

**2018**  
**HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP**

**RESEARCH PRESENTATION**

**OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATION**

**1/c Matthew Nagle,  
United States Coast Guard Academy**

## **Purpose**

**To provide information on research conducted during my 2018 Homeland Security Internship and to provide recommendations for future conduct of the program.**

# Border Studies

UNIVERSITY of **HOUSTON**

# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Border Studies Research

### Tracking Sheet:

BTI Border Studies Research								
Institution of Higher Education	Program Name	Program Description	Program Level	Program Level	Lead Phone Number	Lead Email Address	Program URL	Summary Completed
Center for Inter-American and Border Studies College of Liberal Arts	Graduate Certificate in homeland Security	The Graduate Certificate in Homeland Security is designed for working and mid-career professionals who already hold a baccalaureate or graduate degree and are interested in further professional education in this field. It consists of 15 semester hours of study and includes two required courses and three electives	Graduate	Josiah Heyman	(915) 747 5196	jmheyman@utep.edu	<a href="https://www.utep.edu/liberalarts/cibs/academic-programs/master-s/latin-border-studies.html">https://www.utep.edu/liberalarts/cibs/academic-programs/master-s/latin-border-studies.html</a>	yes
University of Luxembourg, Faculty of Language And Literature, Humanities, Arts And Education (FLSHASE)	Master in Border Studies	The Master in Border Studies provides students with the major concepts and analytical tools to understand the social, cultural, political and economic challenges of border regions and cross-border cooperations. Students gain theoretical knowledge of border problems, border cultures, border literature and constructions of "otherness". Students acquire the needed skills to play a crucial part in the increasing discussions on national and European identities, worldwide mobilities, migration, cultural diversity, citizenship and cross-border cooperation – especially in the Greater Region. Students may specialise in one of the two tracks: spatial track including geography and spatial planning; language and cultural track including cultural studies, literature, linguistics, intercultural communication.	4 semester masters program	Birte Nienaber	(+352) 46 66 44 9318	birte.nienaber@uni.lu	<a href="https://www.uni.lu/studies/flshase/master_in_border_studies">https://www.uni.lu/studies/flshase/master_in_border_studies</a>	yes
Angelo State University	Undergraduate Online Program: Border Security (B.B.S.)	The Bachelor of Border Security (B.B.S.) is meant to increase students' awareness and understanding of current issues in border security within the wider realm of homeland security. Courses will increase your critical thinking and analytical skills across the diverse fields of homeland security, criminal justice, emergency management and associated legal issues.	Undergraduate	Dr. Randy Mullis	325-486-6685	tony.mullis@angelo.edu	<a href="http://www.angelo.edu/online-education/online_degree_programs/border_and_homeland_security_bss.php">http://www.angelo.edu/online-education/online_degree_programs/border_and_homeland_security_bss.php</a>	yes
Presscott College	Border Studies	Border Studies is the study of metaphorical, symbolic, and territorial borders between nations, societies, cultures, and economic systems. Due to the college's location near the U.S.-Mexico border, much of our coursework incorporates issues related to that border, such as the border's dissection of ecosystems and communities, the policing of the border and relationship to militarization, the relationship of border communities to national and international economies, and activism on the border for human rights and justice. We use border studies as a lens to explore broader issues of the politics and practices of state sovereignty and militarism, exile, migration, diaspora, ecotourism, ongoing and "post-" and neo-colonialism, multi-culturalism, subcultures, and xenophobia.	Undergraduate	Zoe Hammer and Ernesto Mireles	(520) 260 2394 and (928) 350 2231			yes

# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## **Border Studies Research**

### **Summary of Results:**

- 14 Programs
  - 8 graduate
  - 6 under-graduate
- Offered under Homeland Security Studies department
- Appear to be concentrated at public universities in southern border states

# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## **Border Studies Research**

### **Value to the Intern:**

- **Increased awareness of post-graduate programs**
- **Developed skills in researching and report writing**
- **Contributed to the productivity of BTI Institute**

**Unified Regional Response  
to a  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack  
(CCTA)**

**FOCUS AREA:  
Operational Communications**

# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## MOI – Operational Communications

**Task:** Complete a ready to publish Memorandum of Implementation for the Operational Communications workshop.

### Results:

*SETRPC Regional Response to a Coordinated Complex Terrorist Attack*

**THE UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON**  
4849 Calhoun Road  
Houston, Texas 77024

September 1, 2018

MEMORANDUM OF IMPLEMENTATION

Subject: CCTA Medical Response Workshop – (September 12-13, 2018)

- Purpose.** To delineate roles and responsibilities in the preparation, support, and conduct of the South East Texas Regional Planning Commission's CCTA Operational Communications Workshop, on September 12-13, 2018, at Montagne Center (Cardinal Room), Lamar University, 4400 S. Martin Luther King, Jr. Parkway, Beaumont, TX 77705.
- Objectives.** Through the conduct of this CCTA Operational Communications, the SETRPC/UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON will seek to:
  - Review lessons learned and best practices from CCTA and Active Shooter incidents both in the United States and world-wide
  - Contribute to development of the SETRPC's Unified Regional Response Plan to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack
  - Identify capability gaps related to preparing for, preventing, and responding to a coordinated Complex Terrorist Attack
  - Identify needed capabilities
  - Develop and/or update plans, annexes, and processes to address identified gaps
- Concept:** The South East Texas Regional Planning Commission (SETRPC), in partnership with the University of Houston, will host a series of two-day workshops over the course of the Spring-Summer 2018, focusing on the functional areas of Public Information, Operational Communications, Intelligence, Medical Response, Medical Response, and Victim and Family Services (Schedule of Workshops at Annex E).

*SETRPC Regional Response to a Coordinated Complex Terrorist Attack*

ANNEX I – (Certificates of Attendance) to CCTA Operational Communications Workshop



**Value to the Intern:** Exposure to the professional publication process.



## Doctrinal Research

**Task:** Conduct research of published information from federal, state, local, tribal entities to compile a list of recommendations relating to Operational Communications.

**Results:**

- 87 ready-to-publish recommendations
  - Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Homeland Security, National Counter Terrorism Center, National Incident Command, InterAgency Board, etc.

**Value to the Intern:** Experience researching policy and familiarization with government doctrine

# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Doctrinal References

Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 2016. "Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook."

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2014. "Crisis Emergency Risk Communication."

Department of Homeland Security. n.d. "Active Shooter Pocket Card."

Department of Homeland Security. 2012. "ICS COMU Implementation and Best Practices: A Guide for Program Development."

Department of Homeland Security. 2016. "National Interoperability Field Operations Guide."

Leadership During the Boston Marathon Bombings: A Qualitative After-Action Review

National Counter Terrorism Center. 2016. "First Responder's Toolbox."

National Incident Command. 2008. "Incident Command System Field Guide."

New York City Police Department. n.d. "Active Shooter Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation."

Police Foundation. 2017. "Managing the Response to a Mobile Mass Shooting A Critical Incident Review of the Kalamazoo, Michigan, Public Safety Response to the February 20, 2016, Mass Shooting Incident."

Rand Corporation. 2017. "Lessons for First Responders on the Front Lines of Terrorism."

SAFE-COMMS. 2011. "Terrorism Crisis Communication Manual."

The InterAgency Board. 2015. "Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response Best Practices by Integrating Law Enforcement, Fire, and EMS."

n.d. "Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack."

## Action Plan

**Task:** Use Doctrinal Review to compile a list of action item recommendations for agencies to employ to improve Operational Communications capabilities, as per official government doctrine.

**Results:**

- 51 ready-to-publish well sourced action recommendations

**Value to the Intern:** Ability to influence policy making and government actions through research

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- Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response, p. 9.
- Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack, p. A-2.
- SAFE-COMMS Terrorism Crisis Communication Manual for Public Authorities, p. 44.
- First Responder's Toolbox, National Counter Terrorism Center.

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## Action Plan Recommendations (Example)

### **Task 2.2 Plan To Establish Face-To-Face Communications Across Agencies.**

**Discussion:** Face-to-face communications should be established at a command center to limit reliance on other communication channels which may tend to fail in the presence of increased traffic. Pair personnel from different agencies together to facilitate face-to-face operational communication and limit the need for other means of communication, which contributes to electronic congestion and has a potential for failure. Runners and radios can also be used in the absence of cellphone communication capabilities.

**Reference:**

*Leadership During the Boston Marathon Bombings: A Qualitative After-Action Review*, p. 4.

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## Action Plan Recommendations

### Task 2.3 Maintain A Crisis Dark Site.

**Discussion:** For crisis communication, preparation of a dedicated 'ready-to-use' dark site is recommended. This site is only activated – i.e. visible to users - if an incident occurs. The dark site is linked to the main site and is generally operated with a content management system as a direct and straightforward method of feeding the site with current information. The primary advantage offered by a dark site is speed. Valuable information and content can be entered in advance; in the event of a crisis, all that needs to be done is the addition of up-to-date information in the pre-prepared areas to transform the dark site into a key information.

#### **References:**

*SAFE-COMMS Terrorism Crisis Communication Manual for Public Authorities*, p. 49.

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*SAFE-COMMS Terrorism Crisis Communication Manual for Public Authorities*, p. 49.

#### **Responsibility:**

**Assisted by:**

**Target Date:**

**Status:**

# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### Task 2.3 Maintain A Crisis Dark Site.

**Discussion:** For crisis communication, preparation of a dedicated 'ready-to-use' dark site is recommended. This site is only activated – i.e. visible to users - if an incident occurs. The dark site is linked to the main site and is generally operated with a content management system as a direct and straightforward method of feeding the site with current information. The primary advantage offered by a dark site is speed. Valuable information and content can be entered in advance; in the event of a crisis, all that needs to be done is the addition of up-to-date information in the pre-prepared areas to transform the dark site into a key information.

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

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**Discussion:** For crisis communication, preparation of a dedicated 'ready-to-use' dark site is recommended. This site is only activated – i.e. visible to users - if an incident occurs. The dark site is linked to the main site and is generally operated with a content management system as a direct and straightforward method of feeding the site with current information. The primary advantage offered by a dark site is speed. Valuable information and content can be entered in advance; in the event of a crisis, all that needs to be done is the addition of up-to-date information in the pre-prepared areas to transform the dark site into a key information

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## Task 2.4 Develop Immediate Information Sharing Triggers Between Public Health Officials And Law Enforcement Officials.

Discussion: Public health and law enforcement are encouraged to notify and involve each other early in a potential investigation of a biological threat, even if it turns out to be a non-criminal event. During a biological threat, certain information or a specific event should trigger the exchange of information between law enforcement and public health. These include: any specimens or samples submitted to public health for analysis that test positive for a potential biological threat-related agent, large numbers of patients with similar symptoms or disease, large numbers of unexplained symptoms, diseases, or deaths, disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution (e.g., tularemia in a non-endemic area), unusual disease presentation (e.g., inhalational vs. cutaneous anthrax), endemic disease with unexplained increase in incidence (e.g., tularemia, plague), death or illness in humans preceded or accompanied by death or illness in animals that is unexplained or attributed to a zoonotic biological agent, unusual “typical patient” distribution (i.e., several adults with an unexplained rash).

## References:

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Discussion: Public health and law enforcement are encouraged to notify and involve each other early in a potential investigation of a threat, even if it turns out to be a non-event. During a biological threat, close exchange of information between law enforcement and public health. This includes any specimens or samples submitted to public health for analysis that test positive for a potential biological threat-related agent. Examples include: a large number of patients with similar symptoms, large numbers of unexplained symptoms, diseases, or deaths, disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution (e.g., tularemia in a non-endemic area), unusual disease presentation (e.g., inhalational vs. cutaneous anthrax), endemic disease with unexplained increase in incidence (e.g., tularemia, plague), death or illness in humans preceded or accompanied by death or illness in animals that is unexplained or attributed to a zoonotic biological agent, unusual "typical patient" distribution (i.e., several adults with an unexplained rash).

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.5 LE Officials Should Immediately Notify Public Health Officials During Certain crises.**

**Discussion:** The following law enforcement observations should result in the automatic notification of public health officials: any intelligence or indication that any individual or group is unlawfully in possession of any biological agent, seizure of bio-processing equipment from any individual, group, or organization, seizure of potential dissemination devices from any individual, group, or organization, identification or seizure of literature pertaining to the development or dissemination of biological agents, any assessments that indicate a credible biological threat exists in an area, a HAZMAT response that involves the presence of biological agents.

#### **References:**

*Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook, FBI/CDC, p. 52.*

**Responsibility:**      **Assisted by:**      **Target Date:**      **Status:**

# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

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#### **References:**

*Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook, FBI/CDC, p. 52.*

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.5 Establish Notification Lines For A Chemical Attack.**

**Discussion:** First responder agencies, including 911 emergency call and dispatch centers, should familiarize themselves with the policies, procedures, and resources within their area of responsibility and make the following notifications in the event of a chemical attack.

Notifications may include chemical agent information, patient signs and symptoms, and number of casualties. Local Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Field Office Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD), Coordinator and Special Agent Bomb Technicians (SABTs) should be notified.

#### **References:**

*First Responder's Toolbox*, National Counter Terrorism Center.

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#### Target Date:

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## **Task 2.6 Establish Plans And Procedures For A Joint Threat Assessment.**

**Discussion:** The purpose of the joint threat assessment is to determine the likelihood of an intentional incident and identify response actions that should be performed by law enforcement and public health. It is recommended that the joint threat assessment be conducted by a conference call and, at a minimum, include the following representatives: Law enforcement (trained in WMD response), Public health (epidemiologist, clinician, laboratorian), Communications (law enforcement and public health). The agenda of the conference call may include: incident briefing by public health, explanation of concern by public health, update on confirmed or suspected cases, demographic information: gender, age, race, ethnicity, occupation, religious affiliation, membership in any groups or associations, description of where patient lives (e.g., urban, rural), patient's recent travel history (e.g., domestic or international), recent activities that may be related to exposure and illness, current laboratory test results, hypotheses regarding

source of exposure, syndromic surveillance: any unusual patterns of disease presentation or geographical clustering of disease. Law enforcement information / intelligence: information on existing threats in the jurisdiction (WMD or otherwise), WMD intelligence that may be connected to patient's exposure (e.g., religious affiliation, group, association), intelligence regarding acquisition or intended use of any biological threat agent, which may be related to the patient's symptoms.

### **References:**

*Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook, FBI/CDC, p. 54.*

### **Responsibility:**

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## **Task 2.6 Establish Plans And Procedures For A Joint Threat Assessment.**

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### Task 2.8 Conduct Tests And Training With Pre-Program Regional Channels On Agency Radios.

**Discussion:** Inter-jurisdictional radio channels including Command, Tactical Response, Medical Response, and Investigations/Intelligence should be tested and trained with on a regular basis.

#### References:

*JCTAWS\* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response*, p. 14.

*Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack*, p. i.

*National Response Framework*, p. 23.

*First Responder's Toolbox*, National Counter Terrorism Center.

*Boston Marathon AAR*, p. 120.

*Aurora AAR*, p. 90.

*National Interoperability Field Operations Guide*, p. 22.

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.9 Invite Telecommunications Providers To Participate In Training Evolutions.**

**Discussion:** Invite telecommunications providers servicing their jurisdictions to participate in drills and exercises that simulate the telecommunications emergency notification and request process.

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*Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack*, p. F-2.

*First Responder's Toolbox*, National Counter Terrorism Center.

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.10 Practice Implementing The Interagency Communications Plan.**

**Discussion:** Test all systems in the Interagency Communications Plan and identify potential problems prior to an incident. Equipment gaps in interoperability may be present and can be discovered in training. Radio “dead zones” may exist within an area of operations and must be detected in advance in order to be adequately prepared for a crisis.

**Reference:**

*Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response*, p. 9, 10, 13, 23.

*Boston Marathon AAR*, p. 120.

*First Responder’s Toolbox*, National Counter Terrorism Center.

*San Bernardino*, p. 115.

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**Discussion:** and identify potential interoperability

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*Improving Acti*

*Boston Marathon*, p. 120.

*First Responder's Toolbox*, National Counter Terrorism Center.

*San Bernardino*, p. 115.

**Responsibility:** **Assisted by:** **Target Date:**

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Communications Plan  
Identify gaps in  
training.

and must be  
for a crisis.

0, 13, 23.

# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### Task 2.10 Practice Implementing The Interagency Communications Plan.

**Discussion:** Test all systems in the Interagency Communications Plan and identify potential problems prior to an incident. Equipment gaps in interoperability may be present and can be discovered in training. Radio “dead zones” may exist within an area of operations and must be detected in advance in order to be adequately prepared for a crisis

#### Reference:

*Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response*, p. 9, 10, 13, 23.

*Boston Marathon AAR*, p. 120.

*First Responder’s Toolbox*, National Counter Terrorism Center.

*San Bernardino*, p. 115.

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.11 Create Realistic Training Simulations.**

**Discussion:** Training should include actual radio/audio recordings of active shooter responses and other training aids to include improvised explosive devices (IED) simulations, markings, precursors, photographs, and videos.

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*Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response*, p. 9, 10, 13, 23.

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.12 Create A Dedicated Tactical Dispatcher.**

**Discussion:** Agencies should develop a tactical dispatcher system that produces a dedicated dispatcher responsible for the operational needs of the incident and tactical commander. Dispatch must maintain a current contact number for the senior tactical advisor and should be clear as to the advisor's role in activating tactical mutual aid agreements (MAAs).

#### **References:**

*Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack*, p. 9.

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.13 Develop A Theoretical Model For Ideal Operational Communications.**

**Discussion:** Have a clear idea of an effective communications system. Ensure the capacity to communicate with both the emergency response community and the affected populations and establish interoperable voice and data communications between local, state, tribal, territorial, and Federal first responders. Re-establish sufficient communications infrastructure within the affected areas to support ongoing life-sustaining activities, provide basic human needs, and transition to recovery.

#### **References:**

*National Response Framework*, p. 23.

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### Task 2.14 Establish Procedures For The Rapid Recall Of Personnel.

**Discussion:** Develop and exercise a series of complex attack response plans that address the quick recall of personnel and the use of communications tools that enable the dispatch center to track and communicate needs to EOCs. Be prepared to obtain all necessary authorizations required to initiate the recall of local and regional tactical teams, who may have a 1-2 hour response time.

#### References:

*JCTAWS\* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*

*Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack*, p. 8, 9.

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.15 Develop Continuity Plans To Mitigate Cellular Degradation.**

**Discussion:** Cellular systems typically become severely overwhelmed during the incident, severely impacting communications and response. The region/jurisdiction should develop communications continuity plans using a diverse set of tools, systems, and applications to mitigate cellular degradation.

#### **References:**

*JCTAWS\* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*

*Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack*, p. A-2.

*Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack*, p. F-2.

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## **Task 2.18 Improve Dispatch Intelligence Collection Through Clear Operator Guidance.**

**Discussion:** Ensure the dispatch obtains answers to the questions: who or what they saw, when they saw it, where it occurred, and why it is suspicious. Active shooter calls should contain information regarding the location of the active shooter, number of shooters, physical description of shooters, number and type of weapons held by shooters, number of potential victims at the location. Ensure follow-ups are conducted with callers to update incident command. Establish guideline for call backs specifically, when to call, who to call, what text to use to convey a sense of emergency, and how acknowledgement is to be obtained from the person.

Dispatchers should ensure that all pertinent information received during an emergency call is documented in the dispatch notes in addition to be broadcast over the radio, even after initial officers arrive on scene. Social media can be used to provide actionable information from institutions and can be a reliable source for the public.

### **Reference:**

*First Responder's Toolbox*, National Counter Terrorism Center.  
*Washington Navy Yard*, p. 71.  
*Aurora AAR*, p. 88.  
*A Critical Incident Review of the Kalamazoo, Michigan, Public Safety Response to the February 20, 2016, Mass Shooting Incident*, p. ii.  
*Leadership During the Boston Marathon Bombings: A Qualitative After-Action Review*, p. 4.  
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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.21 Establish Any Communications Plan According To The Five Phases Of Emergency Communication.**

**Discussion:** The five phases of crisis communication are pre-crisis, initial, maintenance, resolution, evaluation. Each phase should be distinctly reflected in the communications plan. Successful crisis communication management processes rely on the establishment of a fast, reliable flow of information at the internal and external level and required reporting lines to ensure smooth co-ordination.

#### **References:**

*Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication, Center for Disease Control, p. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.*

*SAFE-COMMS Terrorism Crisis Communication Manual for Public Authorities, p. 46.*

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

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**Responsibility:**      **Assisted by:**      **Target Date:**      **Status:**

# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP Action Plan Recommendations

## Task 2.21 Establish Any Communications Plan According To **The Five Phases Of Emergency Communication**

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### Task 2.21 Establish Any Communications Plan According To The Five Phases Of Emergency Communication.

**Discussion:** The five phases of crisis communication are pre-crisis, initial, maintenance, resolution, evaluation. Each phase should be distinctly reflected in the communications plan. Successful crisis communication management processes rely on the establishment of a fast, reliable flow of information at the internal and external level and required reporting lines to ensure smooth co-ordination.

#### References:

*Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication, Center for Disease Control, p. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.*

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.31 Establish Doctrine To Limit Overloading Of Communication Services.**

**Discussion:** Policy should be written to avoid duplicate relaying of information, which can lead to the overwhelming of call takers. In Israel, staff members are trained not to call the hospital while responding to an event so as to avoid overloading the telephone services and the attention span of staff already engaged in event management in the ED.

#### **References:**

*Leadership During the Boston Marathon Bombings: A Qualitative After-Action Review*, p. 4.

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.35 Create Procedures And Obtain Equipment To Re-Direct Or De-Prioritize Non-Emergency Calls.**

**Discussion:** Dispatch must be prepared to transition responsibilities for receiving and authenticating large volumes of information to a dedicated communications center, which has the capacity to handle a significant increase of emergency communications as the response to a MCI progresses. A plan should be in place to divert non-emergency or non-related calls away from the primary communications center, as well as establishing protocols to handle non-emergency calls from family, friends, and media.

### **References:**

*JCTAWS\* Observations in Homeland Preparedness for a Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack*

*Unified Response Framework: Multidiscipline Response to a Complex Terrorist Attack*, p. 8.

*Improving Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response*, p. 14.

*San Bernardino AAR*, p. 115.

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.41 Ensure Dispatch Has The Ability To Receive Text/Picture Messages.**

**Discussion:** Dispatchers have used smartphones to receive critical information from callers during times of high congestion and communications failures. Voice, email, text, picture, video messages can all be used to receive and transmit emergency information. Work arounds, such as the use of smartphones, must be prepared to be utilized in the event of a communications failure.

#### **Reference:**

*A Critical Incident Review of the Kalamazoo, Michigan, Public Safety Response to the February 20, 2016, Mass Shooting Incident*, p. ii.

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Action Plan Recommendations

### **Task 2.48 Ensure Regional Hospitals Have The Capabilities To Communicate With All Responding Aircraft.**

**Discussion:** A hospital must be able to adjust to the possibility of needing to communicate with multiple helicopters carrying patients. Liaisons from agencies with such assets may need to be posted in hospitals to coordinate landings and takeoffs, as well as to close the communications gap between hospitals, first-responders, and medevac assets.

#### **References:**

SETREP Medical Response Workshop, June 26-27.

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# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Synchronization Matrix

**Task:** Complete a “glove box” task list for first responders with limited required training and experience.

**Results:**

SETRPC Unified Regional Response to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack				
SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX - OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS				
	ALERT/NOTIFICATION	LOCATE / ISOLATE THREAT	NEUTRALIZE THREAT	RECOVERY / AFTERMATH
OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	Activate the tactical dispatcher system to begin utilizing tactical response assets. Employ intelligence collection script, identify: <i>Who</i> what the caller saw <i>When</i> the caller saw it <i>Where</i> the incident happened <i>Why</i> it is suspicious <i>Where</i> to call back to Request additional call takers, response may last at a high intensity for a long duration of time.	Re-Direct non-emergency calls to allow for focus on incident response.		
	Obtain briefing from Logistics Section Chief or Service Branch Director. Assess communications system/frequencies in use and advise on communications Implement the Incident Communications Plan Obtain current organizational chart Determine most hazardous tactical activity, ensure adequate communications Make communications assignments to all other Operational elements, including volunteer. Determine Command communications needs Determine support communications needs Establish and post any specific procedures for use of Incident Command Post communications Activate crisis "dark site" to notify public of incident.	Implement effective communications procedures internal and external to the Assess Incident Command Post phone load and request additional lines as needed. Gather feedback from the affected public and correct misunderstandings, rumors, or unclear Ensure those around the incident area are aware that they will need to be processed as potential witnesses, and take steps to inform the public about various road closures and emergency response routes.	Utilize a two-level communications scheme between the Incident Coordination Channel and the On-scene Command Channel.	Make a determination as to whether a biological, chemical, or radiological element was used and notify public health officials if Use pre-determined goals and criteria to judge to effectiveness of the Operational Designate agency spokesperson and convey information with empathy and reassurance to Explain the ongoing cleanup, remediation, recovery, and rebuilding efforts.

**Value to the Intern:** Required application of researched information

# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Synchronization Matrix

<b>OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS UNIT</b>	Obtain briefing from Logistics Section Chief or Service Branch Director.	Implement effective communications procedures internal and external to the	Utilize a two-level communications scheme between the Incident Coordination Channel and the Oc-scene Command Channel.	Make a determination as to whether a biological, chemical, or radiological element was used and notify public health officials if
	Asses communications systems/frequencies in use and advise on communications	Assess Incident Command Post phone load and request additional lines as needed.		Use pre-determined goals and criteria to judge to effectiveness of the Operational
	Implement the Incident Communications Plan	Gather feedback from the affected public and correct misunderstandings, rumors, or unclear		Designate agency spokesperson and convey information with empathy and reassurance to
	Obtain current organizational chart	Ensure those around the incident area are aware that they will need to be processed as		Explain the ongoing cleanup, remediation, recovery, and rebuilding efforts.
	Determine most hazardous tactical activity, ensure adequate communications	potential witnesses, and take steps to		
	Make communications assignments to all other Operational elements, including volunteer,	Inform the public about various road closures and emergency response routes.		
	Determine Command communications needs			
	Determine support communications needs			
	Establish and post any specific procedures for use of Incident Command Post communications			
	Activate crisis "dark site" to notify public of incident.			

# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Synchronization Matrix

		SETRPC Unified Regional Response to a Co SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX - OPERATI <i>As of July 27, 20</i>	
		ALERT/NOTIFICATION	LOCATE / ISOLATE THREAT
<b>COMMUNICATIONS</b>	<b>DISPATCH / 9-1-1</b>	Activate the tactical dispatcher system to begin utilizing tactical response assets.	Re-Direct non-emergency calls to allow for focus on incident response.
		Employ intelligence collection script, identify:	
		Who/what the caller saw	
		When the caller saw it	
		Where the incident happened	
		Why it is suspicious	
		Where to call back to	
		Request additional call takers, response may last at a high intensity for a long duration of time.	

## **CCTA Workshops**

- Medical Response Workshop: (June 26-27)
  - Beaumont, Texas
- Intelligence Workshop: (July 17-18)
  - Beaumont, Texas

**READ FILE:  
DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen**


# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Read File: DHS Sec. Nielsen


> DHS-Secretary\_Kirstjen-Nielsen

Name ↑ ☰ ⋮


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 Nielsen\_Bio.docx ☆ ⋮


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 Nielsen\_Blog\_ICE-Director-Homan\_30APR18.docx ☆ ⋮


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 Nielsen\_Press-Release\_Cyber-Security\_20FEB18.docx ☆ ⋮


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 Nielsen\_Press-Release\_Family-Separation\_18JUN18.docx ☆ ⋮


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 Nielsen\_Press-Release\_Honduras\_7JUN18.docx ☆ ⋮

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 Nielsen\_Press-Release\_Israel-Netanyahu\_13JUN18.docx ☆ ⋮

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 Nielsen\_Press-Release\_Israel-Terrorism\_12JUN18.docx ☆ ⋮



**READ FILE:  
ICE Director Thomas Homan**




# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Read File: DHS Sec. Nielsen


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
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# Recommendations for Future Internships

UNIVERSITY of **HOUSTON**

## **Recommendations**



- Inclusion of gym membership
- Civilian interns
- Interns from other academies
- Trip to Natural Sciences Museum
- Housing closer to dinning facilities/technology building

**The BTI Institute  
Homeland Security Internship Program**

**A Personal Perspective**

UNIVERSITY of **HOUSTON**

# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP My Experience



# 2018 HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNSHIP

## Background

- **Time of Internship:** June 18<sup>th</sup> – July 27<sup>th</sup>
- **Focus Area:** Operational Communications
- **Major at USCGA:** Government, International Relations
- **Interests:** Foreign policy, international law, diplomacy
- **Motivations:** Saving the world



**1/c Matthew Nagle**  
**USCGA 2019**  
**Home Town:** Berwyn,  
Pennsylvania

# Comments / Discussion

**Thank you!**

**Matthew Nagle**

U.S. Coast Guard Academy

2018 BTI Institute Homeland Security Intern

UNIVERSITY of **HOUSTON**