, first responders, and respective federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government agencies, and private sector partners. Military installations should ensure the utilization of FBI field offices, Joint Terrorism Task Forces and state and major urban area fusion centers for information and support. Inherent and exclusive federal jurisdiction requires memoranda of agreement or understanding allowing non-military first responders to respond to an incident on the installation.

References:

- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.12. Establish a Capability For Rapid Message Distribution.

Discussion: A fast response accomplishes the following: It builds credibility, it lets the public know there is a system in place, and it reassures the public that appropriate actions are being taken. The speed with which an agency responds to the public can be a sign of how prepared they are.

References:

- *Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication, Center for Disease Control,* (page 76)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.13. Establish Doctrine To Limit Overload Of Communication Services.

Discussion: Policy should be written to avoid duplicate relaying of information, which can lead to the overwhelming of call takers. In Israel, staff members are trained not to call the hospital while responding to an event so as to avoid overloading the telephone services and the attention span of staff already engaged in event management in the ED.

References:

- *Leadership During the Boston Marathon Bombings: A Qualitative After-Action Review,* (page 4)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.14. Assist Businesses in Developing Emergency Communication Plans.

Discussion: Critical infrastructure, such as privately-owned transportation and transit, telecommunications, utilities, financial institutions, hospitals, and other health regulated facilities should have effective business continuity plans. Put in place communications infrastructure that allows for facility-wide, real-time messaging. Put in place elevator systems that may be controlled or locked down from a central command station. The population at any given time is likely to be highly diverse and include children and foreign passengers with limited English proficiency complicating communication and evacuation efforts. Establish a notification plan for these passengers, and a plan for surrounding businesses.

References:
- *National Response Framework,* (page 3)
- *Active Shooter Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, NYPD,* (page 3)
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR*, (page 79)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Dispatch Center

Task 8.15. Recognize the Important Role of Dispatchers.
Discussion. Dispatchers are generally the first contact of the responder community to become engaged in an Active Shooter/Hostile Event and thus must become part of a seamless response.

    a. Rotate law enforcement, fire and EMS personnel through dispatch training
    b. Create a "Dispatch 101" and field training educational program
    c. Rotate cross-training assignments (have fire/EMS personnel teach law enforcement and vice versa)
    d. Integrate dispatch into all aspects of training and exercise scenarios
    e. Training and exercises should include victim simulations and training on recognizing the type of incident (the difference between shots fired and an active shooter)

References.
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS, The Interagency Board, September 2015, (page 9, para 5)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.16. Recognize and Address the "Communications Cascade."
Discussion. As the response progresses, the amount of information that needs to be managed and processed will grow significantly. Consider surge and technical support requirements, authenticating large volumes of information, potential cross-over to law enforcement and fire/EMS/radio channels or interoperable channels for direct communications, establishing or transitioning to a communications center. Use encrypted communications when available.

94

References.
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS,   The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (Page 14, para 3)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.17. Train, Exercise and Use Dispatch to Assist in Scene Management
Discussion. Dispatch can be a value added resource for incident commanders. Dispatchers can help direct arriving responders to staging areas and rally points, help avoid congestion, and assist in situational awareness and establishment of a common operating picture.
References.
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement, Fire and EMS*, The Interagency Board, September 2015. (page 14, paragraph 2, bullet 2)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.18. Compile/Update Notification Lists of Personnel and Agencies
Discussion. Establish a prioritized list of personnel and agencies that Dispatch should immediately notify of such incidents, to include:
  - Area and state law enforcement agencies
  - Area fire services
  - Area Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
  - Area hospitals
  - Fusion Center(s)
  - Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)
  - FBI
  - Public Works
  - City leaders
  - Others…

References.
- SETRPC Operational Communications Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, September 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.19. Agency Rapid Recall and Cell Phone/Email Rosters.
Discussion. Each responding agency (Law Enforcement, Fire Services, Emergency Medical Services, and Public Works Department) will provide Dispatch contact rosters of each responder agency to include cellular telephone, work telephone, home telephone, and email). This information may be used for rapid recall as well as back-up communications via cell phone, text, and emails

95

when radio communications becomes congested/unavailable. Agencies would be required to collect, submit and update this information on a regular (monthly?) basis.

References.

- SETRPC CCTA Operational Communications Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, September 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.20. Procedures to Re-Direct/De-Prioritize Non-Emergency Calls

Discussion: Dispatch must be prepared to transition responsibilities for receiving and authenticating large volumes of information to a dedicated communications center, which has the capacity to handle a significant increase of emergency communications as the response to a MCI progresses. A plan should be in place to divert non-emergency or non-related calls away from the primary communications center, as well as establishing protocols to handle non-emergency calls from family, friends, and media.

References:

- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page 8)
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response,* (page 14)
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 115)
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 88)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.21. Lease a 1-800 Number(s) for Large Incidents

Discussion. Historically, 9-1-1/Dispatch is deluged with telephone calls seeking incident information or attempting to provide information to law enforcement investigators. In the immediate aftermath of mass fatality incidents, there is typically a need to establish call in telephone numbers for intelligence and tips to solicit information from the public in order to prevent further attacks and loss of life; a Missing Persons Hotline; and a toll-free telephone number to the Family Assistance Center for those family members who are unable to travel to the region. A common and proven method to take pressure off 9-1-1 and free up Dispatchers to focus on emergency mission, is to activate a 1-800 number for the incident. The telephone number should be leased in advance in order to preclude delays and facilitate immediate activation.

Note: 211 has been used by some regions to provide a call-in number.

References.

- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions*, (Slide: Benchmarks – Comms, bullet 4)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.22. Improve Dispatch Intelligence Collection
Discussion: Ensure the dispatch obtains answers to the questions: who or what they saw, when they saw it, where it occurred, and why it is suspicious. Active shooter calls should contain information regarding the location of the active shooter, number of shooters, physical description of shooters, number and type of weapons held by shooters, number of potential victims at the location. Ensure follow-ups are conducted with callers to update incident command.   Establish guideline for call backs specifically, when to call, who to call, what text to use to convey a sense of emergency, and how acknowledgement is to be obtained from the person. Dispatchers should ensure that all pertinent information received during an emergency call is documented in the dispatch notes in addition to be broadcast over the radio, even after initial officers arrive on scene. Social media can be used to provide actionable information from institutions and can be a reliable source for the public.
Reference:
- *First Responder's Toolbox*, National Counter Terrorism Center.
- *Washington Navy Yard*, (page 71)
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 88)
- *A Critical Incident Review of the Kalamazoo, Michigan, Public Safety Response to the February 20, 2016, Mass Shooting Incident,* (page ii)
- *Leadership During the Boston Marathon Bombings: A Qualitative After-Action Review,* (page 4)
- *DHS Active Shooter Pocket Guide.*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.23. Provide Dispatch the Ability To Receive Text/Picture Messages.
Discussion: Dispatchers have used smartphones to receive critical information from callers during times of high congestion and communications failures. Voice, email, text, picture, video messages can all be used to receive and transmit emergency information. "Work-arounds," such as the use of smartphones, must be prepared to be utilized in the event of a communications failure.
Reference:
- *A Critical Incident Review of the Kalamazoo, Michigan, Public Safety Response to the February 20, 2016, Mass Shooting Incident,* (page. ii)
- *Lessons for First Responders on the Front Lines of Terrorism,* RAND Corporation.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

Task 8.24. Follow Responsible Initial Phase Principles
Discussion: Do not over reassure, express appropriate and accurate levels of concern. Acknowledge uncertainty, offer only what you know. Emphasize that a process is in place to learn more. Be consistent in providing messages. Put the good news in the secondary clauses.
References:
- *Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication*, Center for Disease Control, (page 41)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Organization

Task 8.25. Create Interagency Liaison Officer (ILO) Positions
Discussion. Create ILO positions in stationary places such as dispatch, and command centers. In the United Kingdom, ILOs have been used successfully to coordinate communications between the incident commander and law enforcement and fire/EMS responders. They help translate terminology and address gaps in interdisciplinary knowledge and understanding. The ILO Is similar in concept to a safety and intelligence officer. Note that the ILO is not considered a substitute for unified or coordinated command in warm zone operations.
References.
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS, The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (Page 15, para 7)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.26. Assign a Dedicated Tactical Dispatcher to Incident(s)
Discussion: Agencies should develop a tactical dispatcher system that produces a dedicated despatcher responsible for the operational needs of the incident and tactical commander. Dispatch must maintain a current contact number for the senior tactical advisor and should be clear as to the advisor's role in activating tactical mutual aid agreements (MAAs).
References:
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* Page 9)
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 115)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.27. Provide a Dedicated Tactical Dispatcher for Events
Discussion: The jurisdiction(s) should establish a threshold for the number projected attendees at a local event. Should attendance projections meet or

surpass that threshold, Dispatch should assign a dedicated tactical dispatcher throughout the conduct of the event.
References:
- *Las Vegas AAR,* (page 115)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Radio Communications

Task 8.28. Establish Joint Radio Channels
Discussion. Create joint radio channels for the jurisdiction/region that allow all public safety agencies can hear what each is doing.
References.
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response: Best Practices and Recommendations for Integrating Law Enforcement*, Fire and EMS,   The InterAgency Board, September 2015, (page 13, para 1, bullet 7)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Target Date:**

Task 8.29. Survey Jurisdiction for "Dead Spots" to Radio Communication
Discussion. Identify those areas within the jurisdiction that are susceptible to failures in communications. Develop solutions that may be implemented during emergencies to ensure communications coverage.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Operational Communications Workshop, Beaumont, Texas (September 2018)

Responsibility.   **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Target Date**

Task 8.30. Monitoring Communications Channels for Domain Awareness
Discussion. Provide fire services and EMS access to law enforcement communications channels. Allow them to monitor in order to enhance domain awareness.
References.
- *PER 335 – Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks.*

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.31. Establish Face-To-Face Communications Across Agencies
Discussion: Face-to-face communications should be established at a command center to limit reliance on other communication channels which may tend to fail in the presence of increased traffic. Pair personnel from different agencies together to facilitate face-to-face operational communication and limit the need for other means of communication, which contributes to electronic congestion and has a

99

potential for failure. Runners and radios can also be used in the absence of cellphone communication capabilities.
Reference:
- *Leadership During the Boston Marathon Bombings: A Qualitative After-Action Review, (page.* 4)
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 89)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Training and Exercises

Task 8.32. Test/Train with Pre-Programmed Regional Channels
Discussion: Inter-jurisdictional radio channels including Command, Tactical Response, Medical Response, and Investigations/Intelligence should be tested and trained with on a regular basis. Channels should be pre-programmed on agency radios.
References:
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response,* (page 14)
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page i)
- *National Response Framework,* (page 23)
- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center.
- *Boston Marathon AAR*, (page 120)
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 90)
- *National Interoperability Field Operations Guide,* (page 22)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.33. Invite Telecommunications Providers to Participate in Training
Discussion: Invite telecommunications providers servicing their jurisdictions to participate in drills and exercises that simulate the telecommunications emergency notification and request process.
References:
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page A-2)
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page F-2)
- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.34. Practice Implementing the Interagency Communications Plan
Discussion: Test all systems in the Interagency Communications Plan and identify potential problems prior to an incident. Equipment gaps in interoperability may be present and can be discovered in training. Radio "dead zones" may exist within an area of operations and must be detected in advance in order to be adequately prepared for a crisis. Training should include actual radio/audio recordings of active shooter responses and other training aids to include improvised explosive devices (IED) simulations, markings, precursors, photographs, and videos.
Reference:
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response, (*pages 9, 10, 13, 23)
- *Boston Marathon AAR, (*page 120)
- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center.
- *San Bernardino*, (page 115)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.35. Create Realistic Training Simulations
Discussion: Training should include actual radio/audio recordings of active shooter responses and other training aids to include improvised explosive devices (IED) simulations, markings, precursors, photographs, and videos.
Reference:
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response,* (pages 9, 10, 13, 23)
- *Boston Marathon AAR,* (page 120)
- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center.
- *San Bernardino*, (page 115)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.36. Be Familiar with ICS Communications.
Discussion: ICS Communications Unit Program Development Activities by State is a supplement to the ICS Communications Unit Implementation and best Practices guide and the IC Communications Unit Assessment and Development Matrix. This supplement provides a closer look at what is taking place around the country with local regional and statewide initiatives for ICS Communications. The intention is for it to be a dynamic document that is updated as OEC conducts Communications Unit program technical assistance and as States undertake or achieve initiatives. Utilize all assets of the Communications Unit Program Plan Outline including the Sustainable Funding Strategy Tool and Worksheets, Program Plan Outline Guide, Response Kit, Project Resource Planning Toolkit, and Standard Operating Procedure Template.

References:

- *ICS COMU Implementation and Best Practices: A Guide for Program Development,* (pages 47–48)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Technology and Equipment

Task 8.37. Survey of Radio Equipment.
Discussion. Annually, each law enforcement, fire services, Emergency Medical Services and Public Works agency within the SETRPC will survey/update its radio equipment and encryption type and enter this information into IRIS.
References:
- *Pre-decisional Draft, Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page A-2)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.38. Establish Radio Interoperability Across Departments.
Discussion: All regional agencies should ensure real-time connectivity and interoperability of communications during mutual aid responses. All regional agencies should have the ability to operate on the same frequency radio, to transfer information in a timely manner should a suspect in a CCTA flee in the direction of another jurisdiction.
References:
- *A Critical Incident Review of the Kalamazoo, Michigan, Public Safety Response to the February 20, 2016, Mass Shooting Incident,* (page ii)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.39. Pre-Program Regional Channels on Agency Radios.
Discussion: Pre-program radios with the specified regional channels used for communicating across jurisdictional disciplines and agencies. Identify channels used for:

- Command
- Tactical Response
- Medical Response
- Investigations/Intelligence (encrypted)

If there is enough room in your radio, program all channels as analog and again as digital channels. If not, program as follows: Incident Response channels – all analog, Law Enforcement channels – program all as P25 digital with NAC $68F (1 6 7 9 1 0) except LE A, LE 1, LE B, LE10, and LE 16 which are to be programmed analog with Tx CTCSS 167.9 Hz (6Z) and no Rx CTCSS (carrier squelch, CSQ). If your radio has a user-selectable option to enable/disable CTCSS on receive, you may choose to configure this option so that the user can enable the same CTCSS tone used on transmit for receive. The default configuration should be CSQ receive. Note on using the Federal Interoperability Channels: These channels may not be used for state/state, state/local, or local/local interoperability. A Federal entity must be involved when these are used.

References:
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*
- *Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response,* (page 14)
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page i)
- *National Response Framework,* (page 14)
- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center.
- *Boston Marathon AAR*, (page 14)
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 14)
- *National Interoperability Field Operations Guide,* (page 24)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.40. Provide Key Leaders Pre-Programmed Radios

Discussion: A cache of department radios should be set aside and readily deployable. Develop a communications plan that describes how to get enough radios to the right places and to the right leaders during the initial chaos of an attack. Radios should be configured to ensure simple use of interoperative capabilities.

References:
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page A-2)
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 89)
- *Boston Marathon,* (page 14)
- *Broome County*, *NY, Shooting AAR,* (Area 2)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.41. Ensure Adequate Supplies for Extended Operations

Discussion: Maintain an adequate supply of radio and cell phone chargers and batteries to account for the long duration of an incident.

References:
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page A-2)
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 89)
- *Boston Marathon,* (page 97)
- *Broome County*, *NY, Shooting AAR,* (Area 2)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

104

Task 8.42. Provide Leaders With GETS And WPS Capabilities.
Discussion: Ensure public safety and emergency responders have available Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and Wireless Priority Service (WPS) capabilities. To make a WPS call, to user must first have the WPS feature added to their cellular service. Key local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and Federal government, and critical infrastructure personnel are eligible for WPS. Once established, the called can dial *272 and the destination telephone number to place an emergency wireless call.
References:
- *JCTAWS* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*
- *Boston Marathon AAR,* (page 96)
- *Broome County, NY, AAR, Shooting*, (Area 6)
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page A-2)
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page F-2)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.43. Utilize Wireless Carriers That Offer Special Services
Discussion: Identify and utilize those wireless communications carriers that offer special emergency services to law enforcement agencies and the legal community in order to expedite requests during emergencies**.** Types of services may include a dedicated hotline to access 24/7 assistance with processing court orders and subpoenas, obtaining call detail records, technical surveillance assistance, and support for exigent situations. It is imperative to exercise the request process frequently with the carriers to reduce response times and maximize benefits offered.
References:
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page F-3)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.44. Build and Test Workarounds to System Failures
Discussion: Assess the vulnerability to disruption of wireless applications and build workarounds. Implement alternative solutions to mitigate the impact of disruptions to operations. Exercise these workarounds and alternatives frequently.
References:
- *Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack,* (page F-3)
- *A Critical Incident Review of the Kalamazoo, Michigan, Public Safety Response to the February 20, 2016, Mass Shooting Incident,* (page ii)

105

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.45. Maintain a "Ready to Use" Incident Web Page
Discussion: For crisis communication, preparation of a dedicated 'ready-to-use' incident web page template is recommended. This site is only activated – i.e. visible to users - if an incident occurs. The incident web page is linked to the main site and is generally operated with a content management system as a direct and straightforward method of feeding the site with current information. At the onset of the incident, up-to-date information and call-in numbers can be quickly entered in the pre-prepared areas, and the web page activated as a key source of information.
References:
- *SAFE-COMMS Terrorism Crisis Communication Manual for Public Authorities,* (page 49)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Public Response

Task 8.46. Identify Ways To Unify Public Response Across Agencies.
Discussion: Roles, responsibilities, information flows and reporting lines which are to be followed in the event of a crisis should be established in advance. This is not only important to ensure that crisis management runs smoothly, but also plays a role in public perception. The public does not distinguish between individual official bodies and institutions, but views them as a whole and as representatives of the democratic system. The consequences of contradictory statements or uncoordinated actions can thus be damaging; they not only undermine the credibility of the players, but also extend the negative impact of a terrorist attack.
References:
- *SAFE-COMMS Terrorism Crisis Communication Manual for Public Authorities,* (page 49)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 8.47. Develop A Plan To Communicate Road Closures.
Discussion: Establishing and maintaining open lines of communication between all agencies involved will likely increase the effectiveness of information sharing and logistical coordination efforts such as the effect of road closures on emergency response routes.
References:
- *First Responder's Toolbox,* National Counter Terrorism Center.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

106

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

IX. VICTIM AND FAMILY SERVICES

Lead Agencies

Task 9.1. Assess Jurisdictional Readiness
Discussion: Pre-determine who in your jurisdiction has necessary qualifications and training for victim and family support. Individuals involved in directly providing information, support, and services to victims and families during these disaster events must be carefully selected and trained. These providers may be FBI Victim Specialists, air carrier family assistance team members, or local community social service providers. The highly stressful and emotionally challenging environment necessitates the individuals have the requisite skills and temperament to operate effectively.
References:
- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies*, (page 8)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.2. Determine Lead Victim Services Agency
Discussion: Create plans to determine which local agency is the lead agency for human services needs in the aftermath of a disaster. Determining who the local lead agency is can be a challenge as there may be a large local jurisdiction that is made up of many small cities. This designated agency will also serve as the lead agency in establishing a Family Assistance Center.
References:
- *Broome County, NY, Shooting AAR*, (Area 9)
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR*, (page 78)
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter,* (Appendix A)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.3. Designate Lead Forensic Identification Agency
Discussion: Determine the agency responsible for forensic identification. Generally, the local medical examiner or coroner is responsible for victim identification. However, if the incident involved a federal facility, the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner may be designated by the US Attorney General. If a Presidential disaster declaration has been issued, a Federal Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT) may support the local jurisdiction in accordance with the Stafford Act or by request of another federal agency.

107

References:
- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies,* (page 11)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.4. Determine Lead Agency for Death Notifications.
Discussion: Ensure relevant jurisdictions are clear on who shall be conducting the death notifications (Medical Examiner vs. Law Enforcement). Death notifications should be done in teams that include a victim services provider. It may also be prudent to allow an EMT to accompany the notification team (remaining outside the residence) for in-person notifications in case the family member has a physiological reaction to the notification.
References:
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter,* Appendix A
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR*, (page 78)
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 118)
- *Orlando AAR*, (page 6)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Family Reunification Center

Task 9.5. Plan for a Family Reunification Center.
Discussion. In the immediate aftermath of an incident, it should be anticipated that family members and friends will come to the incident site to ascertain status of loved ones. Designate a Family Reunification Center in an area near but not immediately adjacent to the family the incident site where people can gather without interfering.
References.
- *Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents,* (page)
- L-912, *Preparing Communities for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack,* (page 19)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.6. **Train a CERT Team to staff a Family Reunification Center.**
Discussion. Consider training a CERT Team to establish a Family Reunification Center under the guidance of the lead law enforcement agency and Office of Emergency Management.
References.
- Stephanie Davis, ALERRT, 2018 ALERRT Conference, Dallas, Texas, November 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Joint Family Support Operations Center

Task 9.7. Establish Policy/Plan for Joint Family Support Operations Center (JFSOC)

Discussion: The objectives of the JFSOC are to ensure effective communication between agencies responsible for the provision of family assistance services; ensure efficient delivery of family assistance services by identifying needs, gaps, and by avoiding duplication of services; and coordinate/ manage resource requests.

References:

- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies,* (page 7)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.8. Determine Composition of Joint Family Support Operations Center

Discussion: The JFSOC is intended for agency representatives and should not include family members. The exact number of individuals needed to staff the JFSOC will depend on the scale of the event. However, the key positions in any case will include the following: JFSOC manager (from the lead response agency), a senior agency representative for oversight, accountability, and funding approval, a facility or operations manager, an incident command liaison, functional managers (administration, logistics, services, etc.), team members (may consist of multiple agencies), and any applicable non-governmental organizations (i.e. American Red Cross).

References:

- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies,* (page 7)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.9. Identify Joint Family Support Operations Center Locations

Discussion: Pre-determine a potential facility for and the agencies responsible in establishing a Joint Family Support Operations Center (JFSOC). Ensure the location is in proximity to the FAC but is a separate entity. It is important to keep affected families away from the decision making process.

References:

- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies,* (page 7)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

109

Family Assistance Center

Task 9.10. Plan to Establish a Family Assistance Center
Discussion: Create a Family Assistance Center Plan. All participating agencies should be involved in the planning process. Provisions should be made that clearly denote the agency responsible for initiating and leading the family assistance and reunification efforts. Conduct training and exercises to ensure stakeholders understand their roles and responsibilities.
References:
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 136)
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter,* (Appendix A)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.11. Agree on Services Provided at the Family Assistance Center
Discussion: Consider provisions for victim and witness care while they are awaiting interviews and families are being notified. A number of processes, procedures, and assets must be put in place in order to ensure an effective and secure FAC. The following is a recommended, but not exhaustive, list:
- Security of FAC facility
- Check in/out point for families and survivors
- Identification badges and security procedures
- Communications Equipment (computers, phones, audio-visual, public address system)
- Child Care
- Access to emergency medical care
- Crisis intervention specialists
- Access to clergy
- Financial services
- Travel assistance
- Local transportation
- Meals
- Clothing and toiletries

References:
- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies,* (page 9-10)
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practice Guide,* (page 29)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.12. Identify Potential Locations for a Family Assistance Center
Discussion: Pre-identify potential locations within a given jurisdiction for a FAC. The facility should have safe, stable, and comfortable facilities in advance of an incident. Seek to create a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the facilities in advance of any incident. The FAC should include the following:
- Large meeting room for gathering and briefings
- Smaller meeting rooms for private meetings with individual families for the purpose of conducting ante-mortem interviews and discussing other sensitive topics
- Security from the media and others
- Room/office for the JFSOC

References:
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 118)
- *Orlando AAR*, (page 24)
- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies,* (page 9)
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter,* (Appendix A)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.13. **Compile a contact list of agencies and key personnel to notify should the Family Assistance Center be activated**
Discussion. Develop a telephone/email roster of local, state, federal and Non-Governmental agencies to include Volunteers Active in Disasters that would be called upon to assist in the set-up and operation of a Family Assistance Center. A copy of this contact list should be provided to Dispatch/911.

References.
- SETRPC CCTA Victim and Family Services Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, August 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.14. **Family Assistance Center Supplies and Equipment**
Discussion. List supplies and equipment necessary for initial (3-day) operation of the Family Assistance Center. Identify sources who will agree to help provide these items in the event of a Family Assistance Center activation.

References:
- SETRPC CCTA Victim and Family Services Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, August 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.15. Create Signage for the Family Assistance Center
Discussion. Plan for and post signs in the Family Assistance Center to identify services provided. It is recommended that jurisdictions consider fabrication of banners with grommets that are durable, easily hung and stored.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Victim and Family Services Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, August 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.16. Provide Apparel to Identify Family Assistance Center Staff
Discussion: Pre-purchase and designate different arm bands, vests, or similar apparel so that counselors and other FAC personnel can be readily identified by victims and witnesses.
References:
- *San Bernardino AAR*
- *Orlando AAR*, (page 24)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.17. Pre-Screen and Train Clergy
Discussion: Provide psychological first aid training to clergy members and chaplains designated to respond to mass casualty and critical incidents. Credential clergy and counselors so they are vetted and properly trained so as to be ready to respond to a MCI. In the event of an MCI, only pre-approved clergy should have access to the FAC.
References:
- *Aurora AAR,* (page 16)
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 118)
- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies* (page 9-10)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.18. **Train Family Assistance Center staff in Psychological First Aid**
Discussion. Provide training in Psychological First Aid to those local personnel who may serve as Family Assistance Center staff. These may include:
- Designated personnel from Lead Agency
- Mental Health Counselors
- Members of the Clergy
- Advocates
- Medical Reserve
- CERT Team
- Representatives of the Chamber of Commerce

References:

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

- https://learn.nctsn.org/login/index.php

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.19. **Develop and maintain a list of trained Advocates for the Family Assistance Center**

Discussion. Establish training requirements for Advocates at the Family Assistance Center. Establish a vetted network of licensed mental health professionals in the local area. Maintain a list of those agencies and

References.

- *Las Vegas AAR*, (page 47)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.20. **Maintain consistency in the assignment of Advocates**

Discussion. Once a family advocate is assigned to a victim or family, it is best not to change or reassign that advocate, even if another advocate needs to be added per legal protocols. Of course, an exception would be removal if requested by the victim or family. A key aspect of the assistance is providing someone that the family can regard as a trusted advocate.

References.

- American Red Cross, SETRPC CCTA Victims and Family Services Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, June 2018.

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.21. **Designate Victim Advocate POCs for Hospitals**

Discussion: There should be a lead advocate assigned to each hospital that receives victims to coordinate all victim advocates responding to that location. Hospitals should include a point of contact in their mass casualty plans who work with that victim advocate coordinator. As a team, they would be in position to handle requests for information on the status of the injuries, help family members to be with their loved ones and coordinate information with the family reunification center.

References:

- *Aurora AAR*, (page 135)
- *Seattle and King County Mass Fatality and Family Assistance Operations Response Plan,* (page 18)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.22. **Pre-Determine Points of Contact for Federal Support**

Discussion: Plans/annexes for Victims and Family Services should include pre-identified points of contact to work with and support family members (e.g. Federal victim assistance personnel counselors, police officers). Plans should also

113

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

include the process used to request such support. These points of contact should be connected to families as early in the process as possible, including while an individual is still missing but before any victims have been positively identified.

References:
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practice Guide*, (page 16)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.23. Request FBI Victim Assistance Specialists

Discussion: Determine if the jurisdiction in which the incident occurred is equipped to handle the complex victim/ family response. If not, determine the appropriate method to involve the FBI's Victim Assistance Specialists into the incident response to assist with notifications and other support for family members.

References:
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter,* Appendix A

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.24. **Cell Phone Charging Stations**

Discussion. Coordinate with local hotels to obtain those telephone chargers left behind by guests. To create a low cost cell phone charging station, arrange the chargers in mixed groups; fasten them with quick ties, and connect them to electrical outlet extension strips. These charging stations can then be made available for use by Family Assistance Center patrons.

References.
- 2018 ALERRT Conference, Dallas, Texas

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.25. Determine Victim Personal Effects Management

Discussion: Create a system for the processing of victims' personal effects. Personal effects are generally classified as associated if they are in direct contact with the victims' remains (e.g. ring on a finger, shoes worn), associated with the victim's name but not remains (e.g. luggage with baggage tag, wallet with driver's license), and unassociated if there is no easily discernible link to an individual victim. Typically, the process of handling personal effects involves the following:
- Explain personal effects management process to family members
- Documentation and recovery from the site or from remains, including initiating chain of custody
- Decontamination and preservation
- Inventory and catalogue

114

- Provide family members with associated and unassociated catalogues and instructions to claim or disassociate items
- Return associated items per family instructions
- Retain unassociated items and ultimately destroy after notifying families of intentions

References:
- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies,* (page 12)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.26. Create Printed Materials
Discussion: In preparation for a potential incident, consider printing age-appropriate resources to help families recognize and seek help with regard to a wide variety of reactions that they or their loved ones can experience during and after an emergency.
References:
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practice Guide,* (page 16)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.27. Implement Staggered Leave
Discussion: Victim services agencies should consider scheduling leave so that there are not too many advocates on leave at the same time. A phone tree with assigned team leads to facilitate the process of callbacks should be considered as well.
References:
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 136)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Virtual Family Assistance Center

Task 9.28. **Create a web page for the Virtual Family Assistance Center**
Discussion. To supplement the efforts of call center operators, create and activate a web page that incorporates the following features and information:
- Telephone number to Virtual Family Assistance Center
- Link to incident web page
- Access to forms to capture and submit ante mortem data
- Link to the American Red Cross www.safeandwell.org web site
- Links to nation-wide mental health support services
- Links to victim support services (i.e., FBI Victim Services Division, American Red Cross, various state law enforcement victim services

-

- ▪ Names (and memorial photos?) of known victims (only posted following confirmation/notification of family members)
- ▪ Information on such topics as:
  - o Stress and grief coping mechanisms
  - o Spiritual and behavioral health support services
  - o Death Certificate information
  - o Social Security: access to death and disability benefits
  - o Legal Assistance: information on insurance benefits and death-related concerns
  - o Financial Assistance: resources and application/referral process
  - o Public Health concerns
  - o Information regarding keeping the decedent in the home (if the body cannot immediately be removed)

References.

- • SETRPC CCTA Victims and Family Services Workshop, Beaumont, Texas, August 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.29. Establish Service Provision Hotline (SPH)

Discussion: An SPH may be established to provide mental health support, logistic support, emergency assistance services, legal services, and information about scheduled briefings at the FAC. It complements efforts to establish a Virtual Family Assistance Center. The SPH may sometimes evolve from the MPCC after the victim identification process has concluded. Depending on scope and number of victims, the SPH may be physically part of the FAC. The hotline has the added benefit of providing information to family who cannot be physically present at the FAC.

References:

- • *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies*, (pages 4-5)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Missing Persons

Task 9.30. Establish a Missing Persons Call Center

Discussion: Acquire a toll free number to be used as a Missing Persons Call Center (MPCC). In the immediate aftermath of a MCI, the toll free number should direct callers to an existing website until such a time as a call center can be staffed to receive the calls. The objectives of the MPCC are to collect basic information about the person reported missing, contact information for the reporter/informant, and information that will be used by law enforcement to assess the likelihood of involvement allowing for investigative prioritization.

116

Establishing a hotline dedicated to missing persons can help to expedite the identification process.

References:
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 91)
- *Seattle and King County Mass Fatality and Family Assistance Operations Response Plan*, (page 18)
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter,* (Appendix A)
- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies,* (page 4)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.31. Train personnel/operators for Missing Persons Call Center.
Discussion. Develop a protocol that includes script and Call Intake Form for persons assigned responsibilities as operators for a Missing Persons Call Center. Provide training and conduct periodic drills to establish and effectively operate a Missing Persons Call Center as part of the Virtual Family Assistance Center.

References.
- SETRPC CCTA Victims and Family Services Workshop, Beaumont, Texas August 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.32. Create a Victim Data Collection Website
Discussion: Create a website with associated data base (VIPS) that people can report their missing loved ones and provide ante mortem information to assist in victim identification. This information should be made available to the medical examiner/coroner in charge of victim identification, authorized hospital personnel and law enforcement investigators.

References:
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 91)
- *Seattle and King County Mass Fatality and Family Assistance Operations Response Plan,* (page 18)
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter,* (Appendix A)
- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies,* (page 4)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.33. Prepare Talking Points for the Victim Identification Process
Discussion: Be prepared to give general information to family members about the processes of victim identification. If available, it is prudent to inform a family of the number of deceased victims, what needs to be done to identify the victims,

117

how long that process is expected to take, and the potential ramifications of mis-identifying a victim.

References:
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 136)
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter,* (Appendix A)
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 118)
- SETRPC CCTA Victims and Family Services Workshop, Beaumont, Texas August 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.34. Create Single Victim File Infrastructure
Discussion: Create a system that can facilitate a single victim file to avoid multiple files with conflicting or incomplete information. Hospitals, police, and victim advocates are the primary users of this information and should be involved with the creation of the integrated system.

References:
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 136)
- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies,* (page 11)
- *Orlando AAR*, (page 24)
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 118)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Death Notifications

Task 9.35. Create Death Notification Plan
Discussion: Review death investigation and body identification plans to gather best practices. Create a death notification plan and integrate with the mass casualty plan. Designate the lead agency that is tasked with conducting notifications. Victim's Assistance should be included in this process to make personnel, referrals and other resources available to families.

References:
- *Broome County, NY, Shooting AAR*, (Area 10)
- *FBI Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies,* (page 11)
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter,* (Appendix A)
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practice Guide,* (page 29)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.36. Notification of Next-of-Kin

Discussion: Before an emergency, the planning team must determine how, when, and by whom family members (next-of-kin) will be informed if their loved one is missing or has been injured or killed. This is an extremely difficult and emotional task that requires understanding, compassion, candor and strength. Whenever possible, notifications should be made in person. In mass casualty events, notifications should be made in a timely manner to lessen the stress on family members or significant others as they await notification of the status of the missing.

References:
- Orlando AAR, (page 6)
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practice Guide,* (page 29)
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 118)
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR*, (page 78)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Mental Health Services

Task 9.37. Physical and Mental Health Resources for Responders

Discussion: Ensure infrastructure exists so that all personnel involved in the response are provided access to the physical and mental health resources they may need after a critical incident. Establish procedures to rapidly activate and deploy mental health services personnel to assist during an incident and its aftermath. Agencies should identify best practices related to employee wellness.

References:
- *San Bernardino AAR,* (page 113)
- *Washington Navy Yard AAR*, (page 82)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.38. Update Mental Health Support Policies

Discussion: Ensure each agency has a policy regarding mental health support after critical incidents and clearly communicate it to the entire department. Assign a mental health or officer wellness incident commander to oversee officer mental health and coordinate services among participating agencies.

References:
- *Orlando AAR*, (page 28)
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 118)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**

Target Date: **Status:**

119

Donations

Task 9.39. Develop a Plan to Manage Donations
Discussion: <u>In advance of any emergency</u>, develop a community plan to manage, receive, and distribute the large amounts of donations likely to flow in to help victims. It is recommended that the jurisdiction identify a non-profit agency with the capabilities to track all donations and disbursements. It is important that this agency maintain detailed accountability to ensure all donations are provided to survivors, victims' families, and in some aspects, first responders. One approach is to quickly establish a "One Fund" into which all unrestricted financial donations are channeled. Other types of donations, for example airline tickets for victims and families, can be accommodated separately.
References:
- *Aurora AAR*, (page 136)
- FEMA *Planning for a CCA: Guide for Local Jurisdictions,* Washington D.C., (Slide 50)
- *San Bernardino AAR*, (page 118)
- SETRPC CCTA Victims and Family Services Workshop, Beaumont, Texas August 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Public Information

Task 9.40. **Create Public Messages Regarding Victim and Family Services.**
Discussion. Write "fill in the blank" messages in both English and Spanish (and other languages per regional demographics), formatted both for press release, SMS text, Twitter, and Facebook. These messages should include:
- Opening of the Family Assistance Center
- Establishment of the Missing Persons Hotline
- Virtual Family Assistance Center
- Memorial Service
- Transition to Long-Term Care

Coordinate these messages with the jurisdiction's Public Information Officer.
References.
- SETRPC CCTA Victims and Family Services Workshop, Beaumont, Texas August 2018

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.41. Determine Media Engagement and Restrictions
Discussion: Determine how impacted families will be supported if they prefer not to engage with the media. This includes strategies for keeping media separate

120

from families and staff while the emergency is ongoing and support for families that may experience unwanted media attention at their homes.
References:
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practice Guide,* (pages 29-30)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.42.   Assignment of Family PIOs
Discussion: Promote the successful concept of assigning PIOs to the families of the deceased. These resources can be drawn from federal and state agencies, to include the Department of Justice Division of Victims Assistance.
References:
- *Aurora AAR,* (page 137)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Security and Welfare of Minors

Task 9.43. Verify Authorization for Release of a Minor
Discussion: When families are reunited, it is critical that there are child release processes in place where minors might be involved (e.g. childcare, discharged patients) to ensure that no child is released to an unauthorized person, even if that person is well-meaning.
References:
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practice Guide,* (page 29)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Training and Exercises

Task 9.44.   Train Personnel in Psychological First Aid
Discussion: Ensure your department has a sufficient number of personnel qualified in administering psychological first aid (PFA). PFA training can be provided in person or online. The online version (http://learn.nctsn.org/) is broadly used and is a six hour interactive course that puts the participant in the role of a provider in a post-disaster scene. This professionally narrated course is for individuals new to disaster responses who want to learn the core goals of PFA, as well as for seasoned participants who want a review.
References:
- *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practice Guide,* (page 31)

121

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

Task 9.45. Extend Training Exercise Duration
Discussion: Training exercises should continue past the point where the threat no longer exists and extend to notification of victims' families. Critical incident training and exercises should include an investigative component that includes identifying all aspects of victim and witness identification, interviewing, and reunification.
References:

- *San Bernardino AAR*, (pages. 115, 117)

Responsibility: **Assisted by:**
Target Date: **Status:**

X. TRANSITION

X. TRAINING

Listed below are training resources that contribute to increased readiness for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack and Active Shooter Incidents:

Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT)

Course: Terrorism Response Tactics: Active Shooter Level I
Target Audience: Law Enforcement
Course Provider: ALERRT Center, Texas State University
Course Length: 16.0 hours
Course Delivery: Instructor led
Course Description: This course is designed to prepare the first responder to isolate, distract, and neutralize an active shooter. The course curriculum includes weapons manipulation, threshold evaluation, concepts and principles of team movement (including solo officer strategies), setting up for room entry techniques, approach, and breaching the crisis site, follow-on responder tactics, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and post-engagement priorities of work. The course will culminate with dynamic force-on-force scenarios.
References: http://alerrt.org/Course-Catalog/Level1

Course: Terrorism Response Tactics: Active Shooter Level II
Target Audience: Law Enforcement
Course Provider: ALERRT Center, Texas State University
Course Length: 16.0 hours
Course Delivery: Instructor led
Course Description: This course curriculum includes TECC-based self-aid and buddy-aid techniques including hemorrhage control and tourniquets, bandaging, airway management, triaging, casualty collection points, and casualty evacuation points, and casualty evacuation methods. The course includes force-on-force mass casualty scenarios where the student will not only have to neutralize the threat but also treat the wounded, establish casualty collection points, conduct hasty triage, and integrate responses with EMS and fire personnel.
References: http://alerrt.org/Course-Catalog/Level2

Course: Terrorism Response Tactics: Exterior Response to Active Shooter Events (ERASE)
Target Audience: First Responders
Course Provider: ALERRT Center, Texas State University
Course Length: 24.0 hours (3 days)
Course Delivery: Instructor led
Course Description: This course is designed to prepare first responders for an open-air active shooter encounter. It addresses a wide range of tactics and techniques when dealing with an exterior armed aggressor. This hands-on course will cover equipment selection, vehicle ambushes, medical emergencies,

123

mounted and dismounted officer- and citizen-down rescue, dismounted individual and team movement techniques, and emergency vehicle crisis response.
References: http://alerrt.org/ofcm/CourseTypes/catalog/83

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Course: (ICS-300) Intermediate Incident Command System for Expanding Incidents
Target Audience: First Responders
Course Provider: Emergency Management Institute (FEMA)
Course Length: 24.0 hours
Course Delivery: Instructor led
Course Description: This course provides training on and resources for personnel who require advanced application of the Incident Command System (ICS). The target audience includes all individuals who may assume a supervisory role in expanding incidents. This course expands upon information covered in IS 100 and 200 courses. (Both are pre-requisites for ICS 300.) This course is required for those jurisdictions that choose to comply with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) ensuring they continue receiving their federal preparedness funding grants. We are recommending that jurisdictions identify middle management who will be acting in the role of incident commander or section chief during an event and enroll them in this course.
References: http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/trainingmaterials.htm

Course: (ICS-400) Advanced Incident Command System for Command and General Staff – Complex Incidents
Target Audience: First Responders
Course Provider: Emergency Management Institute (FEMA)
Course Length: 16.0 hours
Course Delivery: Instructor led
Course Description: This course is intended to serve as a vehicle to share proven incident management strategies and practices as well as to enhance teamwork and coordination among all response agencies' officers directly responsible for emergency response to a WMD/terrorism incident or other "Incident of National Significance". The course is specifically intended for those emergency response personnel who have duties that require that they be directly involved in incident management or command at either a "field" Incident command post (ICP) or in a city, county, or regional emergency operations center (EOC).
References: http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/trainingmaterials.htm

Course: (G-191) Emergency Operations Center and Incident Command System Interface
Target Audience: Emergency Response Personnel
Course Provider: Emergency Management Institute (FEMA)

124

Course Length: 8 hours (1 day)
Course Delivery: Instructor led
Course Description: This course reviews ICS and EOC responsibilities and functions and depends heavily on exercises and group discussions to formulate the interface. The course provides an opportunity for participants to begin developing an interface between an Incident Management Team and EOC personnel.
References: http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/trainingmaterials.htm

Course: (E/L0912) – Preparing Communities for a Complex Coordinated Attack IEMC: Community Specific
Target Audience: First Responders and Community Leaders
Course Provider: Emergency Management Institute (FEMA)
Course Length: 32 hours (4 days)
Course Delivery: Instructor led - Mobile Training Team
Course Description: The IEMC: Preparing Communities for a Complex Coordinated Attack (CCA) sponsored by FEMA is a community-specific training initiative designed to improve the ability of local jurisdictions to prepare for, protect against, and respond to complex coordinated attacks. The purpose of this course is to provide a no-consequence environment where participants from multiple disciplines can discuss and analyze the local, state, regional and federal capabilities required to respond to an attack involving coordinated assaults against multiple targets. Through briefings, case studies, facilitated discussions, and planning workshops, participants work through a community-specific attack scenario to identify gaps in their current plans as well as mitigation strategies. Course Goals include: Identify interdependencies and gaps in decisions, actions, and resources needed to respond to a complex coordinated attack; Increase situational awareness to inform community of the challenges faced by healthcare systems during a complex coordinated attack; Strengthen and exercise relationships with response partners and members of the whole community; and Understand the key issues that should be addressed in a unified regional response plan for a complex coordinated attack
References: https://training.fema.gov/iemc/complexcoordattack.aspx

Course: (E-947) Emergency Operations Center and Incident Management Team Interface
Target Audience: Emergency Response Personnel
Course Provider: Emergency Management Institute (FEMA)
Course Length: 8 hours
Course Delivery: Instructor led
Course Description: This course provides state and local emergency management officials with the knowledge and skills they need to operate an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and interface it with an Incident Management Team (IMT). Reviewing responsibilities and functions, this course provides an opportunity for participants to begin developing an IMT/EOC

125

interface for their community. Specific course topics covered include: Incident Command System Review; Responsibilities and functions of an Emergency Operations Center; Basic principles of a Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS); Differing needs and assets of IMT and EOC; IMT/EOC Relationships and IMT/EOC Action Planning
References: http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/trainingmaterials.htm

Course: (E-948) – Situational Awareness and Common Operating Picture
Target Audience: First Responders
Course Provider: Emergency Management Institute
Course Length: 32 hours (4 days**)**
Course Delivery: Online Training
Course Description: Situational Awareness (SA) and Common Operating Picture (COP) supports the Communications and Information Management Component of the National Incident Management Systems. This intermediate-level course on SA and COP is designed to improve the skills, knowledge, and capabilities of individuals and organizations involved in domestics emergency preparedness, response and recovery.
References:
http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/trainingmaterials.htm

Course: (IS-907) Active Shooter: What You Can Do.
Course Provider: Emergency Management Institute (online)
Course Description: This course provides guidance to individuals, including managers and employees, so that they can prepare to respond to an Active Shooter situation. This course is not written for law enforcement officers, rather for non-law enforcement employees.
References. https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-907

National Center for Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT) at Louisiana State University

Course: (PER-219) A Prepared Jurisdiction: Integrated Response to a CBRNE Incident
Target Audience: First Responders
Course Provider:
Course Length: 20.0 hours
Course Delivery: Instructor-Led Training
Course Description: This is a 2.5 day course designed to improve interagency collaboration during a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) incident. Disciplines within a community must be able to recognize their roles and the roles of other first responder disciplines when preparing for and responding to disasters. The course examines integration and command structure within a jurisdiction.
References: http://www.ncbrt.lsu.edu/catalog/catalog.aspx

Course: (PER-230) Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings (IRTB)
Target Audience: Emergency Responders
Course Provider: Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMTRC) at New Mexico Tech University
Course Length: 4.0 hours
Course Delivery: Mobile Training
Course Description: This is a performance-level (operations) course designed to prepare emergency responders to perform effectively and safely during bombing incidents, principally in support roles within the warm and cold zones of the incident scene. The course includes a familiarization with IEDs and explosive materials, and detailed training on critical response actions during pre- and post-detonation operations. In addition, the course addresses actions that emergency responders can take to prevent or deter bombing attacks against targets in their communities.
References: http://www.emrtc.nmt.edu/training/irtb.php

Course: (PER-232) Initial Law Enforcement Response to Suicide Bombing Attacks (ILERSBA)
Target Audience:
Course Provider: Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMTRC) at New Mexico Tech University
Course Length: 8 hours
Course Delivery: Mobile Training
Course Description: This is a performance –level mobile course that addresses some of the major considerations a jurisdiction is required to answer when creating plans, procedures, and tactics to prevent and respond to suicide bombing incidents.
References: http://www/emrtc.nmt.edu/training/ilersba.php

Course: (PER-265) Law Enforcement Response Actions for CBRNE Incidents (LERA)
Target Audience: Law Enforcement
Course Provider: Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP)
Course Length: 8.0 hours
Course Delivery: Mobile (non-resident) and residential
Course Description: Law Enforcement Response Actions for CBRNE Incidents (LERA) is a one-day training course designed to enable law enforcement personnel to respond effectively to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) incidents. Participants in LERA will receive hands-on training in surveying and monitoring, decontamination, mass casualty triage, scene survey and safety, and the use of personal protective equipment (PPE).
References: https://cdp.dhs.gov/training/courses/lera

Course: (PER-275) Law Enforcement Active Shooter Emergency Response (LASER)
Target Audience: Law Enforcement
Course Provider: NCBRT at Louisiana State University
Course Length: 16.0 hours
Course Delivery: Instructor led **-** Mobile Training Team
Course Description: The Law Enforcement Active Shooter Emergency Response (LASER) course uses a mixture of classroom presentations, hands-on field training, and practical exercises to enhance the response capabilities of law enforcement officers in order to effectively respond to and stop an Active Shooter incident. This course aims to provide participants with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to rapidly deploy and neutralize violent offenders during active shooter incidents in order to prevent the loss of innocent lives.
References: http://www.ncbrt.lus.edu/catalog/catalog.aspx

Course: (PER-328-W) Situation Assessment for Complex Attacks (SAFCA)
Target Audience: Emergency Services**/**Public Safety First-line Supervisors
Course Provider: Frederick Community College
Course Length: 10.0 hours
Course Delivery: Online Training
Course Description: The SAFCA course is asynchronous, self-paced, web-based instruction designed to provide and education and training event for emergency services sector first-line supervisors and the public and private sector safety and security equivalent to recognize, report, and take appropriate actions for a complex attack
References:
http://frederick.augusoft.net/index.cfm?method=ClassInfo.ClassInformation&int_class_id=6132

Course: (MGT-422-W) Complex Attacks Situational Awareness and Response (CASAR)
Target Audience: First Responders
Course Provider: Frederick Community College
Course Length: 10.0 hours
Course Delivery: Online
Course Description: The CASAR course is asynchronous, self-paced, web-based instruction designed to provide critical knowledge and skills related to a potential complex terrorist attack on critical infrastructures. The course guides participants through a current comprehension of the threat of a complex attack initiated by homegrown or transnational terrorists. It includes an assessment of the leadership and intelligence relationship to situational awareness and continues by reviewing information sharing, crisis communications, and the hazards risk management process. The final element of the course is a web-based complex attack simulation in which students practice application of the

knowledge and skills imparted in the earlier lesson-based components of the course.
References: http://www.frederick.edu/workforce-continuing-education/downloads/macem-casarpostcard.aspx

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)

Course: Law Enforcement First Responder Training Program (LEFRTP)
Target Audience: Law Enforcement
Course Provider: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)
Course Length: 8.0 hours
Course Delivery: Residential
Course Description: LFRTP is designed to provide topics most applicable to law enforcement officers as first responders at the state and local levels, including response to criminal acts, terrorist attacks and other large-scale emergencies.
References: https://www.fletc.gov/training-program/law-enforcement-first-responder-training-program

Course: (PER-335) Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks
Target Audience: Emergency responders: police, fire, and emergency medical services personnel, including those who are likely to assume command at some point during response to a complex coordinated attack.
Course Provider: NCBRT at Louisiana State University
Course Length: 16.0 hours
Course Delivery: Instructor-Led Training
Course Description: This course provides first responders from multiple disciplines with skills to manage the initial response to a large-scale attack in a chaotic environment during a complex coordinated attack (CCA). It aims to train responders in how to use intuitive skills such as observation, analysis, anticipation, and awareness to recognize the possibility of an attack involving multiple incidents of an extreme magnitude that inundate resources, exceed conventional tactics and strategies, and often require a joint response involving members from multiple disciplines and jurisdictions. Topics for discussion include recognizing the characteristics of a potential CCA; coordinating and integrating the response of multiple disciplines and agencies; managing resources; using information sharing and intelligence gathering to develop awareness; and solving problems using creative thinking. Participants will learn to gather and disseminate critical information accordingly in order to facilitate rapid analysis. They will also learn to recognize and prevent potential response obstacles or risks to safety including self-deployment and over convergence of assets. Participants will apply the skills learned in Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks through interactive activities, facilitated discussion, and practical application in a training environment.

129

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

References: http://www.ncbrt.lsu.edu/catalog/catalog.aspx

Course: Law Enforcement and First Response Tactical Casualty Care (LEFR-TCC)
Target Audience: First Responders
Course Provider: National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians
Course Length: 10 hours (one day)
Course Delivery: Instructor led
Course Description: LEFR-TCC is continuing education offered through the National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians' (NAEMT) Pre-Hospital Trauma Life Support (PHTLS) program. This course was developed in collaboration with the Denver Health Department of EMS Education, the Denver Police Department Metro SWAT unit, and the NAEMT's PHTLS Committee. It teaches public safety first responders (police, law enforcement officers, firefighters, and other first responders) the basic medical care interventions that can help save an injured responder's life until EMS practitioners can safely enter a tactical scene.
References: www.naemt.org/education/LEFR-TCC/WhatIsLEFRTCC.aspx

Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service (TEEX)

Course: (MGT-346) EOC Operations for All-Hazards Events
Target Audience: EOC personnel
Course Provider: Texas Engineering Extension Service (TEEX) at Texas A&M University
Course Length: 24.0 hours
Course Delivery: Mobile Training
Course Description: This course provides personnel who could be assigned to or work in an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) the skills necessary to effectively plan for and manage a large-scale incident by applying and implementing an all-hazards, multi-disciplinary, management team approach as described in the National Incident Management System (NIMS), with specific emphasis on the planning, resource, and information management processes.
References: https://teex.org/Pages/default.aspx (see EOC Operations for All Hazards Events Course)

Course: (MGT-348) Medical Preparedness and Response for Bombing Incidents (MPRBI)
Target Audience: First Responders (Medical)
Course Provider: Texas Engineering Extension Service (TEEX) at Texas A&M University
Course Length: 16 hours
Course Delivery: Mobile Training

130

Course Description: This co-sponsored course, developed and delivered by TEEX and EMRTC, provides a strong emphasis in developing a multi-discipline approach to response to bombing incidents. Essential first responder personnel who would be involved in the medical response to an explosive incident will be introduced to real-world event case studies and research-based information designed to enhance medical preparedness for and response to blast effects.
References: http://www.emrtc.nmt.edu/training/mprbi.php

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

XI. EXERCISES

1. Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series (JCTAWS)

Sponsoring Agency: National Counterterrorism Center, Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau of Investigation

Synopsis: The JCTAWS program is designed to improve the ability of local law enforcement, fire, emergency medical, communication, and private sector communities to prepare for complex terrorist attacks. Course provides a no-consequence environment where participants from multiple disciplines can discuss and analyze the local, state, regional and federal capabilities required to respond to a complex terrorist attack.

Training Objectives: The workshop underscores the need for whole community response to:

- Review existing preparedness, response and interdiction plans, policies, and procedures related to a complex terrorist attack;

- Identify shortfalls in plans, operational capabilities, response resources, and authorities;

- Identify federal, state, and local resources—including grants, training, exercises, and technical assistance;

- Improve situational awareness, recognize best practices, and encourage information sharing among all stakeholders in the event of a complex terrorist attack;

- Examine healthcare system and clinical challenges unique to a complex terrorist attack employing small arms and explosives;

- Discuss a framework for immediate medical management of wounded in, or near, an attack site;

- Identify and share best practices and lessons learned from case studies in medical preparedness and response; and

- Examine the roles of the community and bystanders in a complex terrorist attack.

Exercise Delivery: Mobile Training Teams

Methodology: JCTAWS is a two-day on-site workshop that provides a forum for discussion and analysis of federal, state, regional and local capabilities that would be deployed or activated to respond to a complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack in and surrounding the jurisdiction.

133

- Day 1. JCTASWS begins with a plenary session that includes a regional threat analysis, presentation of the workshop scenario, and four breakout sessions for Operations, Senior Command, Hospital, and Community/Private-Public Sector, where participants discuss responses related to the scenario timeline.

- Day 2. Subject Matter Experts provide presentations on homemade explosives (HMEs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), high-threat integrated operations, clinical considerations, and bombing injury patterns and care. Breakout groups will include discussions to develop gap mitigation strategies and consider next steps to further the region's preparedness posture.

Target Audiences: Participants in the locally focused workshop will include personnel from the City, County, Regional, State, and Federal entities in law enforcement, fire departments, emergency medical services, fusion center(s), emergency management, public affairs, medical communities, as well as other key stakeholders from the private sector**.**

Training Location: Training takes place at the requesting jurisdiction

Web Site: www.dhs.gov/obp

Contact Information: JCTAWS@anl.gov

Funding. Funding for the MJIEDSP program is provided by DHS

2. Multi-Jurisdictional Improvised Explosive Device Security Planning (MJIEDSP) Workshops

Sponsoring Agency: DHS Office of Bombing Prevention

Synopsis: MJIEDSP is a systematic process that fuses counter-IED capability analysis, training, and planning to enhance urban area IED prevention, Protection, mitigation and response capabilities. The MJIEDPS assists with collectively identifying roles, responsibilities, capability gaps and how to optimize limited resources within a multi-jurisdictional planning area. The Office of Bombing Prevention (OBP) works closely with communities to provide expertise on planning and operational requirements for IED incident preparedness in alignment with the National Preparedness Goal and Core Capabilities.

Training Objectives: The MJIEDSP process strengthens IED prevention, protection, mitigation, and response capabilities of specific communities by:

- Identifies requisite counter-IED capabilities and assets (with associated gaps).
- Defines steady-state and threat-initiated tasks specific to a particular community.
- Emphasizes National Incident Management System (NIMS)-compliant Mutual Aid Agreements.

Methodology: The MJIEDPS process include coordination with stakeholders from the planning are to conduct familiarization briefs and training, data collection activities, and facilitated scenario-based workshops. MJIEDPS workshops engage stakeholders in a discussion of cross-discipline, multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional response to multiple IED attacks within the planning area that identifies key threats and vulnerabilities; practices to integrate and maximize available resources; and steady-state and threat-initiated actions to reduce the risk of IED attacks. OBP offers three types of MJIEDSP workshops:

- *First Responders* - Assists the first responder community, including the private sector, in understanding and identifying the unique operational aspects of responding to IED incidents.

- *Bomb Squad/SWAT Interoperability* – Focuses on tactical coordination of bomb squads and SWAT Teams in responding to EID incidents involving active shooters.

- *Executive Level* – Provides high level decision makers with a greater understanding of the unique challenges associated with responding to large scale IED incidents.

Target Audiences: First Responders; Bomb Squad-Special Weapons and Tactics Teams; high level decision makers (agency executives and elected officials)

Training Location: Training takes place at the requesting jurisdiction

Web Site: www.dhs.gov/obp

Contact Information:
    MJIESP Unit Chief
    Capability Analysis and Planning Support Section
    DHS, Office for Bombing Prevention
    703.-235-9572
    OBP@hq.dhs.gov

Funding. Funding for the MJIEDSP program is provided by DHS

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Community Action Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack

XII. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Be Aware

Task 12.1. "See Something, Say Something"
Discussion. To report suspicious activity please contact your local law enforcement. Describe specifically what you observed, including:
- Who or what you saw;
- When you saw it;
- Where it occurred; and
- Why it's suspicious.
- If there is an emergency, call 9–1–1.

References.
- https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something

Task 12.2. Become a Community Partner with "See Something, Say Something" Campaign
Discussion. The "If You See Something, Say Something®" campaign forms partnerships to help reach the public across the nation. Our partners increase awareness by displaying the campaign's messages and distributing outreach materials, including Public Service Announcements (PSAs).
Partners include, but are not limited to:
- States, cities, and counties
- Airports and mass transit entities
- Sports leagues and teams
- Major sports events and entertainment venues
- Colleges and universities
- Fairs and festivals
- Private sector businesses
- Media outlets

To become a partner, send an email to seesay@hq.dhs.gov
References.
- https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something/become-partner

Task 12.3. Train as an Infrastructure Liaison Officer.
Discussion. Texas seeks to build a robust statewide network of public and private sector volunteers helping Texas law enforcement reduce vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure. The Texas Joint Crime Information Center's Infrastructure Liaison Officer (ILO) program is a network of trusted citizen volunteers or law enforcement officers recruited and trained to help Texas protect its infrastructure from crime, sabotage, and terrorism. ILOs are partners of the state's primary fusion center, the JCIC, which house a diversity of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies working together under one roof. ILOs are trained to see

137

and report suspicious activities. In turn, the JCIC can use the reporting to create investigative leads and awareness to guard against threats.

References.

- http://www.dps.texas.gov/IntelligenceCounterTerrorism/ictILOBrochure.pdf
- tip@dps.texas.gov

Task 12.4. **Train in the Bomb Making Materials Awareness Program**

Discussion. The Bomb-Making Materials Awareness Program (BMAP) is a national outreach program, sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, designed to increase public and private sector awareness of the use of homemade explosive (HME) precursor chemicals, explosive powders, and improvised explosive device (IED) components. Through increased awareness, BMAP builds a network of vigilant and informed private sector partners who serve as the Nation's counter-IED "eyes-and-ears" as the first line of defense in providing early detection of the sale of HME precursor chemicals to suspect individuals. Program Description BMAP provides the training, tools, and resources that help local first responders and other community outreach officers engage a wide range of private sector establishments within their jurisdictions that manufacture, distribute, or sell products that contain HME precursor chemicals or explosive powders.

Participants who attend the BMAP training become BMAP Outreach Officers who reach out to local businesses in their jurisdictions to help employees identify relevant HME precursor chemicals, explosive powders, potential critical IED components, suspicious purchasing behavior, and proper reporting procedures. The program simultaneously encourages stronger relationships between businesses and local law enforcement, and reinforces the foundation of effective community safety and security. This program serves to

- Enhance public/private partnerships
- Increase private sector point-of-sale awareness
- Increase identification of suspicious purchasing behavior and reporting
- Promote community-based policing
- Provide free, secure access to training and awareness materials
- Provide reporting mechanisms to track and measure success
- Strengthens prevention opportunities

References.

- The Bomb-Making Materials Awareness Program at http://www.dhs.gov/bomb-making-materials-awarenessprogram.
- DHS Office for Bombing Prevention, http://www.dhs.gov/obp

138

Volunteer

Task 12.5. **Volunteer for Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT)**
Discussion. The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Program educates individuals about disaster preparedness and trains and organizes teams of volunteers that can support their communities during disasters. The CERT Program offers training in basic disaster response skills, such as fire safety, light search and rescue, and disaster medical operations. With proper CERT training, citizens can help protect their families, neighbors, and co-workers if a disaster occurs.
References.

* *IS-317: Introduction to Community Emergency Response Teams*
  https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-317

Task 12.6. Support/Participate Citizen Corps Programs and initiatives.
Discussion: Our Nation's Citizen Corps was created "to harness the power of every individual through education, training and volunteer service to make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to respond to the threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues, and disaster of all kinds."
Citizen Corps Programs include: Community Emergency Response Teams; Medical Reserve Corps; Neighborhood Watch; The Fire Corps; and the Volunteers for Police Program
References:

* https://www.ready.gov/citizen-corps

Task 12.7. **Volunteer for Medical Reserve Corps**
Discussion. The Medical Reserve Corps is an element of the national Citizens Corps. It organizes volunteers to increase the capacity of medical teams to respond in the event of a tragedy. The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) is a national network of volunteers, organized locally to improve the health and safety of their communities. The MRC network comprises approximately 190,000 volunteers in 900 community-based units located throughout the United States and its territories.

MRC volunteers include medical and public health professionals, as well as other community members without healthcare backgrounds. MRC units engage these volunteers to strengthen public health, improve emergency response capabilities and build community resiliency. They prepare for and respond to natural disasters, such as wildfires, hurricanes, tornados, blizzards, and floods, as well as other emergencies affecting public health, such as disease outbreaks. They frequently contribute to community health activities that promote healthy habits.
References.

* https://MRC.hhs.gov/homepage

Task 12.8. **Encourage medical training for members of the community to provide bystander care.**

Discussion. Municipal and county agencies should provide training in TECC First Care Provider guidelines. Offer and encourage training to members of government agencies, CERT Teams, Scouts, and other community organizations to initiate bystander care under TECC First Care Provider guidelines prior to the arrival of EMS.

References.

- "*A Tactical Medicine After-action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident,*" by Joshua Bobkin, Mrinal Sinha, and David Chen, Western Journal of Emergency Medicine: Integrating Emergency Medical Care with Population Health January 1, 2018. (page 291)
- https:scholarship.org/uc/item/7zf9j4w1

Task 12.9. **Train in Psychological First Aid**

Discussion. Psychological First Aid is crisis counseling, designed to address the difficult transition that some disaster survivors may suffer between the immediate aftermath and to the long road ahead to recovery. First authorized by Congress in 1974 as part of the Disaster Relief Act, crisis counseling programs are funded by FEMA and implemented by the state.

Psychological First Aid online includes a 6-hour interactive course that puts the participant in the role of a provider in a post-disaster scene. This professionally-narrated course is for individuals new to disaster response who want to learn the core goals of PFA, as well as for seasoned practitioners who want a review. It features innovative activities, video demonstrations, and mentor tips from the nation's trauma experts and survivors. PFA online also offers a Learning Community where participants can share about experiences using PFA in the field, receive guidance during times of disaster, and obtain additional resources and training.

References.

- https://learn.nctsn.org/enrol/index.php?id=38

Task 12.10. **Expand upon the Neighborhood Watch Program.**

Discussion. The Neighborhood Watch Program is another element of the Citizens' Corps that focuses on crime prevention in the community. The National Neighborhood Watch Program unites law enforcement agencies, private organizations, and individual citizens in a nation-wide effort to reduce crime and improve local communities. The Neighborhood Watch program empowers citizens to become active in community efforts through participation in Neighborhood Watch groups. This existing program can be expanded upon to increase awareness of terrorism and terrorist activities –and also address helping those disabled or in need of assistance in the aftermath of a tragedy/disaster.

References.

- http://www.nnw.org/

Task 12.11. **Volunteers In Police Service (VIPS) Program**
Discussion. Volunteers in Police Service is a locally-driven Citizen Corps program that allows community members to offer their time and talents to their local law enforcement agency. The Volunteers in Police encourages individuals to provide support local police departments and sheriff's offices. Volunteers in Police Service serves both a volunteer's desire to serve as well as a law enforcement agency's need for support. It increases law enforcement's outreach capacity during times of emergencies.
References.
- http://nnw.org/volunteers-police-service-vips

Task 12.12. **Volunteer for Fire Corps**
Discussion. The Fire Corps is an element of the national Citizens Corps. It advocates the use of trained volunteers to provide support to local fire services and rescue teams in order to increase their capacity in the event of a tragedy. The mission of Fire Corps is to increase the capacity of volunteer, career, and combination fire and EMS departments through the use of citizen advocates. Fire Corps provides resources for departments to utilize citizen advocates in non-operational roles so they can develop, implement, and sustain programs and services that will help their department meet the needs of their community.
References.
- https://www.firecorps.org/

Task 12.13. **Establish Psychological First Aid Teams**
Discussion. In order to increase the response to train for PFA, organize teams among various associations and organizations to undergo training together and to respond to emergencies or disasters. Experience has shown that volunteers are more comfortable in participating and responding as a group.
References.
- https://learn.nctsn.org/enrol/index.php?id=38

Personal Preparedness

Task 12.14. **Create an Emergency Plan for your family**
Discussion: Make a plan today. Your family may not be together if a disaster strikes, so it is important to know which types of disasters could affect your area. Know how you'll contact one another and reconnect if separated. Establish a family meeting place that's familiar and easy to find. FEMA provides an assortment of plans at its web site www.ready.gov.
References:
- https://www.ready.gov

141

Task 12.15. Make up a "Go Kit" for your family
Discussion: After an emergency, you and your family may need to survive on your own for several days. Being prepared means having your own food, water and other supplies to last for at least 72 hours. A disaster supplies kit is a collection of basic items your household may need in the event of an emergency. Keep this kit in a designated place and have it ready in case you have to leave your home quickly. Make sure all family members know where the kit is kept.
References:
- https://www.ready.gov

Task 12.16. Take online DHS/FEMA Courses
Discussion: Citizens may take free online courses offered by DHS and the FEMA Emergency Management Institute and gain more knowledge to help their communities become more prepared. Example courses are:

IS-907 Active Shooter: What You Can Do.
Course Description: This course provides guidance to individuals, including managers and employees, so that they can prepare to respond to an Active Shooter situation. This course is not written for law enforcement officers, rather for non-law enforcement employees.
References.
- https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-907

IS-909 Community Preparedness: Implementing Simple Activities for Everyone
Course Description: Community members are the key to our Nation's preparedness and resilience. As such, we need to: Support the development of prepared, vigilant, and engaged communities; Foster strategic partnerships among; the private sector; Nongovernmental organizations; Foundations; and, Community-based organizations. The purpose of this course is to present a model program for community preparedness. In addition, resources materials are available to help organizations conduct simple preparedness activities for everyone.
By the end of this course, participants will be able to:
- Identify the definition of preparedness.
- Describe the role of individuals and households in preparedness.
- Identify community preparedness principles.
- Describe the purpose of community-based preparedness activities.
- Identify the steps for planning and conducting a community-based preparedness program.
- Identify resources for supporting community-based preparedness programs.
References.
- https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-909

Business Preparedness

Task 12.17. Participate in InfraGard
Discussion. InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI and the private sector. It is an association of persons who represent businesses, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing information and intelligence to prevent hostile acts against the United States. The InfraGard program provides a vehicle for seamless public-private collaboration with government that expedites the timely exchange of information and promotes mutual learning opportunities relevant to the protection of Critical Infrastructure.
References:
- www.infragard.org

Task 12.18. Take a Business Preparedness Assessment to gauge your business' ability to survive a disaster.
Discussion: Create a business continuity plan to ensure that your business can quickly adapt and continue in the wake of a disaster.
References:
- https://www.readyrating.org/How-It-Works

Task 12.19. Establish an Emergency Plan for your Business.
Discussion: More than 40% of businesses never recover after a disaster. Recent survey found that 62% state that they do not have an emergency plan in place for their business. Make a plan.
References:
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2U0EFYKGn50&feature=youtube
- www.ready.gov/business

Task 12.20. Create a Business Continuity Plan to help your business survive a disaster.
Discussion: Create a business continuity plan to ensure that your business can quickly adapt and continue in the wake of a disaster.
References:
- www.ready.gov/business
- https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/videos/80069

Task 12.21. Save Important Business Documents to the Cloud.
Discussion. Save important documents to the cloud for quick access after an incident/disaster.
References:
- https://www.ready.gov/business-toolkit

Task 12.22. Provide Organizational Training in Active Shooter Incidents.
Discussion. Train your business employees, students, or organization members in the appropriate response to Active Shooter incidents.
References:

- https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=youtube+videos+-+Emergency+Plan+for+Businesses&view=detail&mid=3C5A018BDB78BC7C9CA93C5A018BDB78BC7C9CA9&FORM=VIRE

Task 12.23. Establish Trauma/Mass Casualty Incident equipment stations in select public spaces.
Discussion. In order to facilitate initial bystander care in the wake of Active Shooter and CCTA incidents, establish trauma/MCI equipment stations in select high-traffic locations accessible by the public. Consider co-locating these equipment stations with those currently established for Automated External Defibrillators (AEDs).
References.

- "*A Tactical Medicine After-Action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist Incident,*" by Joshua Bobkin, Mrinal Sinha, and David Chen, Western Journal of Emergency Medicine: Integrating Emergency Medical Care with Population Health January 1, 2018. https:scholarship.org/uc/item/7zf9j4w1, p. 291

Task 12.24. Provide your organization training in Active Shooter Incidents.
Discussion. Train your business employees, students, or organization members in the appropriate response to Active Shooter incidents.
References:

- https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=youtube+videos+-+Emergency+Plan+for+Businesses&view=detail&mid=3C5A018BDB78BC7C9CA93C5A018BDB78BC7C9CA9&FORM=VIRE

144

References

Abir, Mahshid, and Christopher Nelson. 2017. "Lessons for First Responders on the Front Lines of Terrorism." Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/07/lessons-for-first-responders-on-the-front-lines-of.html

After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings.https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/09/uz/after-action-report-for-the-response-to-the-2013-boston-marathon-bombings.pdf

Brinsfield, Kathryn H., MD, MPH, FACEP; & Mitchell, Ernest (Ernie), Jr., MPA. (2015). The Department of Homeland Security's role in enhancing and implementing the response to active shooter and intentional mass casualty events. *American College of Surgeons Bulletin Supplement, 100* (15), 24-27. https://www.bleedingcontrol.org/~/media/bleedingcontrol/files/compendiumdepartmenthomeland.ashx

BROOME COUNTY American Civic Association Shooting April 3, 2009: After Action Report and Improvement Plan. 2009 http://gobroomecounty.com/files/pdfs/Broome%20County%20ACA%20Shooting%20After%20Action%20Report.pdf

Brumfield, Ben. 2015. "Attempts to Pick Off Planned Parenthood Shooter Buzz on Colorado Police Scanner." *CNN.COM*, November 28. http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/28/us/colorado-springs-police-scanner-sniping/

Boyer, David A., MFS, Greg S. Smith, MA, and Alison C Woody, MS. 2012. "Regional Mass Fatality Management, Concept of Operations: Houston Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Initiative.

Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 2016. "Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook." https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/crimepihandbook2016.pdf

Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 2014. "Crisis Emergency Risk Communication." https://emergency.cdc.gov/cerc/index.asp

Department of Homeland Security. (2018). *Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks.* Washington, DC. FEMA. https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1532550673102-c4846f270150682decbda99b37524ca6/Planning_Considerations-Complex_Coordinated_Terrorist_Attacks.pdf

Department American Civic Association of Homeland Security. n.d. "Active Shooter Pocket Card." https://www.dhs.gov/publication/active-shooter-pocket-card

Department of Homeland Security. 2012. 'ICS COMU Implementation and Best Practices: A Guide for Program Development.: http://search.org/files/pdf/ICS_COMU_ImplementBestPracticesGuide.pdf

Department of Homeland Security. 2016. "National Interoperability Field Operations Guide." https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/National%20Interoperability%20Field%20Operations%20Guide%20v1%206%201.pdf

Disaster Cycle Services JT Operations. (2017). *Family Assistance Center/Friends and Relatives Centers: Concept of Operations* [Pamphlet]. American Red Cross.

Disaster Cycle Services JT Respond/Reunification. (2017). *Safe and Well User Guide* V.1.0 [Pamphlet]. American Red Cross.

Disaster Cycle Services SP Operations. (2017). *Mass Casualty Incident Response Guide* [Pamphlet]. American Red Cross.

Dolnik, Adam. 2010. "Fighting to the Death: Mumbai and the Future of the Fidayeen Threat." *The RUSI Journal* 155, no.2 (May 14): 60-68. http://tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10._1080/03071847.2010.486553#.VL0ud02BGM8.

Doyle, John M 2013. "Actionable Intelligence: Getting Accurate Info to Decision Makers-Quickly." *Homeland Security Today*, June 21. http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/correspondents-watch/single-article/actionable-intelligence-getting-accurate-info-to-decision-makers-quickly/51a8bdb5cdb2f1b00b6a12c2f808abd9.html

Dulin, Jeffrey, and Tracy Frazzano, 2016. "Integrating Law Enforcement, Fire, and Emergency Medical Services during Active Shooter/Hybrid Targeted Violence incidents." *The Interagency Board,* August, Accessed October 26, 2015. http://iab.gov/Uploads/Integrating%20:E Fire EMS%20during%20HTV FINAL.pdf

Edwards, Sean. 200. "Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future." Rand Corporation. http://www.rant.org/pubs/monograph reports/MR1100.html

FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). 2015. "Intelligence Cycle." *Directorate of Intelligence.* Accesses January 14. http://www.fbi.gov/about-ur/intelligence/intelligence-cycle

Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017. "Area Command." *National Incident Management System,* 33*,* Washington, D.C: DHS. http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/148019

Federal Emergency Management Agency, *CPG 101: Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans, Version 2.0*, (Washington, DC, 2010), https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/25975.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, CPG 201: Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide, Third Edition, (Washington, DC), https://www.fema.gov/threat-and-hazard-identification-and-risk-assessment.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2016. *Critical Decision Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks - Participant Guide*, Version 1.1., Louisiana State University, National Center for Biomedical Research and Training and the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center at Texas State University-San Marcos.   https://www.ncbrt.lsu.edu/Course/PER-335

Federal Emergency Management Agency, Continuity Guidance Circular, (Washington, DC, 2018), http://www.fema.gov/continuity-guidance-circular-cgc.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, *National Incident Management System*, (Washington, DC) https://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system.

Frazzano, Tracy I., and G. Matthew Snyder. 2014. "Hybrid Targeted Violence: Challenging Conventional 'Active Shooter' Response Strategies" *Homeland Security Affairs 10*, Article 3 (February). https://hsaj.org/articles/253

Hazen, R. J., & Phillips, C. E. (1982). *Field Disaster Identification: Preparation, Organization, Procedures*. Quantico, VA: Forensic Science Training Unit, FBI Academy.

Holcomb, J. B., MD, FACS, Butler, F. K., MD, FAAO, FUHM, & Rhee, P., MD, MPH, FACS, FCCM. (2015). Hemorrhage control devices: Tourniquets and hemostatic dressings. *American College of Surgeons Bulletin Supplement, 100* (15), 66-71. https://www.bleedingcontrol.org/~/media/bleedingcontrol/files/compendiumhemorrhagecontrol.ashx

Hoyt, D. B., MD, FACS. (2015). Increasing survival, enhancing citizen resilience. *American College of Surgeons Bulletin Supplement, 100* (15), 8-8.

Jacobs, Lenworth M., Jr. MD, MPH, FACS. (2015) Strategies to enhance survival in active shooter and intentional mass casualty events. *American College of Surgeons Bulletin Supplemen*t, 100 (15), 16-17. https://www.bleedingcontrol.org/~/media/bleedingcontrol/files/compendiumstrategiestoenhance.ashx

Jacobs, Lenworth M., Jr. MD, MPH, FACS. (2015) *Bulletin* reprint: Initial management of mass-casualty incidents due to firearms: Improving survival. *American College of Surgeons Bulletin Supplemen*t, 100 (15). http://bulletin.facs.org/2013/06/management-of-mass-casualty/

Jacobs, Lenworth M., Jr. MD, MPH, FACS. (2015) Implementation of the Hartford Consensus initiative to increase survival from active shooter and mass casualty events and to enhance the resilience of citizens. *American College of Surgeons Bulletin Supplemen*t, 100 (15), 83-87.

Jacobs, Lenworth M., Jr. MD, MPH, FACS. (2015) Summary. *American College of Surgeons Bulletin Supplemen*t, 100 (15), 88.

Kelly, R. 2012. "Active Shooter Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation." New York City Police Department n.d. https://asprtracie.hhs.gov/technical-resources/resource/1913/active-shooter-recommendations-and-analysis-for-risk-mitigation

King County Medical Examiner's Office, & Preparedness Section, Public Health - Seattle and King County. (2015). *Mass Fatality and Family Assistance Operations Response Plan, Version 4* [Pamphlet]. Seattle, WA: Public Health - Seattle and King County. https://asprtracie.hhs.gov/technical-resources/resource/848/mass-fatality-and-family-assistance-operations-response-plan

Levy, Matthew J., DO, MSc, FACEP. (2015) Intentional Mass Casualty Events: Implications for Prehospital Emergency Medical Services Systems. *American College of Surgeons Bulletin Supplement*, 100(15), 72-74.

Martinez, Michael. 2015. "Timeline: What Happened in Paris Attacks." CNN, November 14. http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/14/world/what-happened-in-paris-attacks-timeline/.

Mass Fatality Incident Rapid Assessment Team. (2015). *Mass Fatality Incident Rapid Assessment Guide*. Austin, TX. Texas Department of State Health Services. www.dshs.texas.gov/.../Mass-Fatality-Rapid-Assessment-Guide.doc

Texas Department of State Health Services. (2015*). Mass Fatality Management Planning Toolkit, Version 2.0* [Pamphlet]. Austin, TX. Texas Department of State Health Services. https://www.dshs.texas.gov/commprep/planning/toolkits.aspx

McSwain, Norman E., MD, FACS. (2015). Integrated education of all responders. *American College of Surgeons Bulletin Supplement, 100*(15), 78-82. https://www.bleedingcontrol.org/~/media/bleedingcontrol/files/compendiumintegratededucation.ashx

148

Metropolitan Police Department. 2014. *After Action Report Washington Navy Yard September 16, 2013: Internal Review of the Metropolitan Police Department Washington D.C.* Washington, DC: Metropolitan Police Department. https://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/MPD%20AAR_Navy%20Yard_07-11-14.pdf

Monahan, Tom and Mark Stainbrook. 2011. "Learning from the Lessons of the 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks." *The Police Chief* 78, no.2 (February): 24-32. http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/naylor/CPIM0211/.

National Counter Terrorism Center. 2016. "First Responder's Toolbox." https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-how-we-work/joint-ct-assessment-team/first-responder-toolbox

National Incident Command. 2008. "Incident Command System Field Guide." https://www.ok.gov/dps/documents/NIMS.pdf

New York City Police Department 2013. Analysis of Al-Shabaab's Attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. https://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00071990:38c422c2c9053c64f0874e4f6d2c55c1.pdf

NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 2016. "UFF Position Statement: Recue Task Force for Active Shooter/Terrorist Events." *Urban Fire Forum (UFF).* Accessed December 18. http://www.nfpa.org/~/media/files/member-access/member-sections/metro-chiefs /uffactiveshooterpositionstatement.pdf.

Nossiter, Adam. 2015. "Hostage at Bataclan Recalls Terrorists During Paris Attack." *The New York Times*, December 31. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/world/europe/bataclan-hostage-paris-terror-attack.html

Office of Victim Assistance. (NDP). *Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies.* Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Transportation Safety Board. https://www.ntsb.gov/tda/TDADocuments/Mass%20Fatality%20Incident%20Family%20Assistance%20Operations.pdf

Rabasa, Angel, Robert Blackwill, Kim Chalk, C. Christine Fair, Brian Jackson, Brian Jenkins, Seth Jones, Nathaniel Shestak, and Ashley Tellis. 2009. "The Lessons of Mumbai." Occasional Paper. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP249.html.

SAFE-COMMS. 2011. "Terrorism Crisis Communication Manual."
https://faculty.biu.ac.il/~sshpiro/pdf/SAFE%20COMMS%20Manual%20final_en_0
605.pdf

Sengupta, Somini, 2009. "Dossier Gives Details of Mumbai Attacks." *New York Times*,
January 6. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07 /world/asia/07india.html

Straub, Frank, PhD, Brett Cosell, Jennifer Zeunik, and Ben Gorban. 2017. "Managing
the Response to a Mobile Mass Shooting: A Critical Incident Review of the
Kalamazoo, Michigan, Public Safety Response to the February 20, 2016, Mass
Shooting Incident" Police Foundation. https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/PF_Managing-the-Response-to-a-Mobile-Mass-
Shooting_5.10.17.pdf

TECC (Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care), 2014. "2014 Tactical
Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) Guidelines." Resources. June**.** http://c-
tecc.org/images/content/TECC_Guidelines - June 2014_update.pdf

The InterAgency Board. 2015. "Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response Best
Practices by Integrating Law Enforcement, Fire and EMS."
https://www.interagencyboard.org/sites/default/files/publications/External%20IAB
%20Active%20Shooter%20Summit%20Report.pdf

Tocco, Jennifer E. 2015. *Community-Based Approaches to Prevention: A Report on
the 2014 National Summit on Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence.*
Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/Multi-Casualty_Summit3.pdf

TriData Division, System Planning Corporation. 2014. "Aurora Century 16 Theater
Shooting: After Action Report for the City of Aurora." April.
http://www.courts.state.co.us/Media/Opinion_Docs/14CV31595%20After%20Acti
on%20Review%20Report%20Redacted.pdf.

United States Fire Administration, FEMA, U.S. Fire Administration. (2013).
*Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and
Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents* (pp. 1-17). Emmitsburg,
MD: U.S. Fire Administration. https://asprtracie.hhs.gov/technical-
resources/resource/2405/fire-emncy-medical-services-department-operational-
considerations-and-guide-for-active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents

U.S. Department of Justice, FBI. 2013. "A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the
United States Between 2000 and 2013"
file:///C:/Users/Kevin/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb
3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/(U)_ActiveShooter021317_17B_WEB%20(1).P
DF

Vinograd, Cassandra, Alastair Jamieson, Florence Viala, and Alexander Smith. 2015. "Charlie Hebdo Shooting: 12 Killed at Muhammad Cartoons Magazine in Paris." *NBC News*. January 7. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/paris-magazine-attack/charlie-hebdo-shooting-12-killed-muhammad-cartoons-magazine-paris-n281266

Western Region Homeland Security Advisory Council, Franklin Regional Council of Governments. (2017). *Children in Disasters Emergency Preparedness: Family Reunification Plan Template* (pp. 19-J-11). Greenfield, MA: Franklin Regional Council of Governments. http://wrhsac.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Family-Reunification-Plan-Template_FINAL_8-31-17_incl.-appendices-pages-all-portrait.pdf

Warshaw, Andrew L., MD, FACS, FRCSE (Hon) (2015). A systematic response to mass trauma: The public organized first responders, and the American College of Surgeons. *American College of Surgeons Bulletin Supplement, 100* (15), 14-15. https://www.bleedingcontrol.org/~/media/bleedingcontrol/files/compendiumsystematicresponse.ashx

Weireter, Leonard J., MD, FACS & Stewart, Ronald M., MD, FACS. (2015). Role of the American College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma in the care of the inured. *American College of Surgeons Bulletin Supplement, 100* (15), 72-74. https://www.bleedingcontrol.org/~/media/bleedingcontrol/files/compendiumroleacs.ashx

Woodson, Jonathan, MD, FACS. (2015). The military experience and integration with the civilian sector. *American College of Surgeons Bulletin Supplement, 100* (15), 22-23. https://www.bleedingcontrol.org/~/media/bleedingcontrol/files/compendiummilitaryexperience.ashx